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CONTRACT INTERPRETATION IN
CALIFORNIA: PLAIN MEANING, PAROL
EVIDENCE AND USE OF THE "JUST
RESULT" PRINCIPLE
Harry G. Prince*
In reaching a just and fair result in this case, does it matter that,
personally, one might not like the plaintiffs? The city is doing a won-
derful thing-it uses, or it proposes to use the land for a park. Should
that play a role here, or is the sole issue before the court what is the fair
result reached under principles of law?1
As [opposing counsel] so quaintly pointed out in his reply brief,
this case is about title, it's not about virtue. We're glad they agree.2
I. INTRODUCTION
A steady stream of cases involving contract interpretation issues
emanates from the California courts. In addition to a large number
of insurance contract cases,3 the interpretation disputes address many
other interesting agreements, including a contract for development of
Hard Rock Cafes in the United States years before the restaurants
began to enjoy tremendous success, 4 a deed involving contested
* Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
The author wishes to thank Chandani Sil, Brian P. Davis, Michael J. Hudelson,
and Paula F. Rankin for their research assistance.
1. Scott Graham, Bounty Hunters, Robber Barons and the High Court, THE
RECORDER, Feb. 23, 1996, at 1 (quoting California Supreme Court Justice Joyce
Kennard in oral arguments of City of Manhattan Beach v. Superior Court, at 13
Cal. 4th 232, 267, 914 P.2d 160, 183, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 82, 105 (1996) (Kennard, J.,
dissenting)).
2. Id. (quoting Joseph Dzida, attorney for plaintiff heirs, challenging sale of
land from railway to the city in oral arguments of City of Manhattan Beach, at 13
Cal. 4th 232,914 P.2d 160,52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 82).
3. The insurance cases invariably involve similar questions of contract inter-
pretation, although in varied contexts, and discuss whether a policy covers a par-
ticular incident. The insurance cases also involve somewhat specialized rules.
See infra notes 74-86 and accompanying text.
4. See Okun v. Morton, 203 Cal. App. 3d 805, 809, 250 Cal. Rptr. 220, 222
(1988), discussed infra Part III.A.
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ownership of railway right-of-way land located in the Los Angeles
suburb of Manhattan Beach and worth as much as $100 million some
one hundred years after the deed's execution,5 and an employment
agreement to pay singer Peggy Lee for speaking and singing per-
formances for the very popular Disney animated film Lady and The
Tramp almost thirty years before the development of video cassettes
as a popular method of distribution.6
These cases illustrate the inherent difficulties that courts face in
identifying the parties' intent through the rules of contract interpre-
tation, and the likelihood that courts often seek to impose a "just re-
sult" in such cases. A cursory examination of City of Manhattan
Beach v. Superior Court,7 a recent California Supreme Court case, re-
veals the difficulties of interpreting contracts and the court's imposi-
tion of a "just result" when parties have not expressed any discover-
able intent as to a particular, probably unforeseen, situation.
In 1887 the Redondo Land Company ("Land Company") pur-
chased a parcel of land located primarily in the present-day Los An-
geles suburb of Manhattan Beach. The next year the company con-
veyed an interest in a portion of the property to the Redondo Beach
Railway ("Railway") for "construction, maintenance and operation
of a Steam Railroad... .9 The wording of the conveyance did not
5. See City of Manhattan Beach v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 4th 232, 914 P.2d
160, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 82 (1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 511 (1996), discussed infra
Part III.B.
6. See Lee v. Walt Disney Co., No. B058897 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 1992)
(unpublished opinion), cerL denied, 1992 Cal. LEXIS 6172 (Dec. 16, 1992), dis-
cussed infra Part III.C.
7. 13 Cal. 4th 232, 914 P.2d 160, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 82 (1996).
8. See id. at 234, 914 P.2d at 162, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 84. The original action
also challenged a similar transfer of land from Santa Fe to the adjacent city of
Hermosa Beach, but the trial court determined that the land transfer from the
Land Company in Hermosa Beach precluded any claim by the company's heirs.
See Kim Kowsky, Judge Switches Again on Who Owns Railroad Right of Way,
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1993, at B3.
9. City of Manhattan Beach, 13 Cal. 4th at 236, 914 P.2d at 163,52 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 85. The deed read in part:
That said parties of the First part [Land Company and Charles Silent]
for and in consideration of the sum of One Dollar to them in hand paid
by said party of the Second part [Railway], the receipt of whicb is
hereby acknowledged do by these presents remise, release and
quit-claim unto said party of the second part the right-of-way for the
construction, maintenance and operation of a Steam Railroad, upon
over and along the following tract and parcel of land, situated, lying and
being in the County of Los Angeles, State of California ....
Id. at 250-51, 914 P.2d at 172, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 94 (Mosk, J., concurring and dis-
senting). The language of the conveyance is set out more fully infra note 402.
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precisely state whether the Land Company intended to grant a fee
simple interest or to confer an easement."0 The motivation of the
grantors, however, was clear. Manhattan Beach was not easily ac-
cessible at the time and the developers realized that the operation of
the railway would make the land more marketable. Thus, for the
price of one dollar, the Land Company intended to give at least such
interest in the land as the operation of the railroad would require.'
The deed contained a number of express conditions effectively con-
cerning short-term operation of the railroad, with a provision that the
failure to comply with the conditions would cause reversion of the in-
terest in the land back to the grantors.' It did not, however, include
explicit provisions addressing the long-term disposition of the prop-
erty.
True to the Land Company's wishes, the Redondo Beach Rail-
way and its successors operated the railway and facilitated the devel-
opment of Manhattan Beach and nearby areas. In 1982, however, the
last railway successor, the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway
Company ("Santa Fe"), discontinued operation of rail services 4 and
sold the property to the City of Manhattan Beach in 1986 for $4.2
million and other consideration."5 The city converted the property
10. See id. at 235, 914 P.2d at 162,52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 84.
11. See id. at 248, 914 P.2d at 171, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 93; see also James
Rainey, Descendants File Suit Seeking Title to Railroad Right of Way in 2 Cities,
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1988, at 6 (indicating that developers who founded the
Land Company knew that holdings would increase in value if a railroad came to
the area).
12. See City of Manhattan Beach, 13 Cal. 4th at 236, 914 P.2d at 163, 52 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 85.
13. See id. The express conditions required maintaining convenient crossings
for access to adjacent property, culverts for water drainage, and a warehouse at a
specified location. The deed explicitly provided that noncompliance with any of
these conditions would cause "said right of way to revert" to grantors and their
successors in interest. Id. at 251, 914 P.2d at 173, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 95 (Mosk, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
14. See id. at 237, 914 P.2d at 163, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 85; see also Hugo Mar-
tin, Hermosa Beach Agrees to Buy Santa Fe Right of Way Property for $75 Mil-
lion, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1988, at 8 (explaining that the railway became obsolete
as the coastal area became more residential and commercial centers and heavy
industry moved to other areas).
15. The city gave Santa Fe $4.2 million in cash and title to other land worth
$800,000. See Dean Murphy, Cost of Coveted Railway Land Raises Doubts in
Manhattan, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1986, at 1. The City also agreed to rezone a 2.1-
acre portion of the railroad right-of-way retained by Santa Fe for commercial
use, worth an estimated developmental value of $5 million, bringing the city's to-
tal purchase price to $10 million. See id. Because of questions concerning Santa
Fe's title to the property, Santa Fe agreed to indemnify the city for five years
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into a park with a jogging path.6 Using the property as public open
space seemed like a fine resolution until two "hobbyist heir hunters"
located heirs of the Land Company and initiated a lawsuit in 1987
challenging the ability of Santa Fe to convey the property.17 The
heirs' theory was that the grant to the Railway in 1888 was not a fee
simple but only an easement or right-of-way which terminated with
the cessation of railway services.'8 Thus, the heirs argued the prop-
erty belonged to them and they should be compensated for the con-
demnation of the property at a value claimed to be as much as $100
million.9
City of Manhattan Beach ostensibly turned on both an accurate
interpretation of the deed, which in California would be interpreted
in the same manner as other contracts, and the proper use of extrinsic
evidence in that process.o The trial court agreed with the heirs of the
Land Company that the proper interpretation of the deed revealed
the conveyance of only a conditional easement to the railway.2' Thus,
the trial court found Santa Fe and the city liable for inverse condem-
nation and indicated that the amount of damages would be deter-
mined in subsequent proceedings.' In an interlocutory appeal of the
against any legal action over title to the property. See id. at I (also including in-
formation about the land sale).
16. See Kim Kowsky, Judge Reverses Ruling, Gives City Full Title to 21-Acre
Park, L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 26, 1993, at B3. The park is situated between two major
northbound and southbound thoroughfares and is one of the few open spaces
within Manhattan Beach city.
17. See City of Manhattan Beach, 13 Cal. 4th at 236 n.1, 914 P.2d at 162 n.1, 52
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 84 n.1. The heir hunters, John P. Farquhar and Ricardo B. John-
son, apparently succeeded in locating over 80 alleged heirs. See id. Heirs were
found from as far away as Rhode Island and Maine. See Kowsky, supra note 8,
at B3. The heir hunters financed the litigation in exchange for one-half of any
recovery. See Kowsky, supra note 16, at B3.
18. See Kowsky, supra note 16, at B3.
19. See id. Another report indicated that the property value had risen to be-
tween $8 million and $70 million. See Graham, supra note 1, at 1.
20. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1856(h) (West 1983). The parol evidence
rule reads: "As used in this section, the term agreement includes deeds and wills,
as well as contracts between parties." Id. See also In re Marriage of Iberti, 55
Cal. App. 4th 1434, 1439, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 766, 769 (1997) (holding that marital
settlement agreements are generally construed under rules governing contracts);
Machado v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 233 Cal. App. 3d 347, 352, 284 Cal. Rptr.
560, 563 (1991) (grant of real property is to be interpreted in the same manner as
any other contract).
21. See City of Manhattan Beach, 13 Cal. 4th at 238, 914 P.2d at 164, 52 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 86.
22. See id. The trial court trifurcated the proceedings, first addressing the in-
terpretation issue and leaving for subsequent proceedings the question of heir-
ship and damages. The trial court decided the interpretation issue and also de-
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title issue only, the intermediate court of appeal upheld the trial
court's interpretation of the deed.2 The California Supreme Court,
however, found itself bitterly divided over the issue, with only a bare
majority of four justices reversing the trial and intermediate appellate
courts, based upon a finding that the deed granted a fee simple to the
Railway and its successors that allowed the valid sale to the city some
one hundred years later. 4 Three dissenting justices asserted that the
deed was properly interpreted to convey only an easement and that
the transfer to the city was inconsistent with the 1888 conveyance.
"
The sharp but close division within the court accurately reflects the
immense difficulty often surrounding contract interpretation and
construction.
California law rather consistently states that the primary objec-
tive in interpreting a contract is to "ascertain and carry out the inten-
tion of the parties."'' The majority of the supreme court in City of
Manhattan Beach concluded that the deed itself was unresolvably
ambiguous and therefore resorted to extrinsic evidence-primarily
subsequent conduct of the grantors-to conclude that the parties in-
tended to confer the property in fee simple to the railway.' The dis-
senting justices, on the other hand, concluded that the deed did not
cided that Santa Fe and the city were jointly liable. See id. The trial court also
determined the question of heirship but did not reach the issue of damages be-
fore the supreme court agreed to hear the appeal and reversed the decision on
liability. See Kowsky, supra note 16, at B3.
23. See City of Manhattan Beach, 35 Cal. App. 4th 359, 365, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d
206, 208 (1994). The city had previously appealed the interpretation issue and
the California Supreme Court had issued an order that the trial judge needed to
explain or reverse his decision. After the trial judge reaffirmed his decision on
the interpretation issue, the city brought the appeal decided in the case at hand.
See id.
24. See City of Manhattan Beach, 13 Cal. 4th at 249-50, 914 P.2d at 172, 52
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 94.
25. See id. at 250-68, 914 P.2d at 172-84, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 94-106 (Mosk, J.,
concurring and dissenting; Kennard, J., dissenting).
26. See id. at 238, 914 P.2d at 164, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 86; see also Machado,
233 Cal. App. 3d at 352, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 563 (stating that the court must put it-
self in the position of the parties to ascertain intent at the time of contracting).
Note, however, that Justice Mosk might disagree that the parties' intent is most
important. He emphasizes the public notice aspect, especially with deeds, sug-
gesting that courts might be obligated to give application to the objective mean-
ing of the language even in the face of substantial evidence that the parties
shared a different subjective meaning. See City of Manhattan Beach, 13 Cal. 4th
at 252-53, 914 P.2d at 173-74, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 95-96 (Mosk, J., concurring and
dissenting).
27. See City of Manhattan Beach, 13 Cal. 4th at 235, 914 P.2d at 162, 52 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 84.
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present any ambiguity that could not be resolved by looking solely
within the four corners of the document.' Thus, the dissenters con-
cluded that extrinsic evidence should not have been used.29 Moreo-
ver, the dissenters viewed the extrinsic evidence as supporting, if any-
thing, the finding of only an easement.'
More significant than its treatment of the general contract inter-
pretation rules, City of Manhattan Beach reflects a fundamental divi-
sion among the justices of the California Supreme Court-indeed
among judges at all levels of the court system-about the ability to
decipher the parties' intent by looking solely at the writing. As a re-
lated matter, the case presents one of a number of scenarios wherein
the search for the parties' intent, either within the four corners of the
document or even among the extrinsic evidence, is likely to be a fu-
tile pursuit. The court's failure to recognize the improbability of
knowing the parties' actual intent avoids confrontation with the im-
portant question of what a court should do in that circumstance, par-
ticularly when the contract has been performed to such an extent that
it is impossible to unwind the transaction and return the parties to
status quo ante.31 One possible answer, which finds support in the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts and the California rules for con-
tract interpretation, is that the court should consider what is known
about the contracting parties' purpose and objectives in its attempt to
identify what term the parties would have agreed upon.32 The Re-
statement (Second) also suggests a second possibility for resolving
such an "indecipherable intent" case: that the court may be guided
by a "sense of justice."33 This Article asserts that a search for a just
28. See idt at 262, 267, 914 P.2d at 180, 183, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 102, 105 (Mosk,
J., concurring and dissenting; Kennard, J., dissenting).
29. See id. (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting; Kennard, J., dissenting.
30. See id. (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting; Kennard, J., dissenting).
31. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 204 cmt. b (1981). For a
number of reasons, parties may fail to make an express provision:
The parties to an agreement may entirely fail to foresee the situation
whichlater arises and gives rise to a dispute; they then have no expecta-
tions with respect to that situation, and a search for their meaning with
respect to it is fruitless. Or they may have expectations but fail to mani-
fest them, either because the expectation rests on an assumption which
is unconscious or only partly conscious, or because the situation seems
to be unimportant or unlikely, or because discussion of it might be un-
pleasant or might produce delay or impasse.
Id.
32. See id. § 204 cmt. d (suggesting that courts may ascertain what term the
parties would have used if the issue had been addressed in the writing); infra text
accompanying note 370.
33. See id. (stating that where no agreement exists in fact, the court should
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result would take into account all equities of the case, including such
factors as the status of the parties, the risk of out-of-pocket loss or
windfall gain, whether either party has engaged in culpable or meri-
torious behavior, and any public interests at stake.' Indeed, the "just
result" principle may best explain why a majority of the supreme
court decided against imposing millions of dollars of liability upon
the City of Manhattan Beach for the benefit of "heir hunters" and
heirs dispersed across the country who would not have pursued the
litigation on their own initiative."
Some commentators have accepted, if not altogether embraced,
the idea that at times courts simply search for a just result in pursuing
questions of contract interpretation. As stated in a leading contracts
textbook:
It is obvious.., that there is no unanimity as to the content
of the parol evidence rule or the process called interpreta-
tion, and that the rules are complex, technical and difficult
to apply. It would, however, be a mistake to suppose that
the courts follow any of these rules blindly, literally or con-
sistently. As often as not they choose the standard or the
rule that they think will give rise to a just result in the par-
ticular case. We have also seen that often under a guise of
interpretation a court will actually enforce its notions of
"public policy" which is "nothing more than an attempt to
do justice."36
supply a term consistent with standards of fairness).
34. See infra Part III.
35. See Kowsky, supra note 16, at B3 (quoting Manhattan Beach City Man-
ager Bill Smith stating that the city had operated under the fear of bankruptcy if
it had to pay damages of $100 million; also quoting the heirs stating that they
were happy to let Farquhar and Johnson bear the expense of pressing their
claim).
36. JoHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACrS §
3-16 (3d ed. 1987) (citations omitted); see also E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH,
CONTRACrS § 7.16 (2d ed. 1990) (If the parties failed to foresee a situation, "it is
often naive to assume that a court can determine how the parties would have
dealt with it ...." Moreover, there is the possibility that the parties might have
agreed to an uneven term because of an imbalance in bargaining power; thus,
courts should impose a term derived from "basic principles of justice."); Michael
B. Metzger, The Parol Evidence Rule: Promissory Estoppel's Next Conquest?, 36
VAND. L. REv. 1383, 1401-02 (1983) (suggesting that courts depart from official
statements of the parol evidence rule to achieve fair results).
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Sections 204 and 20738 of the Restatement (Second) offer at least
limited support for the just result principle.
Other California cases reveal a number of areas in which the
rules governing contract interpretation and construction are fraught
with apparent inconsistencies. City of Manhattan Beach, in addition
to raising the possibility of a gap in the contract terms, highlights a
perplexing conflict within California law: the tension between the
maxim that contract interpretation should be based on the plain
meaning of its terms as determined by looking solely within the four
corners of the document, and the principle that courts should resort
to extrinsic evidence to better understand the bargaining context and
intent of the parties. Other areas of concern include the proper ap-
plication of the parol evidence rule's exclusion from the contract
terms that are left out of a final writing and the proper relation of
implied terms to the express terms of the agreement.
This Article first undertakes a succinct review of the principles
of contract interpretation and construction within California. Part II
then narrows its focus, discussing the three specific problem areas
indicated above: the plain meaning rule,39 the parol evidence rule, °
and the use of implied terms, such as trade usage and customs, in
conjunction with final writings." Finally, Part III examines a number
of cases where courts use the normal maxims of interpretation as a
cover for actually applying the just result principle in construing the
contract. The judicial search for a just result takes place in such re-
cent cases as Okun v. Morton,42 City of Manhattan Beach,43 and Lee v.
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRAcrs § 204 (1981) (regarding courts
supplying an omitted essential term): When the parties to a bargain sufficiently
defined to be a contract have not agreed with respect to a term which is essential
to a determination of their rights and duties, a term which is reasonable in the
circumstances is supplied by the court. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying
text.
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrS § 207 (1981): In choosing
among the reasonable meanings of a promise or agreement or a term thereof, a
meaning that serves the public interest is generally preferred. See id. The sole
comment to section 207 provides in part: "The rule [favoring the public] ... rests
more on considerations of public policy than on the probable intention of the
parties." Id. at cmt. a.
39. See infra Part ll.B.
40. See infra Part II.C.
41. See infra Part I.D.
42. 203 Cal. App. 3d 805, 250 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1988); see infra Part III.A.
43. No. B058897 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 1992) (unpublished opinion), cert.
denied, 1992 Cal. LEXIS 6172 (Dec. 16, 1992); see infra Part III.B.
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Walt Disney Co.44 This latter discussion will also identify the proper
limits for application of the just result principle. 5
II. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION
This radio broadcast may not be publicized, reproduced, or oth-
erwise utilized for Public or Commercial purposes without the express
written consent of KNBR and the San Francisco Giants Baseball
Club.' That means that any consent has to be written and that it must
be sent by some express form of delivery.'
Courts faced with an alleged breach of contract first must iden-
tify all of the contract terms, express and implied, which constitute
the parties' total obligations. The express terms may be entirely oral,
entirely written in one or more documents, or may be partly oral and
44. 13 Cal. 4th 232, 914 P.2d 160, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 82 (1996); see infra Part
III.C.
45. This discussion might well be categorized as a question of the courts'
application of a "default rule" when the parties have failed to expressly provide
for a particular situation within the contract. Default rule analysis has become a
frequent writing topic among academics. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, The Sound
of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 VA. L. REv. 821 (1992);
Dennis Patterson, The Pseudo-Debate over Default Rules in Contract Law, 3 S.
CAL. INTERDIsC. L.J. 235 (1993). Nonetheless, the default rule analysts have en-
gendered some criticism. See, e.g., N. David Slawson, The Futile Search for
Principles for Default Rules, 3 S. CAL. INTERDIsC. L.J. 29 (1993) (suggesting that
the analysis adds nothing, other than a new phrase for the arena, to the issue of
courts providing terms when a contract is silent).
Professor Lisa Bernstein characterized the perspectives of the writers in
the default rule analysis discussion as falling into four areas: hypothetical bar-
gain, economic theory, consent theory, and relational theory. See Lisa Bernstein,
Social Norms and Default Rules Analysis, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 59 (1993).
The hypothetical bargain approach focuses on what the parties might have
agreed to if they had addressed the issue; the economists generally argue that de-
fault rules should be set so as to maximize efficiency; the consent theory empha-
sizes parties' manifestations of consent as a basis for deriving default rules; and
the relational theory focuses on the need to preserve relationships by balancing
the interests of the parties. See id. Although default rule analysis and terminol-
ogy do not shape the scope of this Article, such principles might well lead to
similar results as those produced by the more traditional analysis contained in
this Article.
46. Disclaimer (KNBR 680 AM radio broadcast, May, 1995) (standard dis-
claimer as read by San Francisco Giants Baseball Club radio announcer, Hank
Greenwald, during every San Francisco Giants game broadcast) (on file with
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
47. Paraphrase of editorial comments by Hank Greenwald made during May
1995, poking fun at the baseball club's standard disclaimer.
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partly written." Courts may also determine that some terms are im-
plicit from facts or law, including terms derived from usage of trade
and the like,49 in addition to those terms expressly made part of the
agreement." Courts often face difficult questions when the parties
have placed many of the express terms in a final writing and at least
one party asserts that additional express terms exist either in what
the parties said orally or in earlier writings. Whether to allow extrin-
sic evidence to "supplement" or add terms beyond the final writing
most clearly invokes the dreaded "parol evidence rule."51
A related issue is the degree to which the courts will recognize
terms, implicit in the facts or implied as a matter of law, to supple-
ment any written or oral express terms.5 2 The Restatement (Second)
approach does not draw a line between express and implied-in-fact
terms, the latter merely being those agreed to by conduct rather than
by words or fairly inferred from the words used. 3 Implied-in-law
48. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 4 (1981).
49. See U.C.C. §§ 1-205, 2-208 (1995) (defining usage of trade, course of
dealing and course of performance). Parties may assume that practices are in-
corporated into an agreement if trade practices within an industry or a relevant
market are widely adopted and known. Course of dealing concerns prior trans-
actions of a similar type between the same two parties that may be deemed to
demonstrate a common understanding between the parties as to later transac-
tions. Course of performance concerns circumstances in which a contract pres-
ents multiple opportunities of performance by one or more parties. The per-
formance rendered and accepted may be deemed as evidence of the parties'
understanding of the contract from the beginning or may reflect a waiver or
modification of original terms. See id.
50. A distinction exists between contract construction and contract interpre-
tation. The term "construction" refers more precisely to the legal effect that
courts will give to a contract under relevant rules of law; "interpretation" refers
more accurately to the process of assigning meaning to the contract terms once
identified. The legal effect or construction, however, may not be determined ex-
clusively by the parties' intent. Ultimately, the courts, the Restatement (Second),
and the writers do not emphasize this theoretical difference. See CALAMARI &
PERILLO, supra note 36, § 3-9; FARNSWORTH, supra note 36, § 7.7.
51. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 36, § 7.2 ("One writer, with some hyper-
bole, has said that '[flew things [in our law] are darker than this or fuller of subtle
difficulties."' (quoting James B. Thayer, The "Parol Evidence" Rule, 6 HARv. L.
REV. 325 (1893))); Justin Sweet, Contract Making and Parol Evidence: Diagnosis
and Treatment of a Sick Rule, 53 CORNELL L. REv. 1036, 1036-37, (1968) (Parol
evidence rule is a maze of conflicting tests, subrules, and exceptions adversely
affecting both the counseling of clients and the litigation process.).
52. See infra Part II.C.
53. Section 4, comment a of the Restatement (Second) states that express and
implied contracts do not differ in legal effect but merely in whether assent is
manifested by words or conduct. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRAcrs §
4 cmt. a (1981).
An implied term may also be fairly drawn from the express terms under
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terms, on the other hand, can be more problematic. More specifi-
cally, the difficulties with such terms arise when one of the parties as-
serts an implied-in-law term that arguably conflicts with either an ex-
press term within the writing or a purported collateral term that was
left out of the final writing. In theory, the implied-in-law term should
clearly yield to a contrary express term of the contract because courts
generally use implied-in-law terms to fill in gaps in the agreement.'
One can argue, however, that courts should avoid finding conflict be-
tween express terms included in a final writing and implied-in-law
terms, especially when such terms are derived from usage of trade or
course of dealing. 5 What to do with an implied term that conflicts
with a purported collateral term omitted from a final writing depends
on the validity of the collateral term. Theoretically, if the court finds
the collateral term to have constituted part of the agreement of the
parties, the term should prevail over a conflicting term that would
have been implied. Moreover, the fact that a term would have been
implied by law may tremendously affect a court's assessment of
whether the parties did, in fact, agree to the purported collateral
term.56
After identifying all of the contract terms, the courts addressing
alleged breaches of contract must interpret the terms. Simply stated,
the process of interpretation determines what meaning to assign to
the terms that make up the contract. The process of interpretation is
integral to ascertaining what performances or obligations the parties
owe. Only after interpretation can the courts determine whether a
party has failed to perform in a way that would constitute a breach
the given circumstances. For example, if a customer requests a local firewood
company to deliver firewood on Saturday and expressly promises to pay $100,
the facts imply that the customer will make payment upon delivery unless special
circumstances, such as a course of dealing, suggest some other arrangement. See
id. § 234.
54. But see Nanakuli Paving and Rock Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 664 F.2d 772, 783
n.16, 794-96 (9th Cir. 1981) (suggesting that express terms in the sale of goods
context might yield to implied terms derived from usage of trade or course of
dealing).
55. See infra text accompanying notes 333-52 for discussion of Hayter Truck-
ing v. Shell Western E&P, Inc., 18 Cal. App. 4th 1, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 229 (1993).
56. For a good example, see infra Part III.C.1, discussing Masterson v. Sine,
68 Cal.2d 222, 436 P.2d 561, 65 Cal. Rptr. 545 (1968). Briefly stated, the law
would have implied a term that an option to repurchase property was freely as-
signable. One party alleged that a collateral term was omitted from the writing
that would have made the option nonassignable. The fact that the free assign-
ability term would have been implied by law supports the argument that the par-
ties should have placed a contrary term in the final writing rather than omitting
it.
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and therefore cause liability in the absence of a recognizable excuse.57
Frequently, courts, including those in California, will state their
preference for interpreting the contract by looking solely to the final
writing, if one exists." This method, the plain meaning approach,
would bar extrinsic evidence in this second step of assigning meaning
to contract terms, just as the parol evidence rule may bar extrinsic
evidence in the first step of deciding what terms make up the con-
tract.59 Just as often as courts embrace the plain meaning rule, how-
ever, the same courts-or perhaps a dissenting judge within the same
opinion-may endorse and apply a contextual approach to contract
interpretation that freely uses extrinsic evidence.' These equivocal
messages thus may cause confusion concerning the law that governs
contract interpretation generally, and in California in particular.
57. The failure to render performance when due may be excused, of course,under a legally recognized doctrine such as mistake or impracticability. See
FARNSWORTH, supra note 36, § 9.1. Parties may also be legitimately excusedfrom apparent contractual obligations because of some fault in the formation
process, such as lack of capacity, misrepresentation, or duress. See id. § 4.1.58. See, e.g., S. Kornreich & Sons, Inc. v. Genesis Ins. Co., 56 Cal. App. 4th407,417,65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 418,423 (1997) (holding that insurance policy should begiven its plain and ordinary meaning); Miscione v. Barton Dev. Co., 52 Cal. App.4th 1320, 1326, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 284 (1997) (stating that "the rules of inter-pretation of written contracts are for the purpose of ascertaining the meaning ofthe words used therein . . . .") (citations omitted); Machado v. Southern Pac.Transp. Co., 233 Cal. App. 3d 347, 352-53, 284 Cal. Rptr. 560, 563 (1991) (statingthat court should first attempt to derive parties' intent from the plain meaning ofwords before resorting to rules of construction). But see Margaret N. Kniffin, ANew Trend in Contract Interpretation: The Search for Reality as Opposed to Vir-tual Reality, 74 OR. L. REv. 643 (1995) (suggesting that the plain meaning rule is
falling increasingly into disfavor).
59. See Arthur L. Corbin, The Interpretation of Words and the Parol Evidence
Rule, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 161, 161-62 (1965) (noting the tendency of courts to oftenstate, if not follow, the rule that a court must find written words ambiguous be-fore it can admit extrinsic evidence to aid in contract interpretation if the written
words themselves are plain and clear).
60. See, e.g., Waller v. Truck Ins. Exch., 11 Cal. 4th 1, 900 P.2d 619, 44 Cal.Rptr. 2d 370 (1995) (applying contextual approach; dissent argues that plainmeaning rule is more appropriate standard); In re Marriage of Iberti, 55 Cal.App. 4th 1434, 1439-40, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 766, 769 (1997) (reiterating that extrinsicevidence is only admissible to prove a meaning to which the contract is reasona-bly susceptible); Department of Indus. Relations v. UI Video Stores, Inc., 55 Cal.App. 4th 1084, 1094-95, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 457, 463 (1997) (applying contextual ap-proach to interpretation of settlement agreement between Blockbuster Videoand governmental agency over unpaid wages and benefits); Curry v. Moody, 40Cal. App. 4th 1547, 1552, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 627, 630 (1995) (stating that court isnot limited to contract language in determining meaning of contract); see also,e.g., Corbin, supra note 59, at 161-63 (noting the common practice of courts to
cite to the plain meaning rule and then deviate from its application).
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A. California Rules for Contract Interpretation
Both the California Civil Code and court opinions reflect the
fundamental goal of contract interpretation for California courts: to
identify and give effect to the expressed mutual intention of the par-
ties. " In deriving the mutual intent of the parties, the California Su-
preme Court continues to state, relying on the California Civil Code,
that contractual language that is clear and explicit must govern the
interpretation of the contract.6 2 Giving such priority to the facial
meaning of the written contract appears to embody the plain mean-
ing rule, which will be discussed below as a source of confusion within
California law on contract interpretation.6
Other principles reinforce the priority given to the writing. First,
courts must try to avoid ambiguity by construing the written language
in the context of the instrument and the pertinent circumstances, and
courts should not deem a writing ambiguous as an abstract or hypo-
thetical matter.6 Moreover, the California courts often have phrased
the interpretation rules in a manner that suggests that a court should
examine extrinsic evidence only if there is patent ambiguity in the
express terms.' The plain meaning rule has persisted in the courts
despite key California Supreme Court decisions and California Code
of Civil Procedure section 1856, modified in 1978 to reflect those key
judicial developments, which clearly discredit the rule.66
61. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1636 (West 1985); Bank of the West v. Superior
Court, 2 Cal. 4th 1254, 1264-65, 833 P.2d 545, 552, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 538, 545
(1992); Golden West Baseball Co. v. City of Anaheim, 25 Cal. App. 4th 11, 21, 31
Cal. Rptr. 2d 378,385 (1994).
62- See CAL. CIv. CODE § 1638; City of El Cajon v. El Cajon Police Officers'
Ass'n, 49 Cal. App. 4th 64,71,56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 723,727 (1996); Bank of the West,
2 Cal. 4th at 1264-65, 833 P.2d at 552, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 545.
63. See discussion infra Part II.B.
64. See Bank of the West, 2 Cal. 4th at 1265, 833 P.2d at 552, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 545 (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 1641).
65. See, e.g., Powers v. Dickson, Carlson & Campillo, 54 Cal. App. 4th 1102,
1111, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 261, 266 (1997) ("'Under the parol evidence rule, extrinsic
evidence is not admissible to contradict express terms in a written contract or to
explain what the agreement was .... The agreement is the writing itself."')
(citing Sunniland Fruit, Inc. v. Verni, 233 Cal. App. 3d 892, 898, 284 Cal. Rptr.
824, 827) (1991); AIU Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 3d 807, 821-22, 799 P.2d
1253, 1264, 274 Cal. Rptr. 820, 831 (1990) (Parties' mutual intent "is to be in-
ferred, if possible, solely from the written provisions of the contract.") (citing
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1639); Golden West Baseball, 25 Cal. App. 4th 11, 31 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 378 (holding that precise meaning of a contract depends upon the par-
ties' expressed intent, using an objective standard).
66. Section 1856 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, as amended in
1978, states in part:
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An analytical review of relevant California cases involving con-
tract interpretation reveals that although the plain meaning rule is of-
ten recited as though a mantra, it actually holds little value. The
California courts repeatedly apply a contextual analysis in determin-
ing how to interpret contracts.67 Unfortunately, however, a minority
of the courts do in fact apply a plain meaning approach and thereby
create the risk that the obligations imposed will not be those that the
parties contemplated when making the contract.' Similarly, the
courts inconsistently determine when the use of extrinsic evidence
may properly supplement a written contract or how implied terms
may interact with the written terms of a contract.
69
The California courts have also expressed the view that once a
writing is completely integrated, it represents the contract of the
parties.0 Extrinsic evidence is therefore irrelevant in establishing the
terms of the agreement.7' This phrasing, similar to the frequent
(b) The terms set forth in a writing described in subdivision (a) may be
explained or supplemented by evidence of consistent additional terms
unless the writing is intended also as a complete and exclusive statement
of the terms of the agreement.
(c) The terms set forth in a writing described in subdivision (a) may be
explained or supplemented by course of dealing or usage of trade or by
course of performance.
(g) This section does not exclude other evidence of the circumstances
under which the agreement was made or to which it relates, as defined
in Section 1860, or to explain an extrinsic ambiguity or otherwise inter-
pret the terms of the agreement, or to establish illegality or fraud.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1856.
The official comments to section 1856 make clear that the purpose of the
section was to codify the key California Supreme Court rulings on the use of ex-
trinsic evidence, such as Pacific Gas & Elec. v. G. W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging
Co., 69 Cal. 2d 33, 442 P.2d 641, 69 Cal. Rptr. 561 (1968), discussed infra Part
II.B, and Masterson v. Sine, 68 Cal. 2d 222, 436 P.2d 561, 65 Cal. Rptr. 545 (1968),
discussed infra notes 231-64 and accompanying text. See also FPI Dev., Inc. v.
Nakashima, 231 Cal. App. 3d 367, 386-90, 282 Cal. Rptr. 508, 519-22 (1991)
(discussing the codification of the parol evidence rule in section 1856).
67. See discussion infra Parts II.A-B.
68. See, e.g., Haggard v. Kimberly Quality Care, Inc., 39 Cal. App. 4th 508,
517-18, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16, 21-22, (6th Dist. 1995) (certified for partial publica-
tion); Banco Do Brasil, S.A. v. Latian, Inc., 234 Cal. App. 3d 973, 1001, 285 Cal.
Rptr. 870, 886 (2d Dist. 1991); Gerdiund v. Electronic Dispensers Int'l, 190 Cal.
App. 3d 263,272, 235 Cal. Rptr. 279,283-84 (1987).
69. See Susan J. Martin-Davidson, Yes, Judge Kozinski, There Is a Parol Evi-
dence Rule in California-The Lessons of a Pyrrhic Victory, 25 Sw. U. L. REv. 1,
4-5 (1995) (noting the use of parol evidence in trial courts and frequent reversals
in the appellate courts in California).
70. See Cione v. Foresters Serv. Inc., 58 Cal. App. 4th 625, 637-38, 68 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 167, 174 (4th Dist. 1977).
71. See Hayter Trucking, Inc. v. Shell Western E&P, Inc., 18 Cal. App. 4th 1,
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formulation of the plain meaning rule, suggests an overly restrictive
approach to the possibility that the parties may have left terms out of
the final writing. Additionally, it is inconsistent with the most
authoritative California Supreme Court case on the parol evidence
rule, Masterson v. Sine,7 and the statutory embodiment of that rule in
section 1856 of the California Code of Civil Procedure.73
Many of the recent leading cases have involved questions of in-
terpretation based on insurance contracts.7 4 California courts have
stated repeatedly that "[w]hile insurance contracts have special fea-
tures, they are still contracts to which the ordinary rules of contrac-
tual interpretation apply."7'  Ultimately, a number of interpretive
rules that are particularly relevant to the insurance contract context
may in fact come into play. One such classic rule states that courts
should construe any ambiguity against the insurer and in favor of
coverage. 76 In a recent case, however, the California Supreme Court
emphasized that resort to that special rule of construction cannot be
made until there is a determination that an ambiguity exists under
the general rules of contract interpretation."
14, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 229, 237 (1993); Ailing v. Universal Mfg., 5 Cal. App. 4th
1412, 1433-36,7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 718,731-32 (1992); Banco Do Brasil, S.A. v. Latian,
Inc., 234 Cal. App. 3d 973, 1000-01, 285 Cal. Rptr. 870, 886 (1991).
72. 68 Cal. 2d 222,436 P.2d 561,65 Cal. Rptr. 545 (1968).
73. See discussion infra Part II.C.
74. See, e.g.,*Waller v. Truck Ins. Exch., 11 Cal. 4th 1, 900 P.2d 619, 44 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 370 (1995) (affirming that commercial general liability insurer is not re-
quired to defend a third-party action seeking incidental damages for emotional
distress); La Jolla Beach & Tennis Club, Inc. v. Industrial Indem. Co., 9 Cal. 4th
27, 884 P.2d 1048, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 100 (1994) (holding unanimously that claim
for wrongful termination and infliction of emotional distress did not potentially
fall within scope of workers' compensation policy); Bank of the West, 2 Cal. 4th
1254, 833 P.2d 545, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 538 (holding that insurance policy did not
cover claims arising from advertising injury due to unfair business practices);
AIU Ins., 51 Cal. 3d 807, 799 P.2d 1253, 274 Cal. Rptr. 820 (ruling that insurer
was obligated to provide coverage for cleanup and other response costs incurred
due to compliance with federal and state environmental laws under policy provi-
sion covering 'all sums which [the insured] shall become legally obligated to pay
as damages...."').
75. See La Jolla Beach & Tennis, 9 Cal. 4th at 37, 884 P.2d at 1053, 36 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 105 (quoting Bank of the West, 2 Cal. 4th at 1264, 833 P.2d at 551-52,
10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 544-45).
76. See id.; see also Bank of the West, 2 Cal. 4th at 1265, 833 P.2d at 552, 10
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 545.
77. See Bank of the West, 2 Cal. 4th at 1264-65, 833 P.2d at 552, 10 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 545. After the trial court applied a plain meaning analysis in ruling that the
term "unfair competition" did not cover the alleged advertising activity, the in-
termediate appellate court reversed based on a finding that the term was am-
biguous and should be construed against the insurance company. The supreme
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The rule favoring coverage derives from the perception that the
insurer usually drafts the contract language and that the insured has
little or no opportunity to bargain for change.78 This doctrine of con-
tra proferentum in construing contracts against the drafter has par-
ticular effect when used against insurance companies79 and other
special parties, such as lawyers, who are perceived to have an advan-
tage over more unsophisticated parties.' If the insured, however, ac-
tually drafted or participated in drafting the policy language, the pre-
sumption of construing ambiguities in favor of coverage may be
altered."'
The courts have also emphasized that the rule of construction
against the drafter does not mean that the policy will be distorted to
provide coverage that has been explicitly excluded by the language of
the policy.' Although this principle is essentially reasonable, the
court, however, held that the term was not ambiguous when viewed in the proper
context. See id. at 1272, 833 P.2d at 557, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 550; see also Wil-
mington Liquid Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. Somerset Marine Inc., 53 Cal. App. 4th
186, 195, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 727, 732 (1997) (stating that the court will construe
ambiguities in favor of coverage but will not strain to find ambiguity); AIU Ins.,
51 Cal. 3d at 822, 799 P.2d at 1264, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 831 (applying, first, the
meaning a layperson would ascribe if not ambiguous; second, the meaning the
promisor should have understood the promisee to attach; and third, in the insur-
ance context, resolving ambiguities in favor of coverage).
78. See AIU Ins., 51 Cal. 3d at 822, 799 P.2d at 1265, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 832
(citing Garcia v. Truck Ins. Exch., 36 Cal. 3d 426, 438, 682 P.2d 1100, 1105-06, 204
Cal. Rptr. 435, 440-41 (1984) and Bareno v. Employers Life Ins. Co., 7 Cal. 3d
875, 878, 500 P.2d 889, 890, 103 Cal. Rptr. 865, 866 (1972)).
79. See, e.g., La Jolla Beach & Tennis, 9 Cal. 4th at 37, 884 P.2d at 1053, 36
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 105; General Star Indem. Co. v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. App. 4th
1586, 1593, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 322, 325 (1996); Desai v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 47 Cal.
App. 4th 1110, 1117,55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 276,279 (1996).
80. See, e.g., Mayhew v. Benninghoff, 53 Cal. App. 4th 1365, 1370, 62 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 27, 30 (1997) (finding that "the doctrine of contra proferentum... ap-
plies with even greater force when the person who prepared the writing is a law-
yer"). Cf. Century 21 Butler Realty, Inc. v. Vasquez, 41 Cal. App. 4th 888, 891,
49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1, 2 (1995) (holding that where broker has prepared a listing
agreement, uncertainty about commission will be construed in favor of seller);
Powers, 54 Cal. App. 4th at 1112-16,63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 267 (enforcing arbitration
provision in retainer agreements between client and attorney based on finding
that the arbitration provisions unambiguously covered malpractice claims that
might be brought against attorney).
81. See AIU Ins., 51 Cal. 3d at 822, 799 P.2d at 1264, 274, Cal Rptr. at 831
(1990).
82 See La Jolla Beach & Tennis, 9 Cal. 4th at 41-42, 884 P.2d at 1056, 36 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 108 (finding that workers' compensation insurance policy was not
ambiguous in its exclusion of claim for damages based on wrongful termination
when the contract was construed as a whole and in light of the circumstances);
Gunderson v. Fire Ins. Exch., 37 Cal. App. 4th 1106, 1118, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 272,
280 (1995) (finding plain meaning of "property damage" in homeowner insur-
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California courts' placement of undue emphasis upon the plain
meaning aspects of insurance policy interpretation unfortunately may
tend to exclude consideration of extrinsic evidence.' Circumstances
certainly arise where applying a plain meaning approach may likely
lead to an absurd result.Y
Even if California law on contract interpretation begins with the
written terms, the applicable rules note a number of circumstances in
which resort to evidence outside the writing would be appropriate.
For example, the supreme court has stated that "[i]f the terms of a
promise are in any respect ambiguous or uncertain, it must be inter-
preted in the sense in which the promisor believed, at the time of
making it, that the promisee understood it."" At the same time,
ance policy required physical damage or destruction of tangible property and not
merely interference with use of property by claim of adverse possession);
Lunardi v. Great-West Life Assurance Co., 37 Cal. App. 4th 807, 819-21, 44 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 56, 62 (1995) (finding no ambiguity in insurance application language
which provided that no effect would be given to policy where applicant learned
of material change in health after application but prior to delivery of policy).
83. See Bluehawk v. Continental Ins. Co., 50 Cal. App. 4th 1126, 1132, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 147, 151 (1996) (stating that extrinsic interpretative aids may be used
only if policy is ambiguous); Gunderson, 37 Cal. App. 4th at 1118, 44 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 280 ("The language of the insurance policy must be interpreted in light of
its plain and ordinary meaning, unless the Policy clearly indicates to the con-
trary."); National Auto. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Stewart, 223 Cal. App. 3d 452, 461,272
Cal. Rptr. 625, 630 (1990) (holding that the plain language of insurance policy
limitations must be respected).
84. See, e.g., Knopp, 50 Cal. App. 4th 1415, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 331. In Knopp
the auto insurance policy excluded coverage for "use of a vehicle while used to
carry persons or property for a charge." Id. at 1419, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 333. The
insured was involved in an accident while driving a commercial limousine after
having dropped off his passengers and returning to his employer's place of busi-
ness unaccompanied. See id. The insured asserted that because he was not carry-
ing a person for a charge at the time of the accident, the exclusion was not appli-
cable. See id. at 1419-20, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 333. The appellate court affirmed
the trial court's judgment in favor of the insurer, emphasizing that coverage was
limited to the objectively reasonable expectations of the insured. See id. at 1422,
58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 335. Notably, however, a true plain meaning approach to the
policy might have led to coverage in a circumstance where all reason would sug-
gest that none should have been had. See also Continental Heller Corp. v. St.
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 47 Cal. App. 4th 291, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 621 (1996)
(holding that policy covering contractor for injury or damage that "results from"
subcontractor's "work" should not have been interpreted by trial court as having
"plain meaning" to exclude coverage for worker injured while gathering tools at
the job site in preparation to performing assigned tasks), cert. denied 47 Cal.
App. 4th 291, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 621 (1996), and ordered depublished 47 Cal. App.
4th 291, 54 Cal Rptr. 2d 621 (1996).
85. Bank of the West, 2 Cal. 4th at 1264-65, 833 P.2d at 552, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
545 (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 1649 (West 1985)); see also AIU Ins., 51 Cal. 3d
at 822, 799 P.2d at 1264,274 Cal. Rptr. at 831 (stating that ambiguities should be
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California courts have adopted the generally prevailing view in
American courts that contracts should be interpreted on the basis of
objective evidence, therefore rendering the parties' purely subjective
intent irrelevant.86
The California courts also have adopted the general rule "that in
construing the terms of a contract the construction given it by the acts
and conduct of the parties with knowledge of its terms, and before
any controversy has arisen as to its meaning, is admissible on the is-
sue of the parties' intent. ' While the conduct of one party to the
contract is not conclusive evidence as to the meaning of the contract,
it is relevant to the question of whether the contract is reasonably
susceptible to the meaning advanced by one of the parties." Con-
versely, courts that do utilize extrinsic evidence may find the drafting
history helpful in understanding the meaning of express terms in the
writing.
89
Using another interpretive rule, the courts will fill in gaps in con-
tracts with default terms in accordance with widely accepted norms.
For example, if an otherwise enforceable contract fails to specify a
time for performing an act, a court will insert a "reasonable time"
provision, with reasonableness depending on the circumstances of
each case.9° California courts repeatedly state that the law implies a
resolved to mean what the promisor thought the promisee meant when the con-
tract was formed).
86. See Winet v. Price, 4 Cal. App. 4th 1159, 1166, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 554, 558
(1992) (supporting the position that the outward expression of the agreement,
rather than any unexpressed intention, is what the court will enforce); Edwards v.
Comstock Ins. Co., 205 Cal. App. 3d 1164, 1169, 252 Cal. Rptr. 807, 810 (1988)
(When intent can be derived from words and acts, unexpressed state of mind is
immaterial.); Sheehan v. Atlantic Int'l Ins. Co., 812 F.2d 465, 470 (9th Cir. 1986)
(Under California law, unexpressed reservations cannot contradict express terms
of contract.).
87. Southern Cal. Edison Co. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. App. 4th 839, 851, 44
Cal. Rptr. 2d 227, 234 (1995) (citing Universal Sales Corp. v. California Press
Mfg. Co., 20 Cal. 2d 751, 761, 128 P.2d 665, 671 (1942)).
88. See id. at 851, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 234; Golden West Baseball Co. v. City of
Anaheim, 25 Cal. App. 4th 11, 39, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 378, 397 (1994) (considering
parties' conduct both before and after making of contract).
89. See Foothill Properties v. Lyon/Copley Corona Assocs., 46 Cal. App. 4th
1542, 1549-52, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 488, 492-94 (1996) (The fact that party rejected
earlier drafts that included firm dates for completion of mapping of a develop-
ment, and instead accepted a final writing requiring only that developer
"diligently pursue" mapping, undercut proposed interpretation that mapping had
to be completed by end of option contract.).
90. See, e.g., Consolidated World Invs., Inc., v. Lido Preferred Ltd., 9 Cal.
App. 4th 373, 379-80, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 524, 527-28 (1992) (positing that where
contract was properly read to require that escrow close within sixty days but
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covenant of good faith and fair dealing in every contract but also em-
phasize that the nature and extent of the duty depend on the contrac-
tual context.9'
B. Interpretation and the Plain Meaning Rule
In his widely cited Pacific Gas & Electric v. G.W. Thomas Dray-
age & Rigging Co.' opinion, Roger Traynor, a legendary justice of
the California Supreme Court who served from 1940 to 1970,9' ob-
served that "[i]f words had absolute and constant referents, it might
be possible to discover contractual intention in the words themselves
and in the manner in which they were arranged. Words, however, do
not have absolute and constant referents."' 4 According to Justice
Traynor, then, contract terms will inevitably require some degree of
contextual interpretation. Indeed, in Pacific Gas the California Su-
preme Court held that contract language can never be deemed suffi-
ciently clear such that the terms should be given their "plain mean-
ing" without at least a brief examination of extrinsic evidence that
might further explain the parties' intent.95
One cannot discuss the plain meaning rule in California without
a discussion of Pacific Gas or its most famous criticism by Judge Alex
Kozinski in Trident Center v. Connecticut General Life Insurance
failed to specify when escrow should open, a reasonable time for opening is one
that allows for closing within sixty days); cf El Cajon v. El Cajon Police Officers'
Assoc., 49 Cal. App. 4th 64, 73, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 723, 728 (1996) (deeming labor
contracts of indeterminate duration terminable at will).
91. See, e.g., Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 684, 765 P.2d
373, 390, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211, 227-28 (1988) (holding that employment contract
imposed duty of good faith but precise meaning depends on contractual pur-
poses); Torelli v. J.P. Enters., Inc., 52 Cal. App. 4th 1250, 1255-56, 61 Cal. Rptr.
2d 76, 79-80 (1997) (holding that duty of good faith prevented seller from cir-
cumventing duty to pay commission to real estate broker who located a buyer)
Foothill Properties, 46 Cal. App. 4th at 1550, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 492 (interpreting
contract provision that developer would "diligently pursue" final mapping of new
development to mean that developer was reasonable in delaying final mapping in
light of dramatic downturn in real estate market).
92. 69 Cal. 2d 33, 442 P.2d 641, 69 Cal. Rptr. 561 (1968).
93. See James R. McCall, Roger Traynor: Teacher, Jurist, and Friend, 35
HASTINGS L.J. 741, 743-46 (1984). Traynor served as chief justice from 1964 to
1970. See id. at 745-46. For additional information on Judge Traynor, see Henry
J. Friendly, Ablest Judge of His Generation, 71 CAL. L. Rnv. 1039, 1039 (1983).
94. Pacific Gas, 69 Cal. 2d at 38, 442 P.2d at 644, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 564; cf
Kniffin, supra note 58, at 644-49 (explaining untenable nature of plain meaning
rule).
95. See Pacific Gas, 69 Cal. 2d at 40-41, 442 P.2d at 645-46, 69 Cal. Rptr. at
566.
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Co.96 Other cases in this area, such as the more recent California Su-
preme Court decision in Waller v. Truck Insurance Exchange, Inc.,9'
continue to point to the futility of the plain meaning rule while also
reflecting the courts' tendency to try to use it.
1. Pacific Gas & Electric v. G. W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co.
Pacific Gas involved a contract calling for the G.W. Thomas
Drayage & Rigging Company ("Thomas") to perform repair work on
a steam turbine owned by Pacific Gas & Electric ("PG&E")." While
making the repairs, a cover fell onto the turbine and caused more
than $25,000 worth of damage.9 PG&E sought to hold Thomas liable
for the repairs based upon language in the contract, a standard form
agreement drafted by PG&EY with a key term providing that Tho-
mas would "indemnify" PG&E "against all loss, damage, expense
and liability resulting from... injury to property, arising out of or in
any way connected with the performance of this contract."'' 1
PG&E brought suit and recovered a judgment at trial on the
theory that the indemnity provision held Thomas responsible for all
injury to property regardless of ownership.1°2 At trial, Thomas at-
tempted to rebut PG&E's position by offering extrinsic evidence that
the indemnity clause was intended to cover harm to property belong-
ing to third parties only.' 3 The trial court, however, excluded the ex-
trinsic evidence and held that the "plain language" of the agreement
required Thomas to indemnify PG&E for all damage to property, re-
gardless of ownership, including harm to the steam turbine belonging
to PG&E.1 4
96. 847 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1988).
97. 11 Cal. 4th 1, 900 P.2d 619,44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 370 (1995).
98. See Pacific Gas, 69 Cal. 2d at 36,442 P.2d at 643,69 Cal. Rptr. at 563.
99. See id.
100. See Pacific Gas & Elec. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 62 Cal.
Rptr. 203,203 (1967).
101. Id. at 204. The full indemnity clause read:
Contractor [Thomas] shall indemnify Company [PG&E], its officers,
agents, and employees, against all loss, damage, expense and liability re-
siting from injury to or death of person or injury to property, arsing
out of or in any way connected with the performance of this contract.
Contractor shall, on Company's request, defend any suit asserting a
claim covered by this indemnity. Contractor shall pay any costs at
may be incurred by Company in enforcing this indemnity. 1d. at 204.
102. See Pacific Gas, 69 Cal. 2d at 36,442 P.2d. 643, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 563.
103. See id.
104. See id.
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Despite ruling that the plain meaning required Thomas to com-
pensate PG&E for the damage, the trial court observed that the lan-
guage used was "the classic language for a third party indemnity
provision" and that "one could very easily conclude that.., its whole
intendment is to indemnify third parties."' 5 Thus, rather paradoxi-
cally, while the trial court acknowledged that the contract language
might have been understood to reflect a third party indemnity provi-
sion, it still refused to admit any extrinsic evidence for purposes of
aiding the interpretation of the contract. The court gave the con-
tract's words a flat, absolute interpretation of covering harm to all
property without consideration to ownership and ignored the possi-
bility that in a particular context these words may have been used
imperfectly to express a different intent.
Ironically, the trial court found the contract to have a plain
meaning that was the antithesis of what the court of appeal foundY#
That is, the appellate court held that the language of the contract ex-
pressly limited Thomas to indemnification of PG&E's liability for
harm to third parties. 1' The court of appeal reinforced its decision by
reference to a definition of "indemnity" found in the California Civil
Code'0 and to the maxim that an ambiguous contract should be con-
strued against the drafter, in this case PG&E.'O Ultimately, the court
of appeal held that the contract had an obvious meaning, even with-
out resorting to extrinsic evidence,' 0 and rendered final judgment in
favor of Thomas.
The California Supreme Court rejected the conflicting plain
105. See id
106. See Pacific Gas & Elec. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 62 Cal.
Rptr. 203, 204-05 (1967).
107. See id. at 204. After first noting that "[t]he term 'indemnity' has a distinct
meaning in the law of contracts" involving a responsibility to save another from
obligation incurred to a third person, the appellate court stated: "It is clear that
the subject indemnity provision was drafted for the sole purpose of protecting
the 'Company' [PG&E] from all third party claims made against it and that
[PG&E] did not look to this provision to insure its own property." Id.
108. See id. The appellate court stated, "Indemnity is a contract by which one
engages to save another from a legal consequence of the conduct of one of the
parties, or of some other person." Id. (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 2772 (West
1993)). The court then reasoned that since no legal consequence was imposed on
PG&E by virtue of harm to its own property, the indemnity clause would not be
relevant to the damage in the case. See id.
109. See id. at 204-05.
110. Because the trial court had excluded extrinsic evidence, the appellate
court also rendered its decision without resort to such materials. See id.
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meaning rulings of both the trial and the appellate courts.111 Indeed,
the rather remarkable fact that the trial and intermediate appellate
courts could find conflicting "plain meanings" within the same con-
tract language underscores the approach's futility.112  In a rather
stinging rebuke of the plain meaning approach, Justice Traynor wrote
for the majority' of the court:
When the court interprets a contract on this basis, it deter-
mines the meaning of the instrument in accordance with the
".... extrinsic evidence of the judge's own linguistic educa-
tion and experience." The exclusion of testimony that might
contradict the linguistic background of the judge reflects a
judicial belief in the possibility of perfect verbal expression.
This belief is a remnant of a primitive faith in the inherent
potency and inherent meaning of words."4
Justice Traynor further stated that patent or facial ambiguity is not
the proper test for the admissibility of extrinsic evidence to aid the
interpretation of a written contract. Rather, said Justice Traynor, the
proper test is "whether the offered evidence is relevant to prove a
meaning to which the language of the instrument is reasonably sus-
ceptible.""1 5 Moreover, Justice Traynor saw two particular flaws in
the "plain meaning" approach: the de-emphasis of the parties' intent
as found in extrinsic evidence and the presupposition that words may
ordinarily have precise and stable meanings."6
Justice Traynor observed, with apparent disdain, that a plain
meaning approach excluding the use of extrinsic evidence would de-
termine the obligations of the parties based on a supposed neutral
reading of "certain magic words" without concern as to what the par-
ties may have actually intended." 7 Justice Traynor noted that the
111. See Pacific Gas, 69 Cal. 2d at 40-41, 442 P.2d at 646, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 566.
In the opinion, the supreme court spoke directly to only the trial court ruling; it
did, however, vacate the appellate court decision. The supreme court's reasoning
was equally damaging to both the trial and appellate courts' bases for decision.
See id.
112. See also supra note 77 (discussing Bank of the West v. Superior Court, 2
Cal. 4th 1254, 833 P.2d 545, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 538 (1992), in which the trial and ap-
pellate courts found conflicting "plain" meanings in the contract language).
113. The court ruled 6 to 1 that the trial court had erred. Five justices con-
curred in the Traynor opinion, with Justice McComb dissenting without written
opinion.
114. Pacific Gas, 69 Cal. 2d at 36-37,442 P.2d at 643-44, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 563-64
(citations omitted).
115. Id at 37, 442 P.2d at 644, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 564.
116. See id. at 37-38
117. Id. at 38, 442 P.2d at 644, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 564. To exemplify this extreme
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California law on interpretation emphasizes "the intention of the
parties as expressed in the contract" but reasoned that the meaning
of particular words varies with the context and parties involved.
8
Therefore, the application of the plain meaning rule might well result
in giving a contract a meaning that the parties never intended. Jus-
tice Traynor cited the area of trade usage as an example of using ex-
trinsic evidence to "interpret" rather than "supplement" the written
terms."9 He also acknowledged, however, that the practice of words
being used to convey a special meaning may occur in other contexts
as well.12"
Justice Traynor thus ruled that "rational interpretation" re-
quired a court to engage in at least a preliminary consideration of all
credible extrinsic evidence offered to prove the intention of the par-
ties,' including testimony about the context of the making of the
writing, with the court aiming to put itself into the position of the
parties at the time the contract was made.'2 Only after engaging in a
preliminary review and concluding that a proffered interpretation is
reasonable should the court actually admit the extrinsic evidence to
support it."u Ostensibly, the finder of fact must then determine which
plain meaning or objective approach, Traynor quoted an earlier opinion by Jus-
tice Holmes: "A contract has, strictly speaking, nothing to do with the personal,
or individual, intent of the parties. A contract is an obligation attached by the
mere force of law to certain acts of the parties, usually words, which ordinarily
accompany and represent a known intent." Hotchkiss v. National City Bank of
New York, 200 F. 287,293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911).
118. Id. Justice Traynor argued that words can only have meaning in light of
the "verbal context and surrounding circumstances" and the linguistic back-
ground of the parties. See id. at 38, 442 P.2d at 644, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 564 (quoting
Arthur L. Corbin, The Interpretation of Words and the Parol Evidence Rule, 50
CORNELL L.Q. 161, 187 (1965)).
119. See id. at 39, 442 P.2d at 645, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 565.
120. See id. at 39, 442 P.2d at 645, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 565. Justice Traynor cited a
number of examples of words taking on special meaning by virtue of trade usage:
the term "United Kingdom" in a motion picture distribution contract including
Ireland; the word "ton" meaning a long ton or 2240 pounds; the word "stubble"
including not only stumps but everything "left on the ground after the harvest
time;" the term "north" indicating a boundary line running along the "magnetic
and not the true meridian;" and a form contract for purchase and sale which was
actually an agency contract. See id at 39 n.6, 442 P.2d at 645 n.6, 69 Cal. Rptr. at
565 n.6. (citations omitted).
121. Id. at 39-40, 442 P.2d at 645, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 565 (citing CAL. CIV. CODE §
1647 (West 1985); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1860 (West 1983)).
122. See id. at 40, 442 P.2d at 645, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 565, (citing Universal Sales
Corp. v. California Press Mfg. Co., 20 Cal. 2d 751, 761, 128 P.2d 665, 672 (1942);
Lemm v. Stillwater Land & Cattle Co., 217 Cal. 474, 480-81, 19 P.2d 785, 788
(1933)).
123. See id. at 39-40,442 P.2d at 645-46, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 565-66.
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of the possible, reasonable interpretations is better supported by the
facts. This approach is consistent with the approach in section 214 of
the Restatement (Second). 24
The court in Pacific Gas concluded by noting the facial ambigu-
ity caused by including a type of indemnity clause sometimes used to
reference harm to property of third parties, and the fact that the term
"indemnify" can apply either to third parties or to contracting par-
ties, as evidenced by its definitions in various dictionaries."z The
court also determined that other provisions in the contract did not re-
solve the ambiguity otherwise present.lu The case was remanded for
retrial.
Importantly, Justice Traynor acknowledged the key difference
between extrinsic evidence used to "add to, detract from, or vary the
terms of a written contract" and extrinsic evidence used to interpret
the terms that are concededly part of the written agreement.'12 Thus,
the opinion drew the distinction between the interpretation issues
that it addressed and the supplementation issues addressed in Mas-
terson as discussed below."
Although some might accuse Justice Traynor of overindulgence
with his reference to mystical beliefs in the power of words,'29 Pacific
124. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrS § 214 cmt. b. (1981)
("[W]ords, written or oral, cannot apply themselves to the subject matter ....
Even though words seem on their face to have only a single possible meaning,
other meanings often appear when the circumstances [of their application] are
disclosed.").
125. See Pacific Gas, 69 Cal. 2d at 41-42 n.9, 442 P.2d at 646-47 n.9, 69 Cal.
Rptr. at 566-67 n.9.
126. PG&E argued unsuccessfully that the use of the word "all" to qualify the
loss prevented application only to third parties and that the provisions that de-
fendant perform the work "at his own risk and expense" and procure liability in-
surance to cover damages to plaintiff's property also amount to absolute as-
sumptions of liability. See id.
127. Id. at 39, 442 P.2d at 645, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 565.
128. See infra Part II.C.1.
129. Justice Traynor included reference to mystical beliefs in the magic of
words in two footnotes, quoting in one note:
"The elaborate system of taboo and verbal prohibitions in primitive
groups; the ancient Egyptian myth of Khern, the apotheosis of the word,
and of Thoth, the Scribe of Truth, the Giver of Words and Script, the
Master of Incantations; the avoidance of the name of God in Brahan-
ism, Judaism and Islam; totemistic and protective names in mediaeval
Turkish and Finno-Ugrian languages; the misplaced verbal scruples of
the 'Precieuses'; the Swedish peasant custom of curing sick cattle smit-
ten by witchcraft, by making them swallow a page torn out of the psalter
and put in dough..."
And in another footnote: "'Rerum enim vocabula immutabilia sunt,
homines mutabilia,' (Words are unchangeable, men changeable) ......
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Gas ultimately stands both as a penetrating disestablishment of the
plain meaning rule and as a framework for the consideration of ex-
trinsic evidence in interpreting contracts. Courts should first resist
any temptation to apply an apparent plain meaning and should take a
preliminary look both at the contracting context and at the parties'
proffered interpretations. If the contract is reasonably susceptible to
more than one meaning, then the finder of fact should hear extrinsic
evidence relative to those meanings to determine what agreement the
parties in fact made. If the contract is not reasonably susceptible to
more than one meaning, then the interpretive process should con-
clude after the court has completed its preliminary look at the con-
text and the extrinsic evidence. Despite the solid reasoning and clear
lessons from Pacific Gas, courts have misapplied its approach-none
more visibly and notoriously than United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit in Trident Center v. Connecticut General Life Insur-
ance Co.m
2. Trident Center v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Co.
Judge Alex Kozinski authored the Ninth Circuit decision in Tri-
dent Center that took direct aim at the holding in Pacific Gas. The
Trident Center opinion bemoaned that in Pacific Gas the California
Supreme Court "turned its back on the notion that a contract can
ever have a plain meaning discernible by a court without resort to ex-
trinsic evidence., '' Judge Kozinski subsequently reiterated his
regret, saying that the time has passed when "a clear contractual
term means what it says. ''U2 While busy criticizing Pacific Gas and
Pacific Gas, 69 Cal. 2d at 37 n.2, 442 P.2d at 644 n.2, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 563-64 n.2
(citations omitted). Judge Kozinski described these citations as "unusual" in the
course of his criticism of Pacific Gas. See Trident Ctr. v. Connecticut Gen. Life
Ins. Co., 847 F.2d 564, 569 n.5 (9th Cir. 1988).
130. 847 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1988).
131. Id. at 568.
132. Wilson Arlington Co. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 912 F.2d 366,369
(9th Cir. 1990). Judge Kozinski wrote:
There was a time, not all that long ago, when parties to a commercial
transaction could rely on a simple maxim-a clear contractual term
means what it says. Based on the notion that words can be used to con-
vey a clear meaning, this principle formed the underpinnings of the pa-
rol evidence rule that made extrinsic evidence inadmissible to interpret,
vary or add to the terms of an unambiguous written instrument .... [I n
Pacific Gas & Electric the California Supreme Court, without expressly
abolishing the parol evidence rule, cut the life out of it by permitting the
introduction of extrinsic evidence to demonstrate the existence of an
ambiguity even when the language of a contract is perfectly clear.
Id. at 369-70 (citations omitted).
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mythologizing its recognition of the inherent limits in human ex-
pression, Judge Kozinski failed to recognize that under Pacific Gas a
court may well dispose of a case summarily once it determines that
the proposed interpretation is unreasonable in light of the transac-
tional context.
Trident Center involved a $56.5 million loan agreement between
two business entities for the construction of an office building in
West Los Angeles.133 Interest rates dropped after a few years and
Trident, the debtor, sought to refinance the loan.134 The lender, how-
ever, resisted and relied on provisions in the contract that restricted
early prepayment of the loan."5 The district court found the terms of
the loan agreement to be clear and unambiguous and therefore dis-
missed Trident's complaint. 136 Moreover, the trial court, on its own
initiative, sanctioned the plaintiff for filing a "frivolous lawsuit."'37
Trident appealed and Judge Kozinski wrote the opinion revers-
ing the trial court and remanding the case on the grounds that dis-
missal was improper, under California state law. 131 Specifically, the
Ninth Circuit reasoned that although the terms of the writing were
clear and unambiguous on its face, California state law required the
trial court to still consider extrinsic evidence because it might reveal a
latent ambiguity or alternative meaning. Judge Kozinski wrote:
Under Pacific Gas, it matters not how clearly a contract is
written, nor how completely it is integrated, nor how care-
fully it is negotiated, nor how squarely it addresses the issue
before the court: the contract cannot be rendered impervi-
ous to attack by parol evidence. If one side is willing to
133. See Trident Center, 847 F.2d at 566.
134. See id.
135. See id. The promissory note provided that the debtor "shall not have the
right to prepay the principal amount hereof in whole or in part [during its first 12
years]." Id. Trident argued that because another clause provided that "in the
event of a prepayment resulting from a default hereunder [during its first 12
years] the prepayment fee will be ten percent (10%)," it had the option of pre-
paying the loan and paying a 10% prepayment fee. Id. Judge Kozinski accu-
rately pointed out that the second clause did not give the borrower the right to
prepay in contradiction of the earlier provision, but rather was properly read to
give the lender the right to declare default and require prepayment. See id. at
566-67. Declaring default, however, was not the only remedy available to the
lender. See id. at 567-68 n.3.
136. See id. at 566. Trident had initiated an action for declaratory judgment in
California state court and Connecticut General, the lender, successfully removed
the suit to federal court. See id. at 566.
137. Id.
138. See id. at 570.
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claim that the parties intended one thing but the agreement
provides for another, the court must consider extrinsic evi-
dence of possible ambiguity. If that evidence raises the
specter of ambiguity where there was none before, the con-
tract language is displaced and the intention of the parties
must be divined from self-serving testimony offered by par-
tisan witnesses whose recollection is hazy from passage of
time and colored by their conflicting interests. We question
whether this approach is more likely to divulge the original
intention of the parties than reliance on the seemingly clear
words they agreed upon at the time."9
Judge Kozinski expressed great dismay that notwithstanding the
size and significance of the transaction, the presumed sophistication
of the parties, the assistance of counsel, and the clarity of the terms,
California law still would allow the written terms to be challenged by
extrinsic evidence.'O Judge Kozinski observed, in a hyperbolic fash-
ion common to much of his writing,4 ' that "Pacific Gas casts a long
shadow of uncertainty over all transactions negotiated and executed
under the law of California .... While this rule creates much busi-
ness for lawyers and an occasional windfall to some clients, it leads
only to frustration and delay for most litigants and clogs already
overburdened courts."' 42
Judge Kozinski then reversed and remanded the case, but not
without constant grumbling, along with instructions for the trial court
139. Id at 569 (citations omitted). Justice Mosk's early criticism of Pacific
Gas in Delta Dynamics, Inc. v. Arioto, 69 Cal. 2d 525, 531-32, 446 P.2d 785, 789,
72 Cal. Rptr. 785,789 (1968) (Mosk, J., dissenting), also influenced Judge Kozin-
ski. Justice Mosk wrote:
Once again this court adopts a course leading toward emasculation
of the parol evidence rule. During this very year [Masterson and Pacific
Gas] have contributed toward that result. Although I had misgivings at
the time, I must confess to joining the majority in both of those cases.
Now, however, that the majority deem negotiations leading to execution
of contracts admissible, the trend has become so unmistakably ominous
that I must urge a halt.
Given two experienced businessmen dealing at arm's length, both
represented by competent counsel, it has become virtually impossible
under recently evolving rules of evidence to draft a written contract that
will produce predictable results in court.
Id.
140. See Trident Center, 847 F.2d at 569.
141. See United States v. Phelps, 895 F.2d 1281 (9th Cir. 1990) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting); David A. Golden, Comment, Humor, the Law, and Judge Kozinski's
Greatest Hits, 1992 BYU L. REv. 507.
142. Trident Center, 847 F.2d at 569.
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to give the plaintiff the opportunity to present extrinsic evidence
relevant to the parties' intent at the time of drafting the contract. *
Judge Kozinski also reversed the sanctions award, noting that the
trial court had imposed them because it deemed the contract lan-
guage so "crystal-clear" that Trident's attorneys must have brought
the action in bad faith. 4 Because the Ninth Circuit Court felt
obliged under California law to reverse on the issue of contract inter-
pretation, Judge Kozinski also reasoned that the court must reverse
the sanctions. In doing so, however, Judge Kozinski imparted some
final shots at Pacific Gas by suggesting that the case invites frivolous
lawsuits and by recommending that the California Supreme Court
revisit the Pacific Gas holding and take the Trident Center case as an
example of why the more traditional rule on extrinsic evidence is "far
wiser."'45
Judge Kozinski made three significant observations in his opin-
ion, including two footnotes, that severely undercut his criticism of
Pacific Gas. First, the judge clearly and expressly concluded that the
loan contract was not reasonably susceptible to the interpretation
proffered by the debtor.'TM Under the rule enunciated in Pacific Gas,
if the trial court, after a preliminary look at the extrinsic evidence,
reaches the same conclusion as it did before reviewing the evidence,
then exclusion of the extrinsic evidence would be proper and dis-
missal or other summary disposal of the case would be appropriate.
Pacific Gas only requires the trial court to take a preliminary look at
the proffered interpretation and related extrinsic evidence before
reaching a conclusion about the apparent "plain meaning" of the con-
tract. This precaution is not unreasonable considering the procedural
history of Pacific Gas, in which the trial and appellate courts
deemed the same contract to have two conflicting plain meanings.47
Nevertheless, if the court concludes that the contract is not reasona-
bly susceptible to the proposed interpretation, then dismissal is
143. See id. at 570. At different points in the opinion Kozinski paused to say
that the court had "doubts about the wisdom of Pacific Gas," and that "[i]t may
not be a wise rule we are applying, but it is a rule that binds us." Id. at 569-70
(citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64,78 (1938)).
144. See id.
145. I&
146. See id. at 568. Judge Kozinski wrote: "[The debtor] wishes to offer ex-
trinsic evidence that the parties had agreed Trident could prepay at any time
within the first 12 years by tendering the full amount plus a 10 percent prepay-
ment fee. As discussed above, this is an interpretation to which the contract, as
written, is not reasonably susceptible." Id.
147. See supra Part II.B.1.
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proper at an early point in the proceedings."4
In his footnotes, Judge Kozinski also stated that the lender might
obtain summary judgment after completion of discovery unless Tri-
dent could present some extrinsic evidence to raise a triable issue of
interpretation-a dubious proposition given the relatively clear lan-
guage of the contract.49 The extreme nature of his criticism seems
inappropriate given that Judge Kozinski recognized that the action
could still be disposed of early in the proceedings. Finally, the judge
stated that sanctions might even be appropriate for parties "urging an
interpretation lacking any objectively reasonable basis in fact" for
"facially unambiguous contracts." 5 ° The import of Judge Kozinski's
latter suggestions is that a party may indeed offer a proposed inter-
pretation of an agreement that is so inconsistent with the express
terms, once context is considered pursuant to Pacific Gas, that the
court would be proper in summarily disposing of the case without
going further in the proceedings. Indeed, that may well have been
the case in Trident Center had Judge Kozinski not been so deter-
mined to use it as a springboard for his criticism of Pacific Gas."'
3. More recent plain meaning cases, including Waller v. Truck
Insurance Exchange
In contrast to Judge Kozinski's exaggerated misreading of the
Pacific Gas decision, many subsequent decisions in the California
courts properly apply its approach. Winet v. Price,"2 represents a
148. See Winet v. Price, 4 Cal. App. 4th 1159, 1172-73, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 554, 562
(1992) (affirming grant of summary judgment based on proffered interpretation
being inconsistent with written terms). Also see infra text accompanying notes
152-71.
149. See Winet, 4 Cal. App. 4th at 1172-73, 6 Cal. Rptr. at 562.
150. See id. at 570 n.9.
151. Others have noted the inaccuracy of the picture of Pacific Gas painted by
Judge Kozinski. See Banco Do Brasil, S.A. v. Latian, Inc., 234 Cal. App. 3d 973,
1011 & n.53, 285 Cal. Rptr. 870, 893 & n.53 (1991) (describing Judge Kozinski's
characterization of Pacific Gas as "unfortunate" and "inaccurate" and reaffirm-
ing that sophisticated parties to commercial transactions are capable of having
writings which "fully and completely define a particular legal relationship"); FPI
Dev., Inc. v. Nakashima, 231 Cal. App. 3d 367, 389 n.10, 282 Cal. Rptr. 508, 521
n.10 (1991) (observing that the Pacific Gas "view of meaning does not embody
the unconstrained view of language that some ascribe to it" and that a court "is
not required to accept implausible or semantically impermissible claims of
meaning"); see also Martin-Davidson, supra note 69, at 16-19; Jeffery J.
Devashrayee, Note, Trident Center v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Co.:
The Continuing Demise of the California Parol Evidence Rule, 1989 UTAH L.
REv. 991, 1008-11.
152. 4 Cal. App. 4th 1159, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 554 (1992).
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good example of a court summarily rejecting a proposed interpreta-
tion of a contract. Defendant Price served as attorney for Winet, per-
forming a number of legal tasks from 1973 to 1975. '53 A dispute arose
between the parties in 1975 concerning the legal fees that Winet
owed.' With legal counsel representing Winet, the parties settled
the matter by execution of a general release in 1975 that very explic-
itly covered known and existing disputes, as well as unknown and
subsequent claims. 5
Fifteen years after signing the general release, Winet's partners
sued him over a particular venture for which Price had drafted the
partnership agreement.5 6 In turn, Winet cross-complained against
Price alleging that Price had committed malpractice in drafting the
partnership agreement. 7 Price moved for summary judgment on the
basis that the 1975 release clearly barred any claim by Winet.' 8 De-
spite the release's broad language, Winet opposed the motion for
summary judgment by alleging that he did not intend to waive all
claims he might have against Price and that at the time he signed the
release he was unaware that the dispute with his former partners
might possibly arise.'59 The trial court granted summary judgment for
Price, "concluding that the release was broadly designed to bar all
claims of malpractice.. . that it was specifically negotiated with the
help of counsel, and that the significance of Winet's waiver ... was
explained and understood by the parties. ' ' "6
The appellate court had no difficulty affirming the grant of
summary judgment in favor of Price, the lawyer."' The Winet court
correctly followed the Pacific Gas rule by first noting that the test for
admissibility of extrinsic evidence for interpretation purposes is
whether the writing is ambiguous.6 The court makes this determi-
nation not by a test of plain meaning or patent ambiguity but on the
basis of whether the proffered evidence supports "a meaning to
which the [contract] language is 'reasonably susceptible"' given the
153. See id. at 1162, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 555.
154. See id.
155. See id.
156. See id.
157. While the release expressly excluded from its scope a particular transac-
tion, the one in question was not mentioned in the exclusion. See id. at 1163, 6
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 556.
158. See id.
159. See id. at 1164, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 556.
160. Id.
161. See id. at 1172-73, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 562.
162. See id. at 1165, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 557.
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transactional context.I" The court also noted that the extrinsic evi-
dence offered cannot be used "to flatly contradict the express terms
of the agreement."1  The court went on to state:
The decision whether to admit parol evidence involves a
two-step process. First, the court provisionally receives
(without actually admitting) all credible evidence concern-
ing the parties' intentions to determine "ambiguity," i.e.,
whether the language is "reasonably susceptible" to the in-
terpretation urged by a party. If in light of the extrinsic evi-
dence the court decides the language is "reasonably suscep-
tible" to the interpretation urged, the extrinsic evidence is
then admitted to aid in the second step-interpreting the
contract.' 65
The appellate court quickly determined that Winet failed mis-
erably as to the first step because the language of the contract was
not at all susceptible to his proposed interpretation. 6 As the court
stated, "Winet... seeks to prove that a release of unknown or
163. Id. at 1167, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 558 (citing Pacific Gas, 69 Cal. 2d at 37, 442
P.2d at 644, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 564). The court specifically noted that it should con-
sider evidence about the circumstances at the making of the contract and its ob-
ject, nature, and subject matter, so that it could understand the perception of the
parties at the time the contract was made. See Winet, 4 Cal. App. 4th at 1168, 6
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 559; see also Consolidated World Invs., Inc., v. Lido Preferred
Ltd., 9 Cal. App. 4th 373, 379, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 524, 526-27 (1992) (following
Winet in allowing extrinsic evidence to aid in determining whether contract lan-
guage was ambiguous).
164. Winet, 4 Cal. App. 4th at 1167, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 558 (citing Stevenson v.
Oceanic Bank, 223 Cal. App. 3d 306, 317-18, 272 Cal. Rptr. 757, 764 (1990)); see
also Consolidated, 9 Cal. App. 4th at 379, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 526-27 (noting that
parol evidence is only admissible to prove meaning to which the contract lan-
guage is reasonably susceptible).
165. Winet, 4 Cal. App. 4th at 1165, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 557 (citing Blumenfeld v.
R.H. Macy & Co., 92 Cal. App. 3d 38, 45, 154 Cal. Rptr. 652, 655 (1979)). The
court noted that different standards of appellate review may be applicable to
each of the two steps. See id. The trial court's ruling on the question of
"ambiguity"-or whether the proffered evidence is relevant to prove a meaning
to which the language is reasonably susceptible-is a question of law, not of fact.
See id. The second step, in the event that the language is deemed ambiguous,
might involve differing standards of review, depending upon the nature of the
parol evidence used to construe the contract. See id. at 1165-66, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 557. If the parol evidence is in conflict and involves determinations of credibil-
ity, the appellate court must uphold the finding as long as it is supported by sub-
stantial evidence. See id. at 1166, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 557. However, when the
relevant parol evidence is not in conflict, construction of the instrument is a
question of law, and the appellate court may engage in de novo review. See id.
In Winet the extrinsic evidence was not in conflict. See id.
166. See id. at 1167, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 558.
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unsuspected claims was not intended to include unknown or unsus-
pected claims." 67 The court reinforced its decision by underscoring
that all of the contracting circumstances indicated that the parties
mutually intended the release of unknown claims of the very type ad-
vanced by Winet.'6 In this situation, the proper outcome under Pa-
cific Gas is the exclusion of the proffered extrinsic evidence and,
probably, the summary dismissal of the claim. While Judge Kozinski
had trouble perceiving this as a proper application of Justice
Traynor's test, the Winet court, and several others, have had little
difficulty. 9
Unfortunately, and in contrast to the solid reasoning in Winet, a
line of cases exists which suggests that courts may find ambiguity by
looking solely at the written contract itself without reference to ex-
trinsic evidence, even as a provisional matter.7 Although extrinsic
evidence may occasionally reinforce or fail to remove an ambiguity, 7'
167. Id. (emphasis added).
16& See id. at 1168, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 559. The court also noted that Winet
was represented by counsel, that he was aware of the possibility of malpractice
claims against Price, that he signed a release referring specifically to California
Civil Code section 1542 concerning the risk of unknown claims, and that the par-
ties used language which excepted a certain transaction from the release. See id.
169. The Winet court relied considerably on Edwards v. Comstock Ins. Co.,
205 Cal. App. 3d 1164,252 Cal. Rptr. 807 (1988). The Edwards court stated:
Appellants urge us to interpret the plain language in their release
agreements discharging respondents from "any and all claims .. ." to
mean "all claims except claims for bad faith .... " Under the circum-
stances presented here, we decline to rewrite appellants' release agreements
to include a concept they failed to enunciate at the time they accepted the
terms of the settlement with their insurer.
ld. at 1167, 252 Cal. Rptr at 809. Of importance to the court was the fact that the
parties entered into the release without any evidence of lack of capacity or fault
in the contract formation process. See id. at 1168-69, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 809-10.
Another case, S. Kornreich & Sons, Inc. v. Genesis Ins. Co., 56 Cal. App. 4th 407,
414-15, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 418, 421-22 (1997), properly applies Justice Traynor's
test. In that case, the court found that an insurance policy was not reasonably
susceptible to the insured's proposed meaning that the temporary policy-
expressly limited to a ninety-day period-would convert automatically into a
permanent policy. See id. at 423.
170. See, e.g., Southern Cal. Edison Co. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. App. 4th
839, 848, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 227, 232 (1995) (stating that whether a contract is rea-
sonably susceptible to a party's interpretation can be determined from the lan-
guage of the contract itself); Ridgley v. Topa Thrift & Loan Ass'n, 54 Cal. App.
4th 729, 739, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 309, 315 (1997) (stating that a contract is ambiguous
when on its face it is capable of two different reasonable interpretations).
171. See, e.g., Edison, 37 Cal. App. 4th at 849-50,44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 233.
The multiple contracts involved long-term agreements by Southern
California Edison Company to purchase electricity generated by wind-powered
turbines owned by Energy Development and Construction Corporation and San
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a considerable chance also exists that an apparent facial ambiguity
might actually be resolved by a provisional resort to extrinsic evi-
dence as Pacific Gas dictates. Thus, a provisional resort to the ex-
trinsic evidence may well provide the more efficient approach be-
cause it avoids engaging the court in a more extended process to
resolve an ambiguity that does not really exist.
Despite the clear dictate of Pacific Gas, California courts con-
tinue to decide questions of interpretation based on the apparent
plain meaning of the agreement without resort to extrinsic evidence
and in contradiction of the parties' probable intent. Ridgley v. Topa
Thrift & Loan Association"7 provides an example. The case involved
an agreement for a "bridge loan" for construction of a luxury home
that was to be sold upon completion.Y3 Because a bridge loan tempo-
rarily covers the period after construction and before permanent fi-
nancing of the home," one would expect repayment of the loan
shortly after the developer finds a buyer. Nevertheless, the lender
initially proposed a two-year loan contract containing stock language
with a prepayment penalty clause for a contract of at least five
years.'75 After the borrower objected to this provision, a lending offi-
cer advised him that there would be no prepayment penalty after six
months. 76 An addendum was added for this purpose but contained
additional, qualifying language that read:
Provided all scheduled payments have been received not
more than 15 days after their scheduled due date, and fur-
ther provided that there have been no other defaults under
the terms of this note or any other now existing or future
obligation of borrower to Topa, then no prepayment charge
Gorgono Farms. The contracts were divided into a 10-year "first period" and a
second period covering the remainder of the contract for which Edison would
pay a higher price. See id. at 843-44,44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 229-30.
Addressing a dispute about the running of the first period, the trial court
limited its review of the contract to the written terms and concluded that it had a
plain meaning. See id. at 844, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 230. The appellate court found,
however, that not only did the contract contain patent ambiguity, but that ex-
trinsic evidence also supported the finding of ambiguity. See id. at 849-50, 44 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 233.
172. 54 Cal. App. 4th 729,62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 309 (1997).
173. See id. at 733, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 311.
174. See Ridgley, 54 Cal. App. 4th at 733, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 311.
175. See id ("Borrower will pay to Lender a prepayment charge of six (6)
months' interest at rate in effect at the time of prepayment on the amount pre-
paid .... No such prepayment charge will be made on prepayments made five
(5) or more years after the date of this Note.").
176. See id.
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will be assessed if this loan is paid in full after June 21,
1991.177
The parties executed the note on December 21, 1990, and the
borrower made all payments in a timely fashion through January
1992 but failed to make timely payments for February and March
1992.17 The April 1992 payment was satisfied, in essence, by payment
of the balance of the loan when the property was sold.179 The bor-
rower objected when the lender asserted a prepayment charge based
on the fact that the February and March 1992 payments were not
made on time.1 O The lender interpreted the addendum to state that
the borrower could not prepay without a penalty during the first six
months and could do so after the first six months only if he had not
defaulted on any payment up to the time of prepayment."' The bor-
rower asserted, to the contrary, that his understanding of the contract
was that as long as he made all payments on time for the first six
months and kept the loan for at least six months, there would be no
prepayment charge even if a default occurred after the first six
months.l 2 After first paying the penalty, the borrower sued to re-
cover the charge."u
The trial court decided for the plaintiff borrower on the basis
that the prepayment charge constituted an unenforceable forfei-
ture.'" The appellate court reversed the judgment on this ground,
deciding that the clause was a valid prepayment provision that consti-
tuted consideration for the lender accepting payment before it was
obligated to do so. 5 The appellate court, however, did not stop
there. It proceeded to decide the contract interpretation issue, hold-
ing that the lender was entitled to the prepayment charge under the
only reasonable reading of the contract.' 6
177. Id.
178. See id. at 734, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 312.
179. See id. at 734-35, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 312-13.
180. See id. at 735, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 312-13.
181. See id. at 735, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 312.
182. See id. at 733-34, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 311.
183. See id. at 735-36, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 313. The borrower sought to recover
a total amount of $114,622.42 plus interest, late fees assessed by the lender, and
attorney's fees. The trial court awarded the borrower more than $190,000. See
id.
184. See id. at 736, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 313.
185. See id. at 737, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 314. This conclusion is premised on the
principle that the debtor has no right to prepay the loan and must bargain with
the lender to have his early payment accepted. See id.
186. See id. at 739, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 315.
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The appellate court justified its decision on the ground that an
appellate court in California may independently determine a contract
interpretation issue where there is no need for extrinsic evidence."
While the appellate court arguably did take the "provisional look" at
extrinsic evidence that Pacific Gas mandates, the Ridgley court ex-
plicitly denied that it needed to consider any such evidence."
Notably, the trial court found that there was a triable issue of
fact because it found the contract language to be ambiguous."'
Moreover, the dissenting appellate court justice also expressed con-
cern that the clause in question might be ambiguous.' 90 Finally, the
nature of the bargaining history and the very nature of the temporary
bridge loan lent some credibility to the borrower's claim that no pre-
payment was to be assessed after the first six months of the life of the
loan. Such a clause certainly appears reasonable for a bridge loan.' 9'
Nevertheless, the important observation about Ridgley is the ap-
pellate court's willingness to decide the important issue on the basis
of the plain meaning rule, without bothering to take into account the
extrinsic evidence, and holding that the contract was not susceptible
to the borrower's asserted meaning. Indeed, the relevant portion of
the appellate court's majority opinion is remarkably brief and con-
tains no analysis of the competing interpretations.) Rather, this veryrecent decision seems to reflect the two majority judges' perception
187. See id.
188. The court stated, "under the plain language of the provision, [the
lender's] interpretation [was] the only reasonable one." Id. The court also said it
could decide the issue because there was "no need for extrinsic evidence." Id.
189. The case was actually handled by two trial court judges. The first held
that there was a triable issue of fact because the contract language was ambigu-
ous, noting particularly that the first draft of the prepayment clause was designed
for a five-year loan even though the term of the instant agreement was two years.
See id. at 736, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 313. Moreover, the first trial court judge also
decided that the language could reasonably be read to mean that if no default oc-
curred during the first six months, the prepayment penalty would be waived and
could not be revived. See id
190. See id. at 741-42, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 316 (Johnson, J., dissenting). The
dissent, however, rested primarily on the view that the prepayment charge was a
penalty and an unenforceable forfeiture under relevant California law. See id.
(Johnson, J., dissenting).
191. See id. at 733-34,62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 311-12.
192. The court briefly stated the two opposing interpretations of the parties
before quickly concluding: "An appellate court-may make an independent inter-
pretation of a written contract when there is no need for extrinsic evidence. We
conclude that under the plain language of the provision, defendant's interpreta-
tion is the only reasonable one." Id. at 739, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 315 (citations
omitted).
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that their assessment of the language against their own linguistic
backgrounds could be the only reasonable one, notwithstanding the
contrary opinions of the trial and dissenting appellate court judges.
Thus, the case reflects the continued application and appeal of the
plain meaning approach despite the clear dictate of Pacific Gas.'"'
Indeed, Ridgley failed to cite Pacific Gas at any point.
Another fascinating example of the continued application of the
plain meaning rule lies in one of the more recent California Supreme
Court decisions involving contract interpretation, Waller v. Truck In-
surance Exchange.' 4 Waller concerned a dispute between an insured
and an insurance company about the insurance company's obligation
to defend the insured under a commercial general liability policy
("CGL").19' Chief Justice Malcolm Lucas's majority opinion cited the
California Civil Code sections that clearly endorse a plain meaning
approach to contract interpretation and thus purported to be apply-
ing that method.'96 Closer analysis of the opinion, however, reveals
that the majority applied a contextual approach to determining the
meaning of the language and, as noted by the concurring and dissent-
ing opinion, placed as much emphasis upon industry practice as on
the particular language of the contract."9 In fact, the concurring and
dissenting opinion of Justice Kennard persuasively asserted that the
plain meaning of the policy language would not support the major-
ity's reasoning.!
Waller involved a closely-held corporation with two initial
shareholders, James Wailer, who owned sixty percent of the stock,
and Lester Amey, who owned forty percent of the stock.'" After
Waller sold his shares in even proportions to four employees without
193. Cf. Kniffin, supra note 58, at 654-55 (suggesting that Pacific Gas has been
followed in California decisions but citing primarily federal court decisions).
194. 11 Cal. 4th 1, 900 P.2d 619, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 370 (1995).
195. A general commercial liability policy provides insurance for businesses
against responsibility for accidents. See Waller, 11 Cal. 4th at 16, 900 P.2d at 625,
44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 376. The policies will usually identify the risks that are cov-
ered and then specify any exclusions from those general areas of risk. See id.
196. Chief Justice Lucas cited section 1639, which provides that intent is to be
inferred, if possible, solely from the written provisions of the contract. See id. at
18, 900 P.2d at 627, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 378. He also cited section 1638, providing
that a court should look first to the language of the contract in order to ascertain
its plain meaning or the meaning a layperson would ordinarily attach to it. See
id.
197. See id. at 37-38, 900 P.2d at 640, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 391 (Kennard, J., con-
curring and dissenting).
198. See id. (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
199. See id. at 11, 900 P.2d at 622, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 373.
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giving Amey advance notice, the new co-owners acted to demote
Amey as an employee and to minimize his participation in the con-
trol of the business.2° Amey initiated litigation against Waller, the
four new officers, and the corporation, alleging breach of fiduciary
and statutory good faith duties, breach of contract, intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress, and a number of other claims on related
theories."' Waller sought defense from his insurer, Truckers Insur-
ance Exchange, who denied coverage on the ground that the com-
plaint arose from a shareholder dispute involving intentional acts and
therefore did not fall within the scope of coverage.2 Internal memo-
randa at Truckers Insurance Exchange revealed additional grounds
for denying coverage, including the fact that the scope of the policy
limited coverage to incidents involving personal injury.'
Waller and the other defendants then brought a subsequent suit
against Truckers Insurance Exchange on the ground that it breached
its duty to defend.' At trial the court made a number of legal rul-
ings, including a decision that Truckers Insurance Exchange had
breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by fail-
ing to fulfill its duty to defend."5 Thereafter, the jury found that
Truckers Insurance Exchange had contravened the statutory bad
faith provisions and awarded almost $2 million in compensatory
damages and over $60 million in punitive damages on all causes of
action combined.
Truckers Insurance Exchange appealed and won a complete
reversal in the court of appeal on the basis that there was no duty to
200. See id.
201. See id.
202. See id. at 13,900 P.2d at 623-24,44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 374-75.
203. The regional claims manager concluded that the CGL policy did not pro-
vide coverage under the alleged facts because: (1) there was not bodily injury or
property damage; (2) any economic injuries suffered were expected or intended
from the standpoint of the insureds; (3) "Amey [was] a named insured and the
policy expressly excluded coverage for liability to named insureds; and [(4)]
Amey was [an] employee, and the policy excluded coverage for bodily injury suf-
fered by employees arising out of and in the course of employment." Id at 13,
900 P.2d at 623, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 374.
204. See id. at 14, 900 P.2d at 624, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 375. Also named as a de-
fendant with Truckers Insurance Exchange was Farmers Insurance Exchange,
which served as Truckers Insurance Exchange's adjuster, responsible for han-
dling claims filed by its insureds. See id Wailer and the other plaintiffs accused
Truckers Insurance Exchange of breach of good faith and fiduciary duties as well
as statutory bad faith. See id
205. The trial court held Farmers Insurance jointly and severally liable as the
insurer's adjuster. See id.
206. See id. at 14-15, 900 P.2d at 624-25, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 375-76.
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defend.2 The court of appeal reasoned that the original complaint
involved a claim of economic loss based on a business dispute and
that economic losses simply were not covered under the policy.S
The California Supreme Court upheld the reversal, offering a num-
ber of insights into the contract interpretation process generally, and
into the interpretation of insurance contracts in particular.'
Although the majority eventually cited a veritable checklist of
interpretative principles which clearly emphasized the plain meaning
aspects of the California rules, 210 it began its analysis by looking to in-
dustry standards to identify common practice with regard to CGL
policies, noting that such policies are usually limited in coverage to
claims involving "bodily injury, sickness or disease" or "physical in-
jury or destruction of tangible property.",2" The court also noted that
CGL policies normally exclude coverage for losses not specifically
named, such as economic losses, unless related to bodily injury or
property damage.2 Thereafter, the majority proceeded to examine
the actual language of the policy in the case at hand.
The insureds argued that the plain meaning of the policy would
cover bodily injury and that the alleged emotional and physical dis-
tress amounted to bodily injury. The response of the majority
opinion to this argument relied on trade custom that denied coverage
for intangible property losses; including economic losses.24 Rather
than relying exclusively on a "plain meaning" reading of the policy
language, however, the court held that industry practice, read in light
of decisions by other courts, excluded claims of physical distress that
were entirely derivative of noncovered economic loss.
25
Similarly, the majority stated that "the result reached by the
courts in [denying coverage for emotional distress based on economic
loss] is consistent with the reasonable expectations of the parties.,
216
In its reasoning, however, the majority was not looking to evidence of
the negotiations between these particular parties but instead was
looking to general practice in the industry.
207. See id. at 15, 900 P.2d at 625, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 376.
208. See id.
209. See id. at 15-37, 900 P.2d at 625-39, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 376-90.
210. See id. at 18-19, 900 P.2d at 627, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 378; see also supra
note 196 (listing the California Civil Code Sections on which the majority relied).
211. Id. at 17, 900 P.2d at 626, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 377.
212. See id. at 17-18, 900 P.2d at 626, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 377.
213. See id. at 26, 900 P.2d at 632-33, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 383-84.
214. See id. at 26-27, 900 P.2d at 633, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 384.
215. See id. at 20-23, 900 P.2d at 628-30, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 379-81.
216. Id at 27-28, 900 P.2d at 633, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 384.
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The insured's plain meaning argument did not fall on completely
deaf ears. Justice Kennard's separate opinion emphasized the same
principle the California courts have consistently emphasized over the
years: "by and large an insurance policy is interpreted no differently
than any other contract, and that when the parties express their in-
tent in unambiguous language in the policy, that intent governs." ' 7
Justice Kennard highlighted the policy language that provided cover-
age for all bodily injuries caused by an "occurrence," which was de-
fined as any "event, or series of events... proximately caused by an
act or omission of the insured... which results.., in bodily injury...
neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured."2 1 s
Justice Kennard asserted that nothing in the language of the policy
excluded "coverage for bodily injuries resulting from events that ei-
ther themselves are economic losses or cause economic losses in ad-
dition to bodily injury."2 9 Justice Kennard also pointed out that nei-
ther party had offered extrinsic evidence relating to the making of
the policy.m
The bodily injury arguably was evident in "headaches, back
pains, and rashes" which the demoted shareholder/employee suffered
as a result of the insureds' conduct.2' Justice Kennard took the posi-
tion that "[m]ost of the courts that have addressed the issue have
held that any physical manifestations accompanying emotional dis-
tress are 'bodily injuries' as that term is used in insurance policies."'
Although Justice Kennard did not actually conclude that the emo-
tional distress should satisfy the requirement of bodily injury within
the policytm she recognized as viable the argument that the plain
217. Id. at 37, 900 P.2d at 640, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 391 (Kennard, J., concurring
and dissenting).
218. Id. at 37-38, 900 P.2d at 640, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 391 (Kennard, J., concur-
ring and dissenting).
219. Id. at 38, 900 P.2d at 640, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 391 (Kennard, J., concurring
and dissenting).
220. See id. at 40, 900 P.2d at 641, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 392 (Kennard, J., concur-
ring and dissenting).
221. See id. at 40, 900 P.2d at 641-42, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 392-93 (Kennard, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
222- Id. at 40, 900 P.2d at 642, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 393 (Kennard, J., concurring
and dissenting) (citations omitted).
223. Justice Kennard concurred in the ultimate outcome of the case because
she concluded that although there may well have been bodily injury within the
plain meaning of the policy, there was not an occurrence because the policy did
not cover injury or damage that is expected or intended by the insured. See id. at
49, 900 P.2d at 647-48, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 398-99 (Kennard, J., concurring and
dissenting). In this case the injured party claimed intentional infliction of emo-
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meaning of the policy should result in a finding of sufficient bodily
injury. Justice Kennard fairly hammered home that the language of
the contract does not exclude bodily injury that results from eco-
nomic distress and that the majority identified no other evidence of
the parties' mutual intent that would otherwise exclude that form of
bodily injury. Justice Kennard also emphasized that the injured party
argued that the emotional distress was not simply derivative of the
economic loss but was the direct result of intentional conduct by the
insureds.24
In light of the majority opinion's very persuasive reasoning that
the emotional distress did not fit within the scope of the policy as
generally understood, Justice Kennard's position points to the fallacy
of the plain meaning approach: It is entirely possible to assign a
meaning that neither party intended nor reasonably expected in the
particular context. Yet California courts often strongly suggest the
plain meaning approach in the stated rules of interpretation for con-
tracts generally, and for insurance contracts as well.'
C. Contract Integration and the Parol Evidence Rule
Pacific Gas is best understood as involving a question of con-
tract interpretation. That is, once the express terms are identified,
the court must then assign meaning to those terms.f Apart from
tional distress, and therefore the injury would necessarily have been intended
and outside the scope of coverage. See id. at 41-43, 900 P.2d at 642-44, 44 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 393-95 (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
224. See id. at 47-48, 900 P.2d at 647, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 398-99 (Kennard, J.,
concurring and dissenting). Justice Kennard also rejected the majority's"reasonable expectations" argument on the grounds that it would be relevant
only when the language of the policy presented an ambiguity, which the justice
deemed not to be present. See id. (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
Moreover, she noted that if there were an ambiguity, the doctrine requires a
court to resolve the ambiguity in favor of the insured by extending coverage to
the insured. See id. at 48, 900 P.2d at 647, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 398 (Kennard, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
225. See, e.g., Bank of the West v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 4th 1254, 1264, 833
P.2d 545, 552, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 538, 545 (1992) ("The fundamental goal of con-
tractual interpretation is to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties ....
If contractual language is clear and explicit, it governs." (citations omitted));
AIU Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 3d 807, 821-22, 799 P.2d 1253, 1264, 274
Cal. Rptr. 820, 831 (1990) ("Such intent is to be inferred, if possible, solely from
the written provisions of the contract."). But see Kniffin, supra note 58, at 643-44
(noting that it may not be possible to know if there are two or more reasonable
interpretations of a disputed contract term without looking at the surrounding
circumstances).
226. Brawthen v. H&R Block, Inc., 28 Cal. App. 3d 131, 136, 104 Cal. Rptr.
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interpretation, an even more fundamental question is how to iden-
tify which terms comprise the express agreement. Normally, an issue
arises concerning whether the parties intended a final writing to be a
complete and exclusive agreement of the parties or whether instead
the parties may have left some terms outside of the final writing.
While the use of extrinsic evidence in resolving such questions of in-
tegration often mimics the use of extrinsic evidence for purposes of
interpretation, parties and courts will undoubtedly err in the inter-
pretive function if they do not recognize the differences between the
two processes and the implications of admitting extrinsic evidence.
The first question to be answered in the process of considering if
terms were left out of a final writing is whether the writing can be
dispositive of the integration question. This question often arises
when a contract includes a merger clause.m A second way, at least
theoretically, in which the writing could prove its completeness is by
virtue of its patent "wholeness," leaving no room for outside terms.
Before 1968 California law stated that the integration of a contract
486, 490 (1972) (The rule of Pacific Gas should be restricted to its stated bounds
of allowing use of extrinsic evidence to prove a meaning to which the contract
language is reasonably susceptible.).
227. A good example of the close line between extrinsic evidence used to in-
terpret and extrinsic evidence used to supplement a writing is found in Delta Dy-
namics, Inc., v. Arioto, 69 Cal. 2d 525, 446 P.2d 785, 72 Cal. Rptr. 785 (1968). The
case involved an exclusive distribution contract for a firearm safety device which
included a clause providing that if the distributor failed to buy a specified quota
the manufacturer could terminate the agreement on thirty days' notice. See id. at
526-27, 446 P.2d at 786, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 786. After the distributor failed to meet
the quota, the manufacturer terminated the agreement and brought an action to
recover money damages for the unfulfilled part of the quota. See id. at 527, 446
P.2d at 786, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 786. The distributor sought to introduce evidence of
conversations during negotiations to prove that the parties expressly agreed that
the right to terminate was to be the sole remedy for failure to meet the quota.
See id. After the trial court barred the extrinsic evidence on the basis of the pa-
rol evidence rule, the California Supreme Court decided in a 4-3 decision that the
extrinsic evidence should have been admitted for purposes of interpreting the
termination clause in the writing, as supporting a meaning to which the clause
was reasonably susceptible. See id. at 528-29, 446 P.2d at 787, 72 Cal. Rptr. at
787. The very same evidence that was not allowed to supplement the writing was
admissible to interpret the written terms. Thus, the case highlights the some-
times slender line between interpretation and supplementation. Cf. Banco Do
Brasil, S.A. v. Latian, Inc., 234 Cal. App. 3d 973, 1008-09, 285 Cal. Rptr. 870,
890-91 (1991) (holding parol evidence inadmissible to supplement writing on
grounds that the purported term would have been included in writing if agreed to
and also rejecting attempt to introduce the same evidence for interpretation pur-
poses where the proposed meaning directly contradicted the written terms).
228. For example, a contract may contain a clause stating, "'there are no pre-
vious understandings or agreements not contained in the writing."' Masterson v.
Sine, 68 Cal. 2d 222, 225, 436 P.2d 561,563, 65 Cal. Rptr. 545, 547 (1968).
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should be determined by looking solely at the face of the writing."
1. Masterson v. Sine °
The California Supreme Court discredited the "facial complete-
ness" approach in Masterson v. Sine. As discussed in niore detail be-
low, on its factual merits Masterson is best viewed as an example of a
court trying to reach a just result where that objective cannot be eas-
ily defended.2l The effort in Masterson may have resulted in stating
its new standard more liberally than it should have by overemphasiz-
ing credibility of extrinsic evidence as a test for admission.
Nevertheless, Masterson does stand for the very defensible proposi-
tion that "the crucial issue in determining whether there has been an in-
tegration is whether the parties intended their writing to serve as the ex-
clusive embodiment of their agreement.' '2 2 Consequently, the fact that a
writing contains a merger clause, or that it may otherwise appear facially
complete, does not bar an examination of extrinsic evidence to help de-
termine whether the parties intended the writing to be fully integrated&3
Masterson states that the court should consider the status of the parties,
the object of the contract, the circumstances of contracting, and other
factors in deciding whether it may reasonably conclude that a term might
have been left out of what might otherwise be a final writing.'
229. See id. at 226, 436 P.2d at 563, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 547; see also FPI Dev., Inc.
v. Nakashima, 231 Cal. App. 3d 367, 388, 282 Cal. Rptr. 508, 520 (1991) ("The
starch in the unreconstructed parol evidence rule was the doctrine that integra-
tion should be determined solely from the face of the instrument.").
230. See Masterson, 68 Cal. 2d at 222,436 P.2d at 561,65 Cal. Rptr. at 547.
231. See infra Part III.
232. Masterson, 68 Cal. 2d at 225, 436 P.2d at 563, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 547; see also
FPI Dev., 231 Cal. App. 3d at 388, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 520.
233. See Masterson, 68 Cal. 2d at 226-27, 436 P.2d at 563-64, 65 Cal. Rptr. 547-
48; see also Hayter Trucking v. Shell Western E&P, Inc., 18 Cal. App. 4th 1, 14,
22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 229, 237 (1993) (determining whether a contract is an integration
is question of law for the court, and evidence of surrounding circumstances and
prior negotiations may be admitted for this limited purpose); Ailing v. Universal
Mfg. Corp., 5 Cal. App. 4th 1412, 1434, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 718, 732 (1992)
("Evidence of surrounding circumstances and prior negotiations may be admit-
ted for the limited purpose of assisting the trial court in determining whether a
document was intended to be the final agreement of the parties superseding all
other transactions."); cf. Banco Do Brasil, 234 Cal. App. 3d at 1001, 285 Cal.
Rptr. at 886 (stating that utilization of a merger clause "may well be conclusive
on the issue of integration").
234. See Masterson, 68 Cal. 2d at 226, 436 P.2d at 563, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 547; see
also McLain v. Great American Ins. Cos., 208 Cal. App. 3d 1476, 1484, 256 Cal.
Rptr. 863, 867 (1989) (In addressing the issue of contract integration, the court
must consider such factors as
'the language and completeness of the written agreement and whether it
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The Masterson approach is consistent with the standard in the
Restatement (Second)' and the relatively recent approach of a num-
ber of jurisdictions. 6 In addition, it has been codified in California
Code of Civil Procedure section 18 5 6.23 Before expanding on the
facts and principles established in Masterson, it is important to rec-
ognize three other limitations on the integration concept. First, a
contract may be only partially integrated. In a partially integrated
agreement, the writing is final on some terms but is not an exclusive
statement of the parties' agreement; therefore some terms may exist
outside the writing.2s Second, as noted above, whether partially or
fully integrated, the contract's terms may require interpretation in
light of relevant extrinsic evidence. Such extrinsic evidence is not
permitted to contradict the writing but may explain a fully integrated
agreement and may explain or supplement a partially integrated
contains an integration clause, the terms of the alleged oral agreement
and whether they contradict those in the writing, whether the oral
agreement might naturally be made as a separate agreement, and
whether the jury might be misled by the introduction of parol testimony
(quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Rossi, 138 Cal. App. 3d 256, 266, 187 Cal. Rptr. 845,
851, (1982)).
235. RESTATEMENT (SECONo) oF CONTRACTS § 210 cmt. b (1981).
Proof of complete integration. That a writing was or was not adopted as
a completely integrated agreement may be proved by any relevant evi-
dence. A document in the form of a written contract, signed by both
parties and apparently complete on its face, may be decisive of the issue
mn the absence of credible contrary evidence. But a writing cannot itself
prove its own completeness, and wide latitude must be alowed for in-quiry into circumstances bearing on the intention of the parties.
See id.; see also FARNSWORTH, supra note 36, § 7.3 (Courts traditionally gave ef-
fect to merger clauses, but the recent trend has been to deny conclusive effect.).
236. See Masurovsky v. Green, 687 A.2d 198,203 (D.C. Ct. App. 1996) (stating
that the presence or absence of merger clause may be a significant, though not
conclusive, factor in determining whether parties intended writing to be com-
pletely integrated); Siegner v. Interstate Prod. Credit Ass'n., 820 P.2d 20, 26-27
(Or. Ct. App. 1991) (merger clause not conclusive on the question of integration
where the documents on their face did not completely contain the terms.); Mor-
gan v. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., 663 P.2d 1384, 1388 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983)
(Courts will examine extrinsic evidence to determine whether the parties in-
tended to be bound by the merger clause.). But see Nelson v. Elway, 908 P.2d
102, 107 (Colo. 1995) (merger clause generally precludes consideration of extrin-
sic evidence to ascertain parties' intent).
237. A portion of the statute is set out supra note 66.
238. See Hayter Trucking, 18 Cal. App. 4th at 14, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 237
(parties may intend the writing to be a final and complete expression only as to
certain terms.); Wallis v. Farmers Group, Inc., 220 Cal. App. 3d 718, 730, 269 Cal.
Rptr. 299, 305-06 (1990); Wagner v. Glendale Adventist Med. Ctr., 216 Cal. App.
3d 1379, 1385,265 Cal. Rptr. 412,416 (1989).
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agreement2 9 Third, contract law in California and in general recog-
nizes a number of other situations in which the parol evidence rule
does not apply or applies in a restricted fashion, such as in cases of
mistake, fraud, oral preconditions, illegality, and the like.24
Justice Traynor wrote the majority decision in Masterson, as he
did in Pacific Gas, and again sought to illuminate a basic area of con-
tract construction. The case establishes clear and cogent legal prin-
ciples for determining whether a contract is fully integrated, but the
majority's application of those principles to the facts of the case is
questionable and perhaps leads to an overstatement of the impor-
tance of credibility as a test for the admission of evidence. Masterson
involved the sale of land from Dallas and Rebecca Masterson to
Medora and Lu Sine. Mr. Masterson was Ms. Sine's brother.24 The
grant deed included a reservation of an option for the Mastersons to
239. See Hayter Trucking, 18 Cal. App. 4th 1, 14-15, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 229, 237-
38; Banco Do Brasil, 234 Cal. App. 3d 973, 1002,285 Cal. Rptr. 870, 886.
240. Several of the exceptions are built into the codified parol evidence rule:
"mistake or imperfection in the writing," "validity of the agreement," and
"illegality or fraud." The California courts take a somewhat restrictive approach
to the exceptions, stating that the parol evidence rule is not a bar, but still look-
ing for consistency with the writing rather than looking solely for credibility of
the parol evidence. For example, the fraud exception to the parol evidence rule
in California is more narrow than in some other jurisdictions by virtue of the
prohibition against showing fraud that is directly at variance with the written
terms. See Ailing, at 1436, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 733 (The fraud exception to the pa-
rol evidence rule applies only if the evidence of the alleged false promise is inde-
pendent of or consistent with the final writing; the extrinsic evidence may not
prove a promise directly at variance with the terms of the final writing.); Price v.
Wells Fargo Bank, 213 Cal. App. 3d 465,483-86,261 Cal. Rptr. 735,745-47 (1989)
(Debtors who signed loan agreement at stated interest rate were barred from
presenting that they had been promised a lower interest rate.). See generally
CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 36, § 3-7 (Generally, proof of fraud in the in-
ducement of a contract may be shown even it contradicts the writing or a merger
clause.). A good example of the treatment of oral preconditions is FPI Dev., Inc.
v. Nakashima, 231 Cal. App. 3d 367, 282 Cal. Rptr. 508 (1991). After the trial
court held that the parol evidence rule stood as a categorical bar to an alleged
oral precondition to the validity of a promissory note that was unconditional on
its face, the appellate court held that the extrinsic evidence should not have been
automatically barred. See id. at 387, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 520. Rather, under Master-
son and section 1856, the appellate court reasoned that the extrinsic evidence
should be examined to determine whether it directly contradicted the face of the
writing or otherwise lacked credibilty. See id. at 389, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 521. The
appellate court proceeded to find that there was "no necessary contradiction"
between a note that was unconditional on its face and an oral precondition to its
validity. See id. at 395, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 525. This part of the court's reasoning is
consistent with the general treatment of oral preconditions. See FARNSWORTH,
supra note 36, § 7.3.
241. See Masterson, 68 Cal. 2d at 222, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 546.
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repurchase the property within ten years for the "same consideration
as being paid heretofore [plus the] depreciation value of any im-
provements [grantees make to the property up to two and a half
years from this date]."242 After Mr. Masterson was adjudged bank-
rupt during the option period, the trustee in bankruptcy and Rebecca
brought a declaratory action to enforce the option.243
The trial court admitted extrinsic evidence for the purpose of in-
terpreting the "consideration" and "depreciation" terms but refused
to admit extrinsic evidence of an alleged oral term that the option
was personal to the grantors because of a desire to keep the property
in the Masterson family.2" Both the majority and the dissenting
opinions in the supreme court decision recognized the propriety of
admitting the parol evidence to interpret the consideration and de-
preciation terms in light of the patent ambiguity of the contract's ex-
press terms.24 The majority and the dissent, however, disagreed ve-
hemently over the admissibility of the alleged collateral term limiting
exercise of the option to the Mastersons. This disagreement went to
both the relevant legal rule governing the determination of when a
contract should be deemed fully integrated and a proper reading of
the facts of the case.
Justice Traynor, in his majority opinion not only rejected the
position that an agreement must appear facially incomplete to allow
for the possibility of a collateral term, but he also rejected the view
that a merger clause alone would be determinative.2" Rather, Justice
Traynor wrote that in either case the purported collateral term must
be examined to determine whether the parties intended it to be ex-
cluded from the contract and that the circumstances at the time of
writing may also be relevant.24 The foregoing principles establish a
rather liberal formulation of the parol evidence rule, but not far
beyond the mainstream." Justice Traynor, however, did not stop
242. Id. at 224, 436 P.2d at 562, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 546.
243. See id.
244. See id. The consideration was $50,000 and the depreciation was deemed
to mean the total amount of any capital expenditures made by the Sines less the
amount of depreciation allowed under United States income tax regulations. See
id.
245. See id.
246. See id. at 224-25, 436 P.2d at 562-63, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 546-47; see also FPI
Dev., 231 Cal. App. 3d at 388-89, 282 Cal. Rptr. 508,520.
247. See Masterson, 68 Cal. 2d at 225-26, 436 P.2d at 563, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 547.
248. See, e.g., Sierra Diesel Injection Serv., Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 890 F.2d
108, 112 (9th Cir. 1989) (applying the Uniform Commercial Code under Nevada
law and holding that the presence of a merger clause is a strong sign that the par-
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there. After noting that the parol evidence rule addresses concerns
that writings are more accurate than human memory and that parties
may testify fraudulently, Justice Traynor stated that the rule must ul-
timately "be based on the credibility of the evidence." '249 In turn, Jus-
tice Traynor wrote that the question of credibility would rest on the
general circumstances and, in particular, whether the purported col-
lateral term was one that might naturally have been omitted from the
writing or that would have certainly been included in the writing if
mader ° Ultimately then, the Traynor formulation ties the credibility
of the extrinsic evidence to the consistency between the purported
collateral term and the final writing. 2' To the extent that Masterson
is read to state that doubtful credibility is the only or the most impor-
tant reason to exclude extrinsic evidence, however, the case may in-
deed be misleading. The case of Gerdlund v. Electronic Dispensers
International,' discussed below, suggests as much.
The proffered evidence in Masterson appeared to be the testi-
mony of Dallas Masterson, the person who had been adjudged bank-
rupt and who sought to frustrate the efforts of the trustee to gain an
important asset that might be used to satisfy some of his creditors. 3
The majority decided that the purported collateral term might have
been naturally omitted from the contract because the writing did not
contain either a merger clause or a provision on the assignability of
the option. The court also considered the parties' lack of sophistication
and that the form of the deed did not lend itself to including the non-
assignability restriction.2 The majority thus decided that the trial
court erroneously excluded the parol evidence of the restriction on
ties intended an integration but is not conclusive as a matter of law); RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTIRAcrS § 214 (1981) (stating that writings do not
prove themselves). Cf Redfern Meats, Inc. v. Hertz Corp., 215 S.E.2d 10, 18
(Ga. Ct. App. 1975) (Proof of express warranty in advertising brochure was
barred by the inclusion of merger clause in subsequent written lease agreement.).
249. Masterson, 68 Cal. 2d at 227,436 P.2d at 564,65 Cal. Rptr. at 548.
250. See id. Justice Traynor took the tests from the first Restatement of Con-
tracts section 240(1)(b) and the UCC section 2-202 cmt. 3. See id at 227-28.
251. See FPIDev., 231 Cal. App. 3d at 388-89, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 520-21; see also
American Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Continental Parking Corp., 42 Cal. App. 3d 260, 266,
116 Cal. Rptr. 801, 804-05 (1974) (Under Masterson, evidence of purported col-
lateral oral terms were properly excluded where they totally contradicted a
thirty-three-page typed contract to lease a parking garage for twenty-five years,
the purported collateral term dealt with a matter on which the lease was explicit,
and the purported collateral term would not naturally have been made as a sepa-
rate agreement.).
252. 190 Cal. App. 3d 263,235 Cal. Rptr. 279 (1987).
253. See Masterson, 68 Cal. 2d at 231, 436 P.2d at 567, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 551.
254. See icL at 228, 436 P.2d at 565, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 549.
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the option. s5
Thus, the Masterson majority held not only that the trial court
had applied an incorrect rule of law but also that under the proper
rule of law the evidence should have been admitted. Alternatively,
the majority could simply have directed the trial court to reconsider
the question of admissibility under the test announced in this case
without dictating what the outcome should be. Under such an ap-
proach, the trial court would first determine whether the contract was
completely or partially integrated. If completely integrated, then no
parol evidence would be admissible to supplement the agreement, al-
though such evidence would still have been admissible to aid in inter-
preting the writing. If only partially integrated, as was likely the case
in light of the apparent brevity of the writing and the lack of a merger
clause, then the court would determine whether the purported collat-
eral term was consistent with the writing and might naturally have
been omitted. The majority answered these questions in its opinion,
appearing to preempt the trial court from engaging in this analytical
process.
In his dissent, Justice Burke, joined by Justice McComb, strongly
disagreed about the proper legal standard for determining whether a
contract is completely integrated and about whether the purported
collateral term was one that might have naturally been omitted from
the writing as a matter of fact. The dissent asserted that the legal rule
adopted by the majority, rejecting the determination of complete in-
tegration based solely on the face of the agreement, was based on
misreadings of California precedent and utilized questionable
authority.26 The dissent also argued that emphasizing the credibility
of the evidence and whether the purported collateral term might
have naturally been omitted from the writing was an "approach that
open[ed] the door to uncertainty and confusion." z Frankly, the
dissent's reluctance to abandon the facial completeness test for
255. See id. at 231, 436 P.2d at 567, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 551.
256. See id. at 235, 436 P.2d at 569, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 553-54 (Burke, J., dissent-
ing).
257. Id. at 238, 436 P.2d at 571, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 555 (Burke, J., dissenting).
The dissent questioned whether trial judges should be burdened with the need to
determine whether a purported collateral term is one that might "naturally" have
been omitted from the writing, noted that the standard is one that places a great
deal of weight on the subjective judgment of each trial court judge and thus
would likely lead to inconsistent decisions, and predicted that the rule will inevi-
tably lead to the appellate courts making such determinations on a case-by-case
basis. See id. at 238-39, 436 P.2d at 571-72, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 555-56 (Burke, J., dis-
senting).
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determining questions of complete integration does not carry the day
in light of subsequent developments in the law in this area. Indeed,
the majority's new standard has been persuasive and, for the most
part, now falls within the mainstream."8
The dissent's observations about factual determinations, how-
ever, are persuasive in arguing that the evidence of the collateral
term should not have been admitted in any event. The dissent points
out that the deed was prepared in escrow under written instructions
from the parties, without mention in either the deed or the escrow in-
structions that the option was personal or nonassignable 29 The dis-
sent persuasively asserts that the restriction rendering the option
nonassignable could have been easily inserted in the deed, which oc-
curs often with other similar deed restrictions.2'° The dissent also re-
futed the majority's perception of the parties as "unsophisticates"
who might be excused from omitting such an important restriction,
noting that Dallas Masterson was an experienced businessman who
used his attorney to draft the option language after explaining what
the parties wanted to accomplish.2' Finally, the dissent points out
that the purported collateral term directly conflicts with a very strong
presumption of the free assignability of property rights in a manner
that would allow creditors to be defeated in bankruptcy."6
Ultimately, the majority in Masterson has proved to be more
correct about the manner in which questions of integration should
be addressed, but the dissent makes a much more persuasive ar-
gument about the effect of the test in the opinion than it does be-
fore the court. The divergent opinions and the weaknesses within
the majority might have been expected to lead to subsequent con-
fusion in the California courts. One can, however, identify a
number of decisions that properly apply the legal principles of
Masterson, including Gerdlund v. Electronic Dispensers Interna-
tional.'
258. See supra, note 232 and accompanying text.
259. See Masterson, 64 Cal. 2d at 233, 436 P.2d at 568, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 552
(Burke, J., dissenting).
260. See id. at 239, 436 P.2d at 572, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 556. (Burke, J., dissenting);
see also Olivia W. Karlin, The California Parol Evidence Rule, 21 Sw. U. L. REV.
1361, 1367-69 (1992) (noting persuasive arguments of Masterson dissent and
criticizing majority opinion).
261. Id. (Burke, J., dissenting).
262. See id. at 241-42,436 P.2d at 573-74, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 557-58 (Burke, J., dis-
senting).
263. 190 Cal. App. 3d 263,235 Cal. Rptr. 279 (1987).
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2. Gerdlund v. Electronic Dispensers International
In addition to exemplifying the standards announced in the ma-
jority opinion in Masterson, Gerdlund also makes the important dis-
tinction between supplementation and interpretation of a contract by
parol evidence. The dispute in Gerdlund arose from a contract be-
tween Electronic Dispensers International ("EDI"), a manufacturer
of bar dispensing equipment, and Leroy and Susan Gerdlund.' Af-
ter Leroy had worked for EDI as an independent sales representative
from 1967 to 1970 and as director of marketing from 1970 to 1973,
Leroy and Susan formed a partnership, S&L Sales, to develop a mar-
ket for EDI products in California, Arizona, and Nevada, and by
1975 in Utah, Colorado and New Mexico.25 The written agreement
between the Gerdlunds and EDI regarding the effective period of the
contract provided:
This agreement shall be effective until thirty (30) days after
notice of termination given by either party. Notice of ter-
mination may be given at any time and for any reason, and
the date of any such notice shall be the postmark date if
mailed, or the transmission date if wired .... This agree-
ment contains the entire agreement between the Company
and the Representative. There are no oral or collateral
agreements of any kind ....
In 1976 EDI changed its commission terms and gave termination
notice to all its sales representatives, including the Gerdlunds.' 7 The
Gerdlunds objected to some of the terms in the new proposed con-
tract and eventually were terminated after negotiations with EDI
failed.m Despite the written merger clause and the provision allow-
ing for termination for any reason on thirty days' notice, the Gerd-
lunds sued EDI based on repeated oral promises that they would not
be terminated "as long as they did a good job" with their territory."
At the time of termination, EDI did not dispute that the Gerdlunds
had performed well. After early years in which they had expended
considerable personal effort and resources in building the EDI cus-
tomer base in the western states, the Gerdlunds were consistently the
top performers for EDI and apparently accounted for approximately
264. See id. at 267, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 280.
265. See id.
266. Id. at 268, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 280.
267. See id.
268. See id. at 268, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 280.
269. Id.
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twenty-five percent of EDI's total United States sales of $4.7 million
in 1976.2'0 The trial court admitted evidence of the oral assurances
that the Gerdlunds would not be terminated as long as they per-
formed well."n The jury returned a verdict against EDI for breach of
the employment agreement and assessed damages in the amount of
$287,573.m
The Gerdlund appellate court correctly concluded that the trial
court had erred in allowing in the evidence of the oral assurances un-
der California law.273 As noted in the appellate opinion:
The parol evidence rule generally prohibits the introduction
of any extrinsic evidence to vary or contradict the terms of
an integrated written instrument. It is based upon the
premise that the written instrument is the agreement of the
parties. Its application involves a two part analysis: 1) was
the writing intended to be an integration, i.e. a complete and
final expression of the parties' agreement, precluding any
evidence of collateral agreements; and 2) is the agreement
susceptible of the meaning contended for by the party offer-
ing the evidence? 4
Thus, the Gerdlund court initially focused on whether the contract
was fully integrated and therefore not subject to supplementation by
some extrinsic term. 5 Distinguishing earlier cases including Masterson,
the Gerdlund court concluded simply that "[b]y any standard, the
270. See id. at 268, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 281.
271. See id. at 269, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 281.
272- See id.
The case was tried on two causes of action: 1) breach of the written
agreement, incorporating both the express oral representations and the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and 2) fraudulent mis-
representation against Wayne Easely individually. The jury found that
EDI had breached the employment agreement... [but] that no fraud
had been committed by Easley.
Id.
273. The contract actually provided for application of Nevada law to the con-
tract. See id. Both parties, however, based their arguments on the law of Cali-
fornia and the appellate court determined that there was no conflict between the
law of the two jurisdictions. See id.
274. Id. at 270, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 282 (citations omitted); see also Hayter
Trucking, 18 Cal. App. 4th at 13, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 237 (stating that if parties
incorporate the complete and final terms, then the writing may not be contra-
dicted by collateral agreements).
275. See Gerdlund, 190 Cal. App. 3d at 270, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 282. The parties
accepted that termination was to be governed by the last written agreement and
did not argue that some subsequent unwritten agreement arose after the written
contract was initially terminated. See id.
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agreement before us is integrated.,2 6 The Gerdlund court reasoned
that the integration clause clearly refuted any argument that the con-
tract was partially integrated, that Leroy Gerdlund had helped draft
the entire agreement while working in management for EDI, that the
agreement's six pages appeared to cover all aspects of the employ-
ment relationship, and that the oral assurances that the Gerdlunds
would not be terminated without cause directly contradicted the ex-
press written term that termination could be made by either party for
any reason.2' The Gerdlund court correctly noted that while Master-
son adopted a liberalizing approach to the parol evidence rule, it also
emphasized that the alleged oral term must not contradict or be in-
consistent with the express written terms of the agreement.us
After concluding that the alleged oral term could not supple-
ment the agreement, the Gerdlund court discussed whether the prof-
fered extrinsic evidence could be used as an aid in interpreting the in-
tegrated written agreement.29 The court stretched to consider the
possibility that the written contract could be read to accommodate
the Gerdlunds' argument but rejected that argument stating:
Testimony by all parties at the in limine hearing was that all
had the same general intent regarding the length of em-
ployment, namely that the Gerdlunds would not be termi-
nated as long as they were doing a good job for EDI. On the
basis of this evidence the Gerdlunds argued that the sentence
which reads "Notice of termination may be given at any
time and for any reason" should be interpreted to mean "for
any good reason," in order to be consistent with the parties'
276. Id. at 271,235 Cal. Rptr. at 283.
277. See id. at 272, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 283.
278. See id. at 270-71, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 282. Another interesting and thought-
ful application of the Masterson decision can be found in FPI Dev., 231 Cal. App.
3d at 385-90, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 518-22. The plaintiffs sued on a promissory note
received from the defendants in exchange for an option on a golf course. See id.
at 376, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 512. The defendants asserted that the promissory note,
although unconditional on its face, was subject to a condition that the golf course
be sold before the note would be due, essentially an argument for an oral pre-
condition to the validity of the contract. See id. at 377, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 513. The
trial court categorically refused to consider the evidence on the grounds that the
parol evidence rule barred any evidence of an oral condition on an otherwise un-
conditional writing. See id. at 380, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 515. The court of appeals
properly ruled that the trial court had erred in generally barring evidence of the
oral precondition, but ultimately the appellate court also decided in favor of the
plaintiffs on the grounds that the purported oral precondition was inconsistent
with the writing. See id. at 396-97, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 525-26.
279. See Gerdlund, 190 Cal. App. 3d at 272-73,235 Cal. Rptr. at 283-84.
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stated understanding.
We do not find that the language of the contract lends
itself to the proposed meaning. The term "any reason" is
plainly all-inclusive, encompassing all reasons "of whatever
kind," good, bad, or indifferent. [(quoting Webster's Dic-
tionary definition of "any")]. Adding the modifier "good"
has a delimiting effect which changes the meaning entirely.
As written the contract is one which is terminable at will;
the interpretation sought by the Gerdlunds is that the con-
tract is terminable only for good cause. The two are totally
inconsistent. The trial court admitted the evidence on the
ground that "both parties have testified as to what they in-
terpreted the contract to mean." Testimony of intention
which is contrary to a contract's express terms, however,
does not give meaning to the contract: rather it seeks to
substitute a different meaning. It follows under the P. G. &
E. case that such evidence must be excluded 5 o
While the above quoted portion of the opinion seems to suggest that
both sides conceded the existence of an oral agreement regarding
termination only for cause, both Mr. Gerdlund and an EDI official
testified that they understood the termination clause to give the right
to terminate for reasons other than the representative performing
poorly. '
Although other courts have erroneously applied the rules con-
cerning both the supplementation and interpretation of written
agreements, the Gerdlund decision exemplifies proper application of
those rules. Though one may not like the outcome based on the eq-
uities of the case or may argue that the rules should be different,
Gerdlund remains true to the fundamental concept in California and
in general contract law that courts should give primacy to the parties'
expressed intent, particularly when reduced to writing, but that courts
should be open to reasonable interpretations of writings.2
280. Id. at 273, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 284.
281. See id. at 274-76,235 Cal. Rptr. at 285-86.
282. A contrasting example can be found in Brawthen v. H&R Block, Inc., 28
Cal. App. 3d 131, 139, 104 Cal. Rptr. 486, 492 (1972) ("Brawthen I") (reversing
trial court's order granting a nonsuit in favor of defendant in a breach of em-
ployment contract dispute) and Brawthen v. H&R Block, Inc., 52 Cal. App. 3d
139, 149, 124 Cal. Rptr. 845 (1975) ("Brawthen I) (affirming the trial verdict in
favor of plaintiff in a second trial following nonsuit). The plaintiff, Brawthen,
agreed to become a manager for H&R Block tax return preparation service un-
der a contract which stated: "This agreement shall be for a period of two years
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Moreover, even with a concededly partially integrated agree-
ment, the proposed term cannot contradict what is in the writing, ei-
ther as a matter of supplementing the writing or interpreting the
terms in the partially integrated contract. Consolidated World In-
vestments, Inc. v. Lido Preferred Ltd.' provides an example.
3. Consolidated World Investments, Inc. v. Lido Preferred Ltd.
In Consolidated, the parties' contract for the sale of land con-
tained a patently ambiguous provision concerning the time for per-
formance.' While the contract stated that time was "of the essence"
and that "[t]he anticipated period of escrow shall be 60 days from the
date of this Agreement," it was unclear whether escrow was to be
closed and title transferred within sixty days or if it would be enough
for escrow to simply open within sixty days."5
After the prospective buyer neither opened nor closed escrow
within sixty days and the seller expressly terminated the agreement,
the buyer initiated a lawsuit alleging that, despite the terms in the
writing, the parties understood that escrow would not open and that
the sixty-day period would not start until the buyer received a loan
from the above date, and thereafter shall automatically renew from year to year
unless either party gives written notice of termination ninety days prior to re-
newal date. . . ." Brawthen I, 28 Cal. App. 3d at 133-34, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
During negotiations Mr. and Mrs. Brawthen allegedly received the assurances
that they had "the word of Henry and Richard Bloch" that they would not be
terminated as long as they did a good job in the new territory. Brawthen 11, 52
Cal. App. 3d at 142-43, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 847. Brawthen developed the territory
over the next six years and was terminated when he refused to sign a new con-
tract which reduced his rate of compensation. See Brawthen 1, 28 Cal. App. 3d at
134, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 488-89. After trial the court barred parol evidence about
the negotiations, the appellate court reversed on grounds that the writing may
not have been totally integrated. See id. at 138-39, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 491-92. The
court noted that the writing did not contain a merger clause, the purported oral
term did not contradict the writing, and the contract consisted of a mimeo-
graphed form with a few blank spaces and was not easily adaptable. See id. at
138-39, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 491. Moreover, the court reasoned that the circum-
stances suggested that the Brawthens might reasonably have raised concerns
about the termination clause and might have accepted the oral assurances out-
side of the writing. See id. at 139, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 491-92. Very significantly, the
Brawthen contract did not contain a termination at-will clause as found in Gerd-
lund. See id. at 136, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
283. 9 Cal. App. 4th 373, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 524 (1992).
284. See id. at 377, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 525-26.
285. Id. at 377-78, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 525-26. The writing also specifically
provided for the possibility of extending the date for "closing of escrow" if the
buyer were unable to obtain a loan by the anticipated closing date, provided the
buyer delivered "a written commitment to the Seller from the proposed lender."
Id. at 377, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 526.
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commitment on the property.' Although one might think that the
court should have summarily precluded the buyer from offering evi-
dence on its proposed interpretation, the case proceeded to trial and
the court granted the seller's motion for nonsuit after the buyer had
presented all of its evidence.m The ground for dismissal was that
while some ambiguity did exist in the contract, the terms still were
not "reasonably susceptible" to the interpretation offered by the
buyer.m The appellate court affirmed, noting that the buyer's inter-
pretation contradicted both of the reasonable meanings that could be
assigned to the express terms in the writing."
4. McLain v. Great American Insurance Companies
A line of cases also exists which permits a contract to be supple-
mented by terms that may have been left out of the final writing. The
court in McLain v. Great American Insurance Companies29 con-
fronted a factual situation similar to Gerdlund in many ways but dif-
ferent in key aspects. Great American hired McLain from a previous
position. McLain took a pay cut based upon representations of long-
term advancement possibilities with Great American. 9' Before
beginning employment, McLain submitted an incomplete application
form.
2n2
286. See id. at 377-78, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 526.
287. See id. at 378, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 526.
288. Id. at 79, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 526-27.
289. See id. at 379-80, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 527. The appellate court stated:
Parol evidence is admissible only to prove a meaning to which the con-
tractual language is 'reasonably susceptible;' not to flatly contradict the
express terms of the agreement. Thus, if the contract calls for the plain-
tiff to deliver to defendant 100 pencils by July 21, 1992, parol evidence is
not admissible to show that when the parties said 'pencils' they really
meant 'car batteries' or that when they said 'July 21, 1992' they really
meant 'May 13,2001.
Id. at 379, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 527 (citation omitted); see also Banco Do Brasil,
234 Cal. App. 3d 973, 1002-05, 285 Cal. Rptr. 870, 887-88 (Assuming loan agree-
ment was only partially integrated, terms which expressly stated that obligations
to make payments were "absolute and unconditional" could not be reconciled
with debtor's claim that the obligation to repay was conditioned on receipt of $2
million line of credit from creditor.).
290. 208 Cal. App. 3d 1476,256 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1989).
291. See id. at 1480,256 Cal. Rptr. at 864-65. The plaintiff took a pay cut from
$40,000 in his former position to $30,000 with the defendant company based upon
representations made by a division manager for Great American. See id. at 1480,
256 Cal. Rptr. at 865. The manager also told the plaintiff that if he went to work
for Great American he would be on probation for ninety days and then would
become a "permanent" employee. See id.
292. The form did not reflect the employee's position or salary and a portion
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The key provisions in the McLain contract were an at-will pro-
vision and related merger language. The contract read, in relevant
part:
In consideration of my employment, I agree to conform to
the rules and regulations of the Great American Insurance
Company, and I agree that my employment and compensa-
tion can be terminated with or without cause, and with or
without notice, at any time, at the option of either the Great
American Insurance Company or myself. I also understand
and agree that the terms and conditions of my employment
may be changed, with or without cause, and with or without
notice, at any time by the Great American Insurance Com-
pany. I understand that no representative of the Great
American Insurance Company, has any authority to enter
into an agreement for any specified period of time, or to
make any agreement contrary to the foregoing.29
After working for more than a year and receiving a promotion to a
managerial position,29 4 McLain was suddenly terminated after a disa-
greement with his immediate supervisor.95 He sued for breach of
contract, alleging breach of an implied contract that McLain would
not be terminated except for cause.296 After a jury returned a verdict
for McLain for $62,000 in compensatory damages, Great American
appealed on the ground that under the parol evidence rule, the ex-
press terms of the contract should have precluded evidence of the
purported "for cause" limitation on the ability to terminate.2'
The facts supported three slightly-but significantly-different
arguments for McLain's position that he could be terminated only for
to be filled in by the employer was never completed. See id.
293. Id. While the key provisions for purposes of the litigation were contained
on the backside of the form and the plaintiff testified that he never read the pro-
visions and no one from the employer ever discussed or pointed the provisions
out to him, he nevertheless signed the form just beneath those provisions. See id.
294. See id. at 1481, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 865. McLain's salary rose incrementally
from $30,000 to $38,000 and he received favorable reviews of his work. See id.
295. See id. at 1481-82,256 Cal. Rptr. at 865-66.
296. See id. at 1482-83, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 866-67. McLain stated causes of ac-
tion based on "(1) wrongful termination; (2) breach of contract; (3) breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (4) violation of civil rights; (5)
intentional infliction of emotional distress; (6) negligent infliction of emotional
distress; and (7) wrongful termination based upon violation of public policy." Id.
at 1482-83, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 866. Because the appellate court found that the
breach of contract action supported the jury verdict for the plaintiff, it did not
address the other causes of action. See id. at 1483, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 867.
297. See id. at 1483, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 867.
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cause despite the statutory presumption that employment not for a
specified duration is terminable at will."8 First, McLain suggested
that he received express, oral representations before he signed the
employment form that he would be terminated only for cause after a
three-month probationary period.'" Second, McLain seemed to ar-
gue that Great American gave him implicit commitments at the time
he started working that it would terminate him only for cause.'
Third, the facts also supported an argument that the terms of the con-
tract were modified over the course of his employment to add an
"implied for cause" limitation on the employer's ability to termi-
nate."1 The McLain court, like others, did not carefully delineate
when it addressed issues of express or implied terms." Only the first
possibility-that apart from a final written contract, the parties had
agreed to an oral side term-squarely invokes the parol evidence
rule.
The McLain court's treatment of the facts may be interpreted as
alleging the side oral term that was left out of the writing. The court
essentially applied the Gerdlund approach: first, determining whether
the contract was a complete integration that would exclude extrinsic
evidence of a collateral term not included in the writing; and second,
consider whether the agreement is "susceptible of the meaning urged
by the party offering the evidence,"'' if the writing is not completely
integrated.
The court noted that the writing did not actually contain a
merger like the one found in Gerdlund.' Instead, the relevant lan-
guage, while establishing employment at-will and providing that no
representative had the authority to make a contrary agreement, also
29& See Alexander v. Nextel Communications, Inc., 52 Cal. App. 4th 1376,
1380, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 293, 295-96 (1997) ("Labor Code section 2922, which pro-
vides that an employment, having no specific term, may be terminated at the will
of either party, establishes a presumption of at-will employment if the parties
have made no express oral or written agreement specifying the length of em-
ployment or the grounds for termination.").
299. See McLain, 208 Cal. App. 3d at 1486-87, 256 Cal. Rtpr. at 869 (plaintiff
testifying that he received assurance of status as a permanent employee after the
probationary period had expired).
300. See id
301. See id. at 1485, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 868.
302. See, e.g., Alexander, 52 Cal. App. 4th at 1378-80,61 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 294-95
(reversing verdict for plaintiff employee where trial court neglected to instruct
jury that it must find either express or implied term that employment could not
be terminated except for good cause).
303. McLain, 208 Cal. App. 3d at 1483,256 Cal. Rptr. at 867.
304. See id. at 1485, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 868.
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provided that Great American could change the terms of employ-
ment at any time.3° The court noted that "[t]his language not only
suggests that the application was not integrated, but also indicates
that the parties specifically intended their relationship to remain
subject to change in terms and conditions."' 'z Additionally, a number
of other factors persuaded the McLain court: the contract was a
standardized two-page form that did not lend itself to adaptation to
particular terms of a specific employment; the written form was very
brief; and the parties neglected to fill out the form completely, failing
to include McLain's salary or position.3 Finally, the court found that
the purported oral term did not "flatly contradict" the written terms
because of a provision that Great American could alter the contract
at any time.' Essentially, the written terms were somewhat self-
contradictory and allowed the court to find that the written contract
was not completely integrated m Thus, the appellate court concluded
that the parol evidence had been properly admitted to establish the
parties' complete agreement and that substantial evidence supported
the verdict for the plaintiff.
310
5. Aragon-Haas v. Family Security Insurance Services, Inc. 311
Yet another helpful case for assessing the plain meaning ap-
proach, as well as the parol evidence rule, is Aragon-Haas. The
plaintiff was employed under a written contract that provided for an
initial one-year term and an automatic renewal for six additional one-
year terms. 2 The contract was clearly subject to termination with or
without cause during the first year but was less than perfectly clear
about circumstances for termination thereafter.313 The plaintiff testified
305. See id. at 1481, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 865.
306. Id. at 1485, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 868 (emphasis added).
307. See id.
308. Id-
309. See id.
310. See id. at 1486-87, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 869. The McLain court went on to
state in dicta: "Even if we were to conclude that the application was integrated,
the parol evidence would still be admissible .... As previously pointed out, the
language that the terms of McLain's employment could be changed demonstrates
that the Great American application is 'reasonably susceptible' to the interpreta-
tion urged by McLain." Id. at 1485-86, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 868-69.
311. 231 Cal. App. 3d 232,282 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1991).
312- See id- at 236, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 235.
313. See id. The contract provided in relevant part:
Section 1.01. The Employer hereby employs the Employee and the
Employee hereby accepts such employment upon the terms and condi-
tions hereinafter set forth beginning July 29, 1986, and expiring one (1)
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that the employer told her the first year was a probationary period,
which she understood to mean that the employer could terminate her
without cause during the first year and would terminate her only for
good cause thereafter. 1' The plaintiff worked for more than three
years, moving up the ranks from manager to executive vice president,
before being terminated "without warning, explanation or just
cause." '315 The plaintiff then initiated the lawsuit based on several
causes of action, including breach of the written contract.316
The court dismissed the lawsuit based essentially on plain
meaning grounds, noting that the written contract did not expressly
state the initial year to be a "probationary period" and that the pro-
vision allowing for termination without cause did not contain limiting
language restricting its provision to the first year.317 The written con-
tract also contained a merger clause, but the trial court appeared not
to rely on the parol evidence rule and the concept that the writing
was a complete integration as grounds for declining to proceed to a
trial on the merits that might have included evidence of the alleged
oral side term."8
year from said date, unless sooner terminated as provided in Section
7.01 [sic; should be Section 8.011 of this Agreement. Thereafter this
Agreement shall be automatically extended for six (6) consecutive one
(1) year terms.
Id.
Section 8.01. This Agreement may be terminated by the Employer with
or without cause upon the giving of written notice of termination to the
Employee. Employee may terminate this Agreement with or without
cause upon thirty (30) days written notice to the Employer.
Id. at 237,238 Cal. Rptr. at 236.
314. See id at 236,282 Cal. Rptr. at 235-36.
315. Id. at 236, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 236. The plaintiff's annual job performance
reviews were positive and never included any significant criticism. See id. Over
the course of a one-year period, the plaintiff received a promotion, a salary in-
crease and other financial incentives, as well as commendations on her job per-
formance. See id. Less than two months after receiving her latest incentive, she
was terminated without cause. See id.
316. The plaintiff stated other causes of action, including breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, estoppel to terminate the contract with-
out good cause, and fraud. See id. at 235-37, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 235-36.
317. See id. at 238 n.3, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 237 n.3.
318. See id. at 237 n.2, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 237 n.2. The employment agreement
included the following provisions:
This Agreement contains all of the terms, conditions and promises of
the parties hereto. Employee represents that she is not relying upon any
representation or promise not contained in this Agreement, and Em-
ployee expressly agrees that Employee has not executed this Agreement
in reliance upon any such representation or promise .... This agree-
ment modifies and supersedes any and all previous agreements if any
existing between the parties hereto.
January 1998] CONTRACTINTERPRETATIONIN CALIFORNIA 615
The appellate court reviewed de novo the contract language and
concluded that it was both ambiguous and "reasonably susceptible"
to the meaning the plaintiff alleged."9 Thus, while the plaintiff ulti-
mately might not have succeeded in proving that her purported
meaning would constitute the proper reading of the contract, the ap-
pellate court held that it was error for the trial court to dismiss the
action on demurrer3 O The appellate court also properly noted, citing
Pacific Gas, that the merger clause in the contract would not bar the
admission of extrinsic evidence for the purpose of resolving an ambi-
guity in the written terms."1 Rather, the court noted that "rational
interpretation requires at least a preliminary consideration of all
credible evidence offered to prove the intention of the parties.
' 2
Thus, the appellate court correctly held that the trial court erred in
applying the plain meaning approach.
Although neither the trial nor appellate court confronted the issue
squarely, it should be noted that even if the terms in the written con-
tract did not provide for the probationary period, the plaintiff could
have argued that the side oral assurance that she would be terminated
only for cause after the first year was consistent with the written terms
and therefore could supplement the writing. The court would have
needed to decide as a preliminary matter, using the Masterson test, that
the writing was a partially integrated agreement and was not a com-
plete, final, and exclusive statement of the contract terms, before decid-
ing whether the collateral term was consistent with the writing. Al-
though the Aragon-Haas contract contained a merger clause,3  its
presence would not be conclusive under Masterson.324 The facts rele-
vant to the making of the contract would also aid the court in determin-
ing integration.3" Aragon-Haas thus presents another good model for
harmonious application of Pacific Gas and Masterson.
D. Plain Meaning, Contract Integration, and Usage of Trade
A party may also assert that a term becomes part of a contract
by virtue of trade usage, course of dealing, or course of perform-
ance.3z6 This type of argument, however, often raises issues concerning
319. Id. at 239, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 238.
320. See id.
321. See id. at 23940, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 238.
322. Id. at 240, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 238.
323. See id.
324. 68 Cal. 2d at 225, 436 P.2d at 562, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 546.
325. See Aragon-Haas, 231 Cal. App. 3d at 239,282 Cal. Rptr. at 238.
326. See infra discussion of Hayter Trucking, Inc. v. Shell Western E&P, Inc.,
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the interaction between these sources and express terms. Trade us-
age deals with industry-wide practices that the parties are assumed to
accept as part of the contract.317 Course of dealing involves prior con-
tracts between the same two parties that are deemed to reflect a
practice that becomes part of the agreement.32 A course of perform-
ance involves repeated occasions for performance under one con-
tract. 9 Course of performance is distinguishable from the two other
preceding terms because it may serve one of two different purposes
in establishing contractual obligations. First, course of performance
may later reflect what the parties intended at the time they made the
contract. Second, course of performance may be deemed to reflect a
modification or waiver of the original contract terms.3° Course of
performance, therefore, cannot actually be a source of a contract
term when the contract is made, and the parol evidence rule should
not bar the evidence.33'
The Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") takes the clear posi-
tion that it is very difficult to bar evidence of trade usage or course of
dealing.332 Hayter Trucking, Inc. v. Shell Western E&P, Inc 3 3 reflects
a similar approach in California that allows evidence of trade usage
or course of dealing in most circumstances. Hayter Trucking entered
18 Cal. App. 4th 1, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 229 (1993); notes 333-52 and accompanying
text.
327. See U.C.C. § 1-205(2) & cmt. 4.
328. See id. § 1-205(1) & cmt. 2.
329. See id. § 1-208(1).
330. See id. § 2-208(3).
331. See Helen Hadjiyannakis, The Parol Evidence Rule and Implied Terms:
The Sounds of Silence, 54 FORDHAM L. REv. 35, 80 (1985) (indicating that evi-
dence of course of performance can never be excluded by the parol evidence rule
because it is subsequent to integration of the writing).
332- See U.C.C. § 2-202 cmt. 2. Usage of trade and course of dealing can be
barred only by a careful negation of the parties-which probably means an ex-
press provision in the contract indicating that terms derived from those sources
are not to be deemed to supplement the writing-or, at least theoretically, by a
showing that the terms contradict the express terms. The latter qualification is
made because there are some cases and other authority that strongly suggest that
the express terms ought to yield to properly proven usage of trade and course of
dealing. See, e.g., Nanakuli Paving and Rock Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 664 F.2d 772,
n.17 (9th Cir. 1981) (noting with approval that some writers assert that express
terms may sometimes yield to usage of trade and course of dealing); Urbana
Farmers Union Elevator Co. v. Schock, 351 N.W.2d 88, 92 (N.D. 1984) (stating
that courts have regarded usages and practices as more reliable indicators of the
parties' intentions than imperfect or incomplete language); American Machine &
Tool Co., Inc. v. Strite-Anderson Mfg. Co., 353 N.W.2d 592, 597 (Minn. Ct. App.
1984) (discussing trend of courts toward extending themselves to reconcile trade
usage and course of dealing with seemingly contradictory express terms).
333. 18 Cal. App. 4th 1, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 229 (1993).
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into a contract with Shell Western to perform vacuum truck services
at an oil well site in California." The relationship began in the fall of
1987 and ended in November 1990 when Shell Western gave thirty
days' notice of termination without stating any reason for ending the
contract.335
The contract covering the relationship contained three relevant
provisions: a general provision allowing for termination upon thirty
days' written notice by either party;- a provision allowing for
"immediate termination" by Shell Western if it deemed itself to be at
risk from Hayter Trucking's performance; 337 and a merger clause.33
Despite the express terms granting Shell Western a broad right to
terminate, Hayter Trucking brought suit against Shell Western alleg-
ing breach of contract by virtue of a purported trade usage requiring
termination only for good cause 9 Shell Western demurred and the
trial court rendered judgment against Hayter Trucking, finding, es-
sentially, that the plain meaning of the express terms precluded the
alleged usage of trade from becoming part of the contract.30
Interestingly, the trial court interpreted a more recent California
Supreme Court decision to reflect movement away from the Pacific
Gas decision and toward an approach that prefers the plain meaning
of words in integrated agreements. 1 The trial court believed this
334. See id. at 6-7,22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 232-33.
335. See id. at 6-9,22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 232-34.
336. The contract provision stated: "This order is effective 2/01/90 and shall
remain in effect through 1/31/92 unless cancelled by either party by giving thirty
(30) days' written notice to the other party." Id. at 7, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 233.
337. See id. at 8,22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 233-34.
338. The merger clause read: "It is agreed that the order and the Attachments
thereto set forth the entire agreement between BUYER and CONTRACTOR
with respect to the work, that no oral agreements made heretofore shall be
binding, and that no modification or supplement thereto shall be made except by
written agreement signed by both parties." Id. at 8, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 234.
339. Hayter Trucking asserted that there existed a trade usage that contracts
for vacuum services could be terminated only for good cause and that the prac-
tice was industry wide, known to both parties at the time of contracting, and
therefore properly deemed part of the contract. See id. at 9, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
234. Hayter Trucking further asserted that the clause allowing for termination
with thirty days' notice "governed the manner in which the contract could be
terminated rather than the basis upon which the contract could be terminated"
and that the other clause granting Shell Western the right to terminate addressed
only "emergency or extreme circumstances ... and was not intended by the par-
ties to govern in non-emergency or non-extreme circumstances." Id.
340. See id at 11-12,22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 235-36.
341. See id. at 11, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 235. The trial court stated:
[I]t seems that [the California Supreme Court] is saying [in AIU Ins. Co.
v. Superior Court] that the language of the contract, if it's in plain terms,
618 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol.31:557
plain meaning approach precluded not only extrinsic evidence of a
collateral term-or a written or oral side agreement between the
parties-but also a term derived from usage of trade. 2 Specifically,
the court reasoned that trade usage directly contradicted the plain
meaning of the express written terms and therefore could not be part
of the contract.33 The trial court obviously was unreceptive to
Hayter Trucking's argument that evidence of trade usage should be
more compelling than extrinsic evidence of a collateral term that was
simply left out of the final writing.44
The appellate court, however, recognized that evidence of trade
usage should stand on different footing than evidence of a collateral
term. The court stated:
Generally speaking, words in a contract are to be construed
according to their plain, ordinary, popular or legal meaning,
as the case may be. However, particular expressions may,
by trade usage, acquire a different meaning in reference to
the subject matter of a contract. If both parties are engaged
in that trade, the parties to the contract are deemed to have
used them according to their different and peculiar sense as
shown by such trade usage and parol evidence is admissible
to establish the trade usage even though the words in their
ordinary or legal meaning are entirely unambiguous.-"
The appellate court further held that the trial court erred in de-
ciding the case on a presumed plain meaning where the plaintiff
properly alleged a meaning that was ascribed to the contract based on
trade usage.64 First, as a matter of general construction, the court
clearly emphasized that evidence of trade usage is admissible to show
a meaning of words shared by the parties regardless of the ordinary
meaning that the words might have.47 Second, the court noted that
California Code of Civil Procedure section 1856(c) expressly pro-
vides that the terms set forth in an integrated agreement "may be
governs the interpretation. And there has to be some showing. It's very
critical of [Pacific Gas], for example .... It's a little hard to reconcile
that holding [in AIU Ins.] with the earlier holdings of the Supreme
Court on which [plaintiff attempts] to rely. It seems to me there is a
weather change in the works here.
Id. (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
342. See id. at 10-11, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 235.
343. See id.
344. See id.
345. Id. (citing Paramount Television Prods., Inc. v. Bill Derman Prods., 258
Cal. App. 2d 1, 10-11, 65 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1968)).
346. See id. at 18-21, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 240-42.
347. See id. at 20,22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 241-42.
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explained or supplemented by course of dealing or usage of trade or
by course of performance."' ' The court thus indicated that the re-
quirement of termination for cause only might be consistent with the
express terms related to termination. If the written contract had
stated expressly that cause was not required, the court could not have
reached that conclusion. 9 The court also would have been prevented
from reaching the result if the contract had negated the application of
trade usage. The contract as drafted, expressly precluding oral sup-
plementation of the contract, did not preclude supplementation by
usage of trade.350 Finally, the appellate court emphasized the effect of
Pacific Gas in liberalizing the parol evidence rule by rejecting the
plain meaning rule and also refuted the trial court's view that the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court had undermined Pacific Gas in subsequent de-
cisions. 5' Indeed, Justice Traynor explicitly recognized in Pacific Gas
the possibility of trade usage giving a different or special meaning to
terms in a contract.3n
The question still remains of what to do when the express
terms simply fail to address certain circumstances. In those situa-
tions the interpretation rules so adroitly applied in Gerdlund and
stated in so many other cases will produce no true result. In those
cases, the courts may in fact, and should in candor, apply the just
result principle in resolving disputes.
III. THE "JUST RESULT" PRINCIPLE AS A RULE OF
INTERPRETATION
In a number of circumstances, the normal rules of contract inter-
pretation and construction do not lead to a clear result. The goal of
348. Id. at 20, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 242 (quoting CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §
1856(c) (emphasis added)).
349. See Wagner v. Glendale Adventist Med. Ctr., 216 Cal. App. 3d 1379,
1393-94, 265 Cal. Rptr. 412, 421-22 (1989) (Implied terms cannot be at complete
variance with express terms, and therefore, contract with express at-will termina-
tion clause could not have implied "for cause" limit on termination.).
350. See id. at 20-21, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 242.
351. See id. at 20, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 241-42. The trial court had relied upon an
insurance contract case, AIU Ins., 51 Cal. 3d 807, 799 P.2d 1253, 274 Cal. Rptr.
820 (1990), and the appellate court noted that with insurance contracts special
rules do come into play, such as the principle of protecting the objectively rea-
sonable expectations of the insured and resolving ambiguities in favor of the in-
sured. See Hayter Trucking v. Shell Western E&P, Inc., 18 Cal. App 4th at 19-20,
22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 241 (1993). The appellate court also explicitly ruled that there
was no portion of AIU Ins. which explicitly or implicitly overruled Pacific Gas.
See id. at 20,22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 242.
352. See Pacific Gas, 69 Cal. 2d at 39,442 P.2d at 645,62 Cal. Rptr. at 565.
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contract interpretation is to discover the intent of the parties, but
there are times when the parties simply have not expressed an intent
for the courts to discover. Section 204 of the Restatement (Second)
raises at least two possibilities. First, the parties may simply fail to
foresee a situation or a development and therefore may fail to ex-
pressly address the circumstance in the contract.353 Second, the par-
ties may anticipate a situation but neglect to address it because the
circumstance is not clearly in focus, seems unimportant or unlikely to
occur, or does not lend itself to ready resolution.",
Another possibility is that the parties, perhaps due to extreme op-
timism about the contractual relationship, fail to address the possibility
of breach, even though the circumstance is clearly foreseeable at the
time of contracting.355 Further, the parties may simply fail to address a
foreseen circumstance, perhaps because they assume that they will be
able to resolve the situation at a later date when the contingency
arises."6 In all of these types of cases, the parties may well have ren-
dered a great deal of performance on one or both sides before the diffi-
culty presented by the absence of terms becomes apparent.
Under the applicable standards for contract interpretation in
California, if the parties have expressly provided for a situation-
even one in the distant future or with a result that might seem uneven
in some respect-the courts are bound to respect that expressed in-
tent.3 7 A good example of such a case is Winet v. Price.358 In that
353. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrS § 204 cmt. b (1979). Pro-
fessor E. Allan Farnsworth further divides the unforeseen situations into those
that were foreseeable but that the parties failed to foresee and those involving
developments that could not have been foreseen at the time of contracting. See
E. Allan Farnsworth, Disputes Over Omission in Contracts, 68 COLUMBIA L.
REv. 860, 871-72 (1968).
354. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 204 cmt. b (1979).
355. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of
Contract, 47 STAN. L. Rav. 211, 213-16 (1995); see also Patterson, supra note 45,
at 236-37 (describing two sources of contract incompleteness: substantive in-
completeness when parties leave terms open and interpretive incompleteness
relating to unforeseen events or changed circumstances).
356. The classic lease renewal case, where the parties sign an agreement to
agree upon a new rental price, provides one illustration. See, e.g., Etco Corp. v.
Hauer, 161 Cal. App. 3d 1154, 1156, 208 Cal. Rptr. 118, 119 (1984) (The lease
provided that new rent would be determined by mutual agreement upon re-
newal.).
357. See supra, notes 26-38 and accompanying text; see also In re Marriage of
Iberti, 55 Cal. App. 4th 1434, 1440, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 766, 769-70 (1997)
(Agreement providing spousal support to wife as long as she was enrolled in
college could not be reasonably interpreted as providing support after she with-
drew from classes allegedly to assist her ill mother.); Corbin, supra note 59, at
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case, the parties agreed in 1975 that a client would release his former
lawyer from any claims, "known or unknown," that then existed or
that might arise later.59 When the client wished to sue for malprac-
tice some fifteen years later, both the trial and appellate courts rather
summarily concluded that the express terms of the contract provided
for this future situation and precluded an action against the lawyer."
Similarly, in some cases, the parties may not have clearly ex-
pressed their intent within the written terms of the contract, but the
courts may find a mutual intent by looking at the contract in light of
the extrinsic evidence. An example is Golden West Baseball Co. v.
City of Anaheim,3 ' a case involving the lease of an Anaheim stadium
to the California Angels baseball team in 1964 for use during home
games for a period as long as sixty-five years, beginning in 1966.362
Although the express terms failed to make explicit provision, sub-
stantial extrinsic evidence proved that a key inducement for the
baseball club was the requirement that the stadium have a minimum
of 12,000 parking spaces on level or "flat land parking." '363 Indeed,
the parties did not dispute that this goal greatly influenced the An-
gels's decision to leave Dodger Stadium, where they had previously
played their home games."
A dispute arose, however, when the city began negotiations with
the Los Angeles Rams football team to play in the stadium and pro-
posed to engage in extensive commercial development of the stadium
parking lot that would reduce the amount of flat parking area.365 The
170-71 (stating that court is never justified in altering or perverting contract lan-
guage to reach just or equitable result).
358. 4 Cal. App. 4th 1159, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 554 (1992). See supra text accompa-
nying notes 152-171.
359. Id. at 1162-63, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 555. The former client was represented
by independent counsel when he signed the release. See id. at 1164, 6 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 556.
360. See id. at 1164-65, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 556-57.
361. 25 Cal. App. 4th 11, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 378 (1984).
362. See Golden West, 25 Cal. App. 4th at 25,31 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 388.
363. Id. at 22-25, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 385-88. In 1960 Gene Autry, the legen-
dary singing cowboy movie star and owner of Golden West Broadcasting Corpo-
ration, purchased a new major league baseball franchise for the Los Angeles
area. See GLENN DICKEY, THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN LEAGUE BASEBALL
SINCE 1901 203 (1980). After five years (1961-1965) of playing as a co-tenant at
Dodger Stadium, Autry initiated the move of the baseball club to the new sta-
dium in Anaheim and changed the team's name to the California Angels. See id.
364. See Golden West, 25 Cal. App. 4th at 19-20,31 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 384.
365. See Golden West, 25 Cal. App. 4th at 20, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 384. Carroll
Rosenbloom, the owner of the Rams, joined with developers Cabot, Cabot &
Forbes to form Anaheim Stadium Associates which negotiated with Anaheim for
four years until plans were finalized in 1982. See id.
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city contended that it could provide the minimum 12,000 parking
spots in any manner that it chose, including multi-level parking struc-
tures.3" Although the express terms of the contract merely provided
that the City of Anaheim was to provide "a multi-purpose stadium
with a seating capacity of approximately 45,000, and suitable parking
facilities adequate to accommodate a minimum of 12,000 cars for
stadium customers,"' 67 the detailed negotiation history clearly sup-
ported the reading of the contract that the city should provide the
12,000 minimum spaces by flat level parking and not through parking
structures.3
While Winet exemplifies a case in which parties expressly con-
tracted for future uncertainties and Golden West presents a case in
which the extrinsic evidence provided a clear indication of the par-
ties' intent for future developments despite contract language lacking
specificity, not all cases lend themselves to definitive resolution based
on mutual intent derived from the contract language or extrinsic evi-
dence. As noted above, it is common for contracting parties to fail to
foresee or otherwise expressly provide for a situation. As further
noted above, some of the gaps in contracts result specifically from the
parties' inability to foresee future developments in the project at
hand or, perhaps, a rather independent technological development.
The courts, however, tend to respond to such cases by purporting to
divine from the contract an intent as to the unforeseen or unad-
dressed situation or to provide a term deemed consistent with those
terms that the parties did make. This approach shows allegiance to
the dated concept that courts only interpret agreements and never
make them for the parties.
As Professor Farnsworth established in a writing on the use of
366. See id. at 21, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 385. While there was conflicting testi-
mony about whether future parking structures were discussed during negotia-
tions, the trial court implicitly found that such discussions did not take place. See
id. at 22 n.4, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 386 n.4.
367. Id. at 25, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 387.
368. See id. at 40, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 397. The appellate court stated:
The trial court correctly concluded the parties intended the parking
would be on ground level. Although there was some testimony to the
contrary, a consistent theme during the original negotiations was
GWB C's [Golden West Baseball Company] desire for more convenient
parking than existed at Dodger Stadium and for ground-level spaces.
The stadium parking lot was built that way using plans and specifica-
tions agreed to by GWBC and Anaheim, and although GWBC assented
to relocation of parking spaces over the years, it never allowed parking
structures.
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implied terms, the fiction that the courts are able to divine the par-
ties' intentions masks what the courts are in fact doing in cases where
circumstances were unforeseen or not addressed by the parties.69
The best way for courts to resolve such cases is to explicitly indicate
that they are seeking a "just or fair result" based upon the equities
and then allow the parties to present argument in that vein. As
courts explicitly apply the "just result" principle in such cases, they
will establish precedent that will promote consistency and predictabil-
ity. Section 204, comment d of the Restatement (Second) essentially
adopts this position, noting that "where there is in fact no agreement,
the court should supply a term which comports with community stan-
dards of fairness and policy rather than analyze a hypothetical model
of the bargaining process."'
The "sense of justice" concept as an interpretative principle can
be compared to the Restatement (Second) principle that the remedy
for detrimental reliance may be limited as justice requires." The
Restatement (Second) also embodies that concept in the provisions
for the proper remedy when a contract violates public policy." The
"sense of justice" is also similar to the broader notions of good faith
as found in the Restatement (Second) and the UCC. 3
The standard interpretive rules in California also lend at least
limited support to the just result principle. California courts endorse
the principle that "[a] contract must receive such an interpretation as
will make it lawful, operative, definite, reasonable, and capable of be-
ing carried into effect, if it can be done without violating the intention
of the parties." 74 In addition, the courts must avoid any interpretation
that "will make a contract extraordinary, harsh, unjust, or inequita-
ble."375 Contract law scholars have also advocated for application of a
"fairness principle" in other aspects of contract law as well. Looking
369. See Farnsworth supra note 355, at 866-68.
370. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrs § 204 cmt. d (1981).
371. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTs § 90 (1981).
372. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 197 (1981).
373. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981).
374. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1643; Powers, 54 Cal. App. 4th 1102, 1111, 63 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 261, 266 (1997); Foothill Properties, 46 Cal. App. 4th at 1550, 54 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 492; see also Edison, 37 Cal. App. 4th at 853-54, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
235-36 (disfavoring interpretation of ambiguous contract for wind turbine gener-
ated electricity that could not be implemented through available technology or
that would cause improper discrimination inconsistent with public utility com-
mission directives or state or federal law).
375. Powers, 54 Cal. App. 4th at 1111-12, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 266 (quoting
Strong v. Theis, 187 Cal. App. 3d 913,920,232 Cal. Rptr. 272,276 (1986)).
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particularly at problems of impracticability, Professor Robert Hill-
man has suggested that the courts should first see whether the parties
have expressly addressed the risk. When, however, the contract does
not explicitly address the issue, Hillman argues that courts should
apply fairness norms in deciding whether or not to excuse perform-
ance that has been rendered more difficult by some supervening
event.3
6
A trio of relatively recent California cases exemplify the poten-
tial for application of the "just result" principle in contract interpre-
tation cases. Those cases are Okun v. Morton3 7 involving a contract
for joint participation in Hard Rock Cafes, City of Manhattan Beach
v. Superior Court,78 involving ownership rights of railway right-away
land worth as much as $100 million some one hundred years after
execution of a deed, and Lee v. Walt Disney Co.,"9 involving a dispute
over an actor's right to share in profits from the sale of video cas-
settes some almost forty years after execution of the contract. These
cases will be discussed in turn.
A. Okun v. Morton-the "Hard Rock Cafe" Cases
Peter Morton and a partner were operating the original "Hard
Rock Cafe" in England in the early 1970s when Milton Okun con-
tacted Morton about the possibility of investing in the business. Mor-
ton declined the offer but indicated that he might contact Okun later
about restaurant investment opportunities in the United States.381 In
1978, after Okun had returned to this country, Morton contacted
Okun, and the two succeeded in opening and operating a restaurant
in the Los Angeles area known as "Morton's."" Four years later, in
1982, the parties opened a "Hard Rock Cafe" in Los Angeles, which
proved to be quite successful." The agreement governing Okun's
376. Robert A. Hillman, An Analysis of the Cessation of Contractual Relations,
68 CORNELL L. REv. 617, 625-29 (1983).
377. 203 Cal. App. 3d 805,250 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1988).
378. 13 Cal. 4th 232, 914 P.2d 160,52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 82 (1996).
379. No. B058897 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 1992) (unpublished opinion), cert.
denied, 1992 Cal. LEXIS 6172 (Dec. 16, 1992).
380. 203 Cal. App. 3d 805, 809, 250 Cal. Rptr. 220, 222 (1988), cert. denied, 203
Cal. App. 3d at 829.
381. See Okun, 203 Cal. App. 3d 805,809-10,250 Cal. Rptr. 220,222.
382 See id. at 810,250 Cal. Rptr. at 222. Morton's was patterned after another
restaurant in London of more modest size and concept than the Hard Rock Cafe.
See id.
383. See id. at 812, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 223. In July 1981 Morton entered into a
settlement agreement with his London partner, Isaac Tigrett, which provided
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participation with Morton in the opening of the Los Angeles Hard
Rock Cafe eventually led to a contractual dispute and ultimately a
lawsuit when Morton began exploiting opportunities in other cities.
After considerable negotiations, Okun agreed to invest $100,000
in the Los Angeles Hard Rock Cafe in exchange for part ownership
of the Los Angeles restaurant, as well as the right to participate in fu-
ture opportunities utilizing the Hard Rock name." Okun agreed to
provide essentially one hundred percent of the general partnership's
contribution to the financing of the Los Angeles restaurant, but it
was agreed that his obligation to contribute as a general partner to
future ventures would be limited to the same percentage as his share
of the general partnership-twenty percent.3
The contract provision governing future opportunities, contained
in paragraph nine of the agreement, and entitled "Business Oppor-
tunities," read:
All business opportunities which arise in connection with
the business of HRC [general partnership], the [L.A. Hard
Rock] partnership or that which utilizes the name and mark
'Hard Rock Cafe' must be offered to HRC [general partner-
ship]. If HRC [general partnership] does not avail itself of
that Morton would have the exclusive right to use the Hard Rock name and logo
in California, Arizona, and Illinois while Tigrett would have rights in New York,
Florida, and Texas. See id. at 814, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 224. Unnamed states would
be available for exploitation on a "first come, first serve" basis. See id at 810,
250 Cal. Rptr. at 222. Morton failed to disclose the existence of the agreement
with Tigrett in his solicitation of investments for the Los Angeles Hard Rock
Cafe. See id. at 812, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 223. Rather, Morton asserted that he was
the sole shareholder of the Hard Rock Cafe Corporation ("HRC") and that he
had personally licensed HRC to use the Hard Rock name in the United States.
See id at 810-11, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 222.
Subsequently, Morton initiated a lawsuit against Tigrett in federal court
over the right to use the Hard Rock name in the United States and, although
Okun was surprised to learn of the dispute, he agreed to contribute the 20% of
the costs of litigation. At trial, the court found that Morton defrauded Okun by
failing to disclose Tigrett's interest prior to the initial agreement between the
parties for the Los Angeles Hard Rock Cafe. See id. at 815,250 Cal. Rptr. at 226.
384. See id. at 811, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 223. Morton's original plan was to be the
sole owner of the general partnership which would operate the restaurant and
possess the right to future exploitation of the Hard Rock name. See id. at 816
n.8, 250 Cal. Rptr. 226 n.8. Morton sought Okun's participation as an investor in
the limited partnership for the Los Angeles restaurant only. See id. at 810, 250
Cal. Rptr. at 222. After the original plan failed to come to fruition, Morton
agreed to give Okun 20% ownership in the Hard Rock Cafe general partnership
along with the right to participate in future opportunities using the Hard Rock
name. See id. at 810-11, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 222-23.
385. See id. at 811, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 223. The restaurant opened at its Beverly
Center location in October 1982 and proved to be a commercial success. See id.
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such opportunity, we shall then have the right to exploit
such opportunity together in a manner mutually agreeable
in the same ratio which we currently hold stock in HRC
[general partnership]. If you elect not to participate in such
opportunity after reasonable notice, I shall be free to exploit
such opportunity in any manner I choose.
386
In 1983 the San Francisco restaurant was the next Hard Rock
Cafe to be developed. Although Morton used participation in this
new venture as leverage to obtain Okun's financial assistance in liti-
gation involving his partner in the British Hard Rock Cafe, the par-
ties eventually agreed on joint participation in the San Francisco res-
taurant on essentially the same basic terms as the Los Angeles
business.3 Morton, however, sought to change the terms of Okun's
participation with regard to planned ventures for Houston and Chi-
cago and sought a general change in the terms of the original 1982
agreement for joint ownership of the Hard Rock Cafe general part-
nership.3  Morton later sought to exclude Okun from participating
altogether in the two restaurants, as well as one planned for Hono-
lulu, when Okun insisted that the new restaurants be operated under
the terms of the 1982 agreement. 89 The exclusion of Okun from the
Chicago, Houston and Honolulu restaurants then led Okun to file
suit against Morton.
At trial, Morton argued that the 1982 agreement was an illusory,
nonbinding contract that was not sufficiently precise in terms to be
specifically enforced. 9' The trial court rejected Morton's claims,
found the contract specifically enforceable, and awarded $360,000 in
general and specific damages. 9' The trial court also issued a decree
allowing Okun participation in the restaurants from which he had
been excluded, as well as in all future investments.3 9 Morton
386. Id. at 812, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 223.
387. See id. at 813-14, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 224-25.
388. See id. at 814 n.5, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 224 n.5
389. See id. at 814-15, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 224-25. Morton aborted the Houston
venture at one point but apparently revived it later. Morton at some time of-
fered Okun participation in the Chicago restaurant before ultimately excluding
him from participation when Okun insisted on operating under the 1982 agree-
ment. Okun was apparently never offered participation in the Honolulu restau-
rant. See id. at 815, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 225.
390. See id.
391. See id. at 809, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 221.
392. See id. at 815-16, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 225-26. The trial court also found that
the defendant:
(1) committed fraud by his failure to disclose the limitations on his right
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appealed the judgment and again sought to prove that paragraph
nine of the agreement, covering future business, was an unenforce-
able "agreement to agree," '393 lacking in the necessary specificity to be
enforceable. More specifically, Morton argued that the agreement
was faulty because it failed to specifically state the manner in which
the parties would share liabilities, failed to elaborate on the effect of
offering other investors the opportunity to participate in any given
deal, and failed to include a provision describing when and how he
must offer Okun the option to invest.94 The appellate court admitted
that the contract was very short on specifics for investment in future
opportunities. The appellate court stated:
Although the agreement admittedly does not deal in specif-
ics, neither law nor equity requires that every term and
condition be set forth in the contract .... In light of the fact
that neither defendant nor plaintiff could predict with any
degree of certainty the success of the Los Angeles opera-
tion, it is not surprising that Paragraph 9 was drafted
broadly enough to accommodate changing circumstances
and unforeseen developments. Because of [Morton's]
expertise, however, he was left with the discretion to formu-
late and structure the ownership for each venture so long as
he maintained the 20/80 ratio. That he believed himself
bound by the agreement needs little discussion. Suffice it to
say that the organizational structure and development of
[the Hard Rock Cafes for San Francisco and Houston] alone
evidence defendant's manifest intent to abide by the terms
of Paragraph 9.395
While the Okun court acknowledged that an "agreement to agree" is
to use and exploit the Hard Rock trademark prior to the execution of
the March agreement; (2) breached the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing by attempting to limit and/or exclude plaintiff from participating
in various business opportunities utilizing the Hard Rock name; (3)
breached the March agreement by withholding profit and management
fee distributions due plaintiff as an HRC shareholder and as a party to
the contract; and (4) tortiously breached the March agreement by deny-
ing in bad faith the existence of contractual terms giving plaintiff a right
to participate in ventures other than HRC and the Los Angeles restau-
rant.
Id. at 817, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 226.
393. Id at 816, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 226.
394. See id. at 818, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 228.
395. See id. at 818, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 228 (citing Burrow v. Timmsen, 223 Cal.
App. 2d 283, 288, 35 Cal. Rptr. 668, 671 (1963); King v. Stanley, 32 Cal. 2d 584,
588, 197 P.2d 321, 324 (1948)).
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usually unenforceable,96 the court very candidly acknowledged that
such a rule of construction ought to be tempered by considerations of
justice and equity. The court stated: "The defense of uncertainty has
validity only when the uncertainty or incompleteness of the contract
prevents the court from knowing what to enforce."3 At bottom,
"[if] the parties have concluded a transaction in which it ap-
pears that they intend to make a contract, the court should
not frustrate their intention if it is possible to reach a fair
and just result, even though this requires a choice among
conflicting meanings and the filling of some gaps that the
parties have left.
398
Thus, the Okun court, rather remarkably, explicitly embraced
the idea that the court may properly fill gaps in contracts if the par-
ties clearly had the intent to contract and it is necessary to reach a
just and fair result. Concededly, the court reinforced its decision by
reasoning that the gaps or ambiguities in the agreement could be
clarified in light of extrinsic evidence at the time the contract was
made and in light of the parties' conduct in performance of the con-
tract before the dispute arose." Ultimately, however, the appellate
396. See id. at 817, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 227. The court stated:
A contract which leaves an essential element for future agreement of the
parties is usually held totally uncertain and unenforceable .... Since ei-
ther party by the terms of the promise may refuse to agree to anything
to which the other party will agree, it is impossible for the law to affix
any obligation to such a promise.
Id. at 817, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 227 (quoting Ablett v. Clawson, 43 Cal. 2d 280, 272
P.2d 753 (1954)).
397. Id. (quoting Hennefer v. Butcher, 182 Cal. App. 3d 492, 500, 227 Cal.
Rptr. 318,322 (1986)).
39& Id. at 817, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 227 (quoting Hennefer at 500, 227 Cal. Rptr. at
322 and 1 CORBIN ON CONTRACrS § 95 (1952)).
399. See id. at 817, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 227. The court stated:
[W]e are of the view that the provisions of Paragraph 9 which defendant
characterizes as fatally uncertain, are either sufficiently certain on their
face, or were made sufficiently certain by the introduction of extrinsic
evidence at trial .... Considered as a whole, the foregoing terms were
sufficient to establish from the outset the ways in which future ventures
were to be financed, owned, and operated by the parties. The funda-
mental structure of all such undertakings was to [be based on the 20/80
ratio established for the creation of the L.A. Hard Rock. This essential
term effectively defined the extent of the parties' capital contributions
and their right to participate in all manner of future investment schemes
commensurate with their ownership interest in [the Los Angeles Hard
Rock Cafe general partnership].
Id. at 817-18, 250 Cal. Rptr. 227-28.
With regard to conduct in performance of the contract, the court stated:
Here, the conduct of the parties subsequent to the execution of the 1982
agreement and before any controversy had arisen, is persuasive evidence
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court relied on its sense of a "just result" in finding the contract suf-
ficiently definite to uphold the trial court's decree of specific per-
formance, despite the lack of clear and comprehensive terms in the
written contract.4m In deciding what a fair result would be, the court
undoubtedly considered the misconduct by Morton, the harsh effect
on Okun if it held the contract unenforceable, and the disappoint-
ment of Okun's expectation under the contract. A similar, but less
candid, outcome is found in the California Supreme Court's decision
in City of Manhattan Beach v. Superior Court.
B. City of Manhattan Beach v. Superior Court'
The California Supreme Court had occasion to apply its rules of
interpretation in the recent case of City of Manhattan Beach, which
involved a deed conveying an interest in land to a railroad com-
pany.4 As highlighted in the introduction to this Article, the heirs
in determining the meaning of Paragraph 9 .... Between the formation
of [the San Francisco Hard Rock Cafe] in 1983 and the Chicago offering
in 1985, both defendant and plaintiff acted in strict accord with the pro-
visions of the contract. This is not to say that they did not dispute the
extent of their responsibilities under Paragraph 9, they did. But regard-
less of those disagreements, defendant continued to offer to plaintiff the
opportunity to become a 20% participant in all ventures utilizing the
Hard Rock name. Plaintiff, in turn, agreed to contribute 20% of the
capital requirements of those operations.
Id. at 819, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 228 (citations omitted).
400. The appellate court did reverse the trial court on the award of $200,000 in
punitive damages for bad faith denial of contract. The reversal was based on the
reasoning that the bad faith denial action founded on Seamans requires the exis-
tence of a type of special or fiduciary relationship between the parties, and the
court concluded that the relationship was not that "special." See Okun, 203 Cal.
App. 3d at 825-27, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 233-34. Similarly, the appellate court also
reversed the trial court's finding of fraud and its award of approximately $75,000
on that basis because Okun did not prove that he detrimentally relied on the mis-
representations that were made by Morton concerning his right to exploit the
Hard Rock name. See id. at 827-28, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 234-35.
401. 13 Cal. 4th 232, 914 P.2d 160,52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 82 (1996).
402. The Redondo Land Company ("Land Company") executed the deed in
favor of Redondo Beach Railway Company ("Railway"). As quoted by the
court, it read in relevant part:
Witnesseth: That said parties of the First part [Land Company
and Charles Silenti for and in consideration of the sum of One Dollar to
them in hand paid by said party of the Second part [Railway], the re-
ceipt of whichis hereby acknowledged do by these presents remise, re-
lease and quit-claim unto said party of the second part the right of way
for the construction, maintenance and operation of a Steam Railroad,
upon over and along the following tract and parcel of land ....
This Grant is made upon condition that the side-track now con-
structed upon said right of way shall be maintained and shall be used as
a Station to receive and discharge freight; that such convenient cross-
ings, not less than four, shall be made and maintained, with sufficient
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of the parties who granted the interest to the railroad company ar-
gued that the conveyance gave only an easement to the railroad com-
pany with conditions attached. Therefore, they argued that the
easement was terminated under the conveyance's terms due to the
cessation of the railroad operation." The defendants took the posi-
tion that the grant was in fee simple, that the railway continued its
ownership despite the discontinuance of rail services, and that it had
the ability to convey title to the city. 5
In a dazzling display of point and counterpoint, the majority and
the dissent demonstrated that almost every aspect of the document,
as well as the extrinsic evidence, could be turned to support opposing
meanings of the contract. In doing so, the judges considered the
possibility of the contract having a plain meaning, the import of ex-
trinsic evidence, and the use of applicable maxims or interpretive
principles to resolve the dispute.406
The majority first addressed the express terms and observed that
the deed used the language "remise, release and quit-claim" to de-
scribe the conveyance to the railway, that those operative words are
commonly used in simple quit-claim deeds, and that quit-claim deeds
usually transfer whatever present right or interest the grantor has in
the property.' Thus, the majority observed that the court had often
decided "that a quitclaim deed conveys the absolute fee-simple title if
the party executing it had such title"--as did the grantor in this
case-and that the use of such language was not consistent with an
cattle guards, at such point on said right of way, as may be necessary for
the full use and enjoyment of the lands adjoining said right of way, and
so as to give access to and from the lands on either side thereof; that
such culverts shall be constructed and maintained as may be necessary
for the free passage of water across the same, and so located that the
lands adjacent to said right of way will not be flooded on account of the
roadbed of said railroad forming an embankment, and upon failure to
comply with said conditions, or any of them, said right of way to revert
to said parties of the first part and their successors in interest.
To have and to hold all and singular the rights aforesaid unto said
party of the second part and its assigns and successors forever, subject
owever to and upon the terms and conditions aforesaid.
Id. at 250-51, 914 P.2d at 172-73, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 94-95 (Mosk, J., concurring
and dissenting).
403. See supra notes 7-30 and accompanying text.
404. See City of Manhattan Beach, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 85-86.
405. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
406. See City of Manhattan Beach, 13 Cal. 4th 232, 914 P.2d 160, 52 Cal. Rptr.
2d 82.
407. Id. at 239, 914 P.2d at 165, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 87.
408. Id. at 239, 914 P.2d at 165,52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 87 (citation omitted).
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intent to convey only an easement.' Thus, certain aspects of the ex-
press terms supported the finding that full title was transferred.
At the same time, however, the majority observed several times
that the deed used the term "right of way," a phrase that is usually
construed to grant only an easement even if the terms of the deed
otherwise might seem to convey a fee simple.r1 Then again, however,
the majority pointed out that the term "right of way" is often used to
describe both the interest in the land and the strip of land itself upon
which the railroad would run.4 ' Thus, the majority concluded that
the express terms of the document left unresolved the question of the
interest granted.
After noting that the applicable maxims of interpretation tended
to lean toward the reading of the deed as granting a fee simple,"2 the
majority nevertheless deemed those rules not dispositive and contin-
ued to construe the deed. The majority considered whether the
purpose of the conveyance would illuminate the meaning of the deed
but once again found the factor ambiguous. On the one hand the
majority seemingly acknowledged that a conveyance for the purpose
of operating a railroad tended to support the granting of an ease-
ment. On the other hand, however, the court noted that the mere
indication of a purpose for the conveyance would not prevent the
finding of a fee, especially if the purpose was for the benefit of the
general public and not specifically for the benefit of the grantors.413
The majority also stated the phrasing that the railroad was to operate
409. See id. at 239-40, 914 P.2d at 165-66, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 87-88.
410. See id. at 240-41, 914 P.2d at 165-66,52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 87-88.
411. See id.
412. The maxims of interpretation have been codified in California. The ma-
jority cited section 1105 of the California Civil Code, which provides that the law
presumes "[a] fee simple title is ... intended to pass by a grant of real property,
unless it appears from the grant that a lesser estate was intended." Id. at 242, 914
P.2d at 167, 52 Cal. Rptr. at 89. (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 1105). While the ma-
jority observed that Civil Code section 801 classifies a "right-of-way" as an ease-
ment and therefore tends to support finding an easement, other statutory provi-
sions supported the finding of a fee: Civil Code section 1070 states that if
different parts of a contract are absolutely irreconcilable, "the former part pre-
vails;" Civil Code section 1067 would favor "quit claim" as being more definite in
meaning than "right-of-way" because of the latter term's dual meaning; and Civil
Code section 1069 supports the maxim that an unclear modifying or limiting
clause in a deed would yield to a clause granting a fee interest, as well as a gen-
eral rule that doubtful clauses in the deed are to be construed most strongly
against the grantor. See id. at 242, 914 P.2d at 167, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 89 (citing
CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 801, 1067, 1069, 1070 (West 1982)).
413. See City of Manhattan Beach, 13 Cal. 4th at 243-44, 914 P.2d at 167-68, 52
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 89-90.
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"upon[,] over and along the following tract and parcel of land" and
"over and through the lands of the grantors" appeared "to limit the
railway to a right of passage and exclude title to the land beneath"
but that subsequent references to "a strip of land" in conjunction
with precise and technical designation of the location generally indi-
cated an intention to grant title in fee simple and not just a limited
right to pass over the property. 4 Continuing its progress through the
interpretive factors, the majority also observed that the fact that the
grantors reserved space for a warehouse would be inconsistent with
the grant of an easement only to the railway.45 Additionally, the
court found that the reference to the conveyed interest "rever[ting]"
to the grantor suggested a fee was given because an easement would
be "extinguished," whereas the grant of fee title would lead to
"reversion" if returned upon the occurrence of some condition. 6
The majority also recognized that the nominal consideration of $1.00
suggested the transfer of only an easement. The court noted that
nowhere in the conveyance was the word "easement" used, thereby
suggesting that a fee simple grant was intended, 7 but neither did the
deed use the term "fee," which would have also clarified the interest
being conveyed.4 8 The majority then concluded that:
Having canvassed the four comers of the deed, we end our
search frustratingly little more informed of the parties' inten-
tion than we began. Judging by the terms "remise, release and
quit-claim" and "right of way," the grantor appears to have in-
tended at one and the same time to convey to the railway the
entire fee estate and a limited interest confined to an easement
for railroad purposes. The remainder of the language is
414. Id. at 244, 914 P.2d at 168, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 90.
415. See id.
416. Id.
417. See id. at 245, 914 P.2d at 169, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 91.'In construing the instrument we cannot overlook the fact that if the
grantors really intended to convey only an easement, they could have
easily so expressed that purpose .... Their failure to do so must be
considered together with the presumption that a fee simple title passed
(Civ. Code, § 1105) and the rule that a grant is to be interpreted in favor
of the grantee. (Cal. Civ. Code § 1069)?
l (quoting Basin Oil Co. v. City of Inglewood, 125 Cal. App. 2d 661, 666, 271
P.2d 73, 77 (1954)).
418. See id. The majority also noted a good number of additional, conflicting
signals. For example, the signature of the mortgage holder suggested that all
rights and title were being conveyed to the railway and that the mortgagee was
implicitly agreeing to forebear further enforcement of his mortgage interest. See
id. at 239 n.5 & 245, 914 P.2d at 165 n.5 & 169,52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 87 n.5 & 91.
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equally ambiguous, both supporting and contradicting one or
the other conclusion. We thus turn to extrinsic evidence in the
hope of enlightenment
4 19
Based on the general principle that a deed or any other contract
may have ambiguities resolved by the conduct of the parties, the
court cited Pacific Gas for the proposition that extrinsic evidence is
admissible when offered to prove a meaning of a contract to which
the language is reasonably susceptible.'° - The majority then identi-
fied the extrinsic evidence as including the fact that the grantor exe-
cuted a number of subsequent documents that indicated the grantors
deemed the railway to have taken a fee interest.421 More significantly,
the Land Company instituted an action in 1901 to quiet title as part of
its process of divesting its holdings and in that action excepted the
"land" conveyed to the railway by the 1888 deed. The majority found
this evidence-that the Land Company no longer considered itself to
have any interest in the railway's property-to be "virtually incon-
trovertible evidence the grantor intended the 1888 deed to convey
the property to the railway in fee simple."4' Further, when the Land
Company dissolved as a corporation, the decree of dissolution indi-
cated that all property had been disposed. The continued holding of
title to the railway property with only the grant of an easement to the
railway was something the majority labeled as "at least implausible"
if not unreasonable.4'
Perhaps revealing an unspoken pursuit of a just result, the major-
ity also noted the very significant role that the railway played in
making the Manhattan Beach area accessible, and therefore market-
able, and asserted that conveyance of full title to the railway would
have been consistent given the value received in return by the grantor.424
419. Id. at 245-46, 914 P.2d at 169, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 91.
420. See id. at 246, 914 P.2d at 169,52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 91.
421. In 1897 the Land Company and the railway's successor entered into an
unrecorded indenture with a third party that modified the reversionary condi-
tions of railroad operations and that referred to the 1888 conveyance by stating
that the earlier "deed shall remain a grant as therein expressed." Id., 914 P.2d at
170, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 92. Additionally, in 1896 the Land Company began di-
vesting itself of its holdings by partition and excluded from all transactions the
"right-of-way... granted" to the railway as well as parcels of land deeded to
other third parties, an exception that would not have been necessary if the Land
Company had conveyed only an easement to the railway that would simply have
passed as an easement upon the transferred property. Id. at 246-47, 914 P.2d at
170, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 92.
422. Id. at 247, 914 P.2d at 170, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 92.
423. Id.
424. See id. at 248, 914 P.2d at 171, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 93.
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The majority rather summarily rejected extrinsic evidence offered by
the heirs to support their position that only an easement was given."
The majority ultimately concluded that the document was ambigu-
ous. Accordingly, their reliance on extrinsic evidence was proper,
and the extrinsic evidence rather conclusively proved that the gran-
tors transferred a fee simple interest to the railway."
As noted in the introduction to this Article, the dissenting jus-
tices presented a counterpoint for almost every one of the majority's
arguments.4 7 Justice Mosk, in his dissenting opinion, indicated a
particular inclination to stay within "the four corners of the instru-
ment" in the case of a recorded deed.4' Justice Mosk also noted a re-
corded deed provides public notice to third parties as to the interest
conveyed and therefore engenders public reliance on its facial
425. The subsequent conduct included: 1) an 1896 deed executed by the Land
Company which conveyed property to Duncan Blanton that, according to de-
scription, included a middle portion of the strip previously deeded to the railway;
2) failure of a partition map made during dissolution to include the railway prop-
erty; and 3) the representations that the railway only owned an easement made
during property tax assessment litigation in 1954 and Interstate Commerce
Commission abandonment hearings in 1982. See id. at 248-50, 914 P.2d at 171-72,
52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 93-94.
426. Justice Arabian concluded in this fashion:
As should be clear from the discussion, we do not find the instant deed a
paradigm conveyance but rather to the contrary, requiring us to ferret
out the parties' intentions by less direct and less preferable considera-
tions. In reaching our conclusion, we emphasize that the peculiar facts
of this case dictate the narrow, perhaps unique, basis of our holding.
Further, we reaffirm the importance o careful drafting to insure prop-
erty transactions consistent with the parties intended and desired result.
The court's only function and concern should be to effectuate their
manifest intent; for, as we have reiterated, that must control.
Id. at 250, 914 P.2d at 172, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 94 (citation omitted).
427. Justice Mosk wrote the principal dissent in which he was effectively
joined by Justices Kennard and Werdegar. See id. at 267-68, 914 P.2d at 183-84,
52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 105-06 (Kennard, J., dissenting). Justice Mosk provided the
counter argument that the deed conveyed only an easement and not the grant of
a fee simple interest to the railway. See id. at 258, 914 P.2d at 177, 52 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 99 (Mosk, J., concurring an dissenting). Although Justice Mosk labeled his
opinion as concurring and dissenting in an act of pique because he believed that
the majority agreed with the greater part of his analysis, he actually dissented in
full. See id. at 250, 914 P.2d at 172, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 94 (Mosk, J., concurring
and dissenting). Justice Kennard wrote a second dissent, joined by Justice Wer-
degar, in which she disagreed with Justice Mosk only on the question of whether
Santa Fe should be jointly liable with the City of Manhattan Beach to the heirs
for inverse condemnation. See id. at 52 (Kennard, J., dissenting). Justices Ken-
nard and Werdegar believed that the trial court had correctly ruled that Santa Fe
should be jointly liable. See id. (Kennard, J., dissenting).
428. Id. at 252-53, 914 P.2d 173-74, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 95-96 (Mosk, J., concur-
ring and dissenting).
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meaning.
42 9
Having asserted that the court should look primarily within the
language of the document to determine what interest was conveyed,
Justice Mosk then argued that the granting language clearly conveyed a
mere easement and there was no need to resort to extrinsic 
evidence.30
Justice Mosk's "plain meaning" argument rested almost entirely on the
idea that the granting of a "right of way" to build a railroad would have
been universally understood in 1888 to convey only an easement.
43'
Justice Mosk further buttressed his conclusion that only an easement
was conveyed by noting that the document did not use language clearly
signaling a transfer of a fee simple interest02 and by recognizing that
the indication within the deed that the right-of-way was to be used for
the purpose of operating a railroad would be generally expected to
convey only an easement unless a contrary intent was revealed!.
Justice Mosk observed that the majority actually agreed that the
use of the term "right of way" supported the conclusion that a mere
easement was granted and proceeded to point out that the majority
went astray by placing too much emphasis upon other language in the
deed. 4  While the majority had concluded that the grantor's use of
429. See id. at 253, 914 P.2d at 174, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 96. (Mosk, J., concurring
and dissenting).
430. See id. at 253, 914 P.2d at 174, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 96 (Mosk, J., concurring
and dissenting).
431. See id. at 250-55, 914 P.2d at 172-75, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 94-97 (Mosk, J.,
concurring and dissenting). Justice Mosk wrote:
The foregoing language gave the railroad a servitude on land... rather
than an estate in it .... It was universally understood at the time that
such language conveyed only a right-of-way-i.e., an easement .... As
the majority s analysis may fairly be read to acknowledge, a conveyance
of a "right of way" .over" the grantor's land is a conveyance of an
easement. This must be so, because the language shows that the landcomp.any conveyed an appurtenant use to the railroad. (Civ. Code, §
801) ["nght[s]-of-way" ".may be attached to other land as incidents or
appurtenances, and are then called easements"] ... Hence[,] the undevi-
ating body of California law explaining that language of tis type con-
veys an easement.
Id. at 253-54, 914 P.2d at 174-75, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 96-97 (Mosk, J., concurring
and dissenting) (citations omitted).
432. Justice Mosk wrote: "The 1888 deed's unvarying and repeated use of the
term 'right of way' without reference to a conveyance of 'land' or 'title' is simply
fatal to any conclusion that fee title was conveyed .... It is different, of course,
when 'land' or a 'parcel' is conveyed." City of Manhattan Beach, 13 Cal. 4th at
255, 914 P.2d at 175, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 97 (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
433. See id. at 256, 914 P.2d at 176, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 98 (Mosk, J., concurring
and dissenting).
434. See id. at 256-57, 914 P.2d at 176, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 98 (Mosk, J., concur-
ring and dissenting).
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the term quit-claim tended to show the grant of a fee simple estate if
the grantor has such an interest to convey, Justice Mosk responded
by noting that a party can quit-claim any interest in property, includ-
ing an easement, citing cases from other states." Revealing a weak-
ness in this argument, Justice Mosk acknowledged that California
decisions tended to treat a "quit-claim" deed as conveying a fee sim-
ple interest if the grantor had such title because the quit-claim gives
whatever the interest the grantor may have.46 Nevertheless, Justice
Mosk asserted, however weakly, that the case at hand was different
because "the face of the deed shows unequivocally that only a right-
of-way was conveyed." 4  Although Justice Mosk presented his ar-
gument with great vigor, he essentially recognized that the express
terms gave conflicting signals as to the interest in land conveyed by
the deed. Application of a plain meaning approach to the case is very
dubious in light of this fact.
Moreover, Justice Mosk acknowledged that in saving the space
for the warehouse "it was inartful drafting to both 'reserve' and
'except' some land from the right-of-way" because the reservation
term implied the grant of a fee interest with a lesser interest being
kept by the grantor, but he dismissed the argument as simply reflect-
ing the use of loose language.38 Similarly, Justice Mosk recognized
435. See id. at 257, 914 P.2d at 176-77, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 98 (Mosk, J., concur-
ring and dissenting).
436. Justice Mosk wrote:
If "it has been often decided by this court that a quitclaim deed conveys
the absolute fee-simple title if the party executing it had such title"
(Spaulding v. Bradley (1889) 79 Cal. 449, 456, 22 P. 47), that is likely so
because the grantor wished to eliminate his or her entire estate or inter-
est, whatever it might be, without "mak[ing any] assurance to the
grantee that he or she actually has good title to, or even any interest at
all in the property ...." (6A Powell on Real Property (1995 ed.) P.89/l)/Lb], p. 8 A-29.)
Id. at 257, 914 P.2d at 177, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 99 (Mosk, J., concurring and dis-
senting).
437. Id. (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting) (emphasis added). Similarly,
Justice Mosk asserted that the majority "makes too much of" the fact that the
deed refers to "a strip of land" as supporting the likely grant of a fee interest, re-
sponding rather persuasively that any "right of way is a strip of land" and that the
use of the word "land" was inconsequential. Id. (Mosk, J., concurring and dis-
senting). Justice Mosk further argued that the fact that relevant property con-
sisted of a strip of land only 100 feet wide and two to three miles long meant that
conveyance of a fee title would have been impractical and thus supports the con-
clusion that only an easement was conveyed. See id. at 261, 914 P.2d at 179, 54
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 101 (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
438. Id. at 254, 914 P.2d at 178, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 100 (Mosk, J., concurring
and dissenting).
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that the use of the term "revert" also implied the grant of a fee inter-
est but again asserted that the inaccurate use of the term "revert" was
widespread in railway conveyances.439 Justice Mosk dismissed the
lack of inclusion in the deed of the term "easement" because he con-
sidered the term "right-of-way" to be more precise.' ° These implicit
concessions by Justice Mosk further undermine his plain meaning
reading of the contract.
Ultimately, the dissenting opinion took the strong position that
the deed was unambiguous, despite its recognition that some terms
were misused and that "quit-claim" usually meant conveyance of a
fee title if the grantor possessed it. The dissent took this position be-
cause it did not want to consider the extrinsic evidence. Justice Mosk
made this point clear at the beginning of his discussion of the extrin-
sic evidence by starting with a criticism of Pacific Gas." Justice
Mosk cited both Judge Kozinski's criticism of Pacific Gas in Trident
Center v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Co. 2 and his own criti-
cism in an earlier dissent. 3 Both criticisms argue that resorting to
extrinsic evidence too quickly creates unreliability in a document's
written terms."' Justice Mosk asserted that this uncertainty was all
the more objectionable in the case of a deed, which serves a public
notice function, as compared to other more private contracts such
as the one at issue in Pacific Gas.445 Thus, Justice Mosk stated a
preference for an objective reading of the document, even if extrinsic
evidence would show a different intent on the part of the parties. On
the other hand, even Justice Mosk would agree that if the deed or
other contract is ambiguous, then it is proper to resort to extrinsic
evidence.4" Thus, Justice Mosk found it necessary to address the
439. See id. at 260, 914 P.2d at 178-79, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 100-01 (Mosk, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
440. See id., 914 P.2d at 179, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 100 (Mosk, J., concurring and
dissenting).
441. See id. at 252, 914 P.2d at 173, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 95 (Mosk, J., concurring
and dissenting).
442. 847 F.2d 564,569 (9th Cir. 1988). See supra note 429.
443. See City of Manhattan Beach, 13 Cal. 4th at 261-62, 914 P.2d at 180-81, 52
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 101-02 (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting) (citing Delta Dy-
namics, Inc. v. Arioto, 69 Cal. 2d 525, 531, 446 P.2d 785, 789, 72 Cal. Rptr. 785,
789 (1968) (Mosk, J., dissenting)).
444. See City of Manhattan Beach, 13 Cal. 4th at 253, 914 P.2d at 174, 52 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 96 (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting); Trident Ctr. v. Connecticut
Gen. Life Ins. Co., 897 F.2d 564,568-69 (9th Cir. 1988).
445. See id at 262, 914 P.2d at 180, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 102 (Mosk, J., concur-
ring and dissenting).
446. See id.
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extrinsic evidence considered by the majority and by the trial court.
Examining the extrinsic evidence, Justice Mosk thought it rele-
vant that some seven to eight years after the deed was executed to
the Railway, the Land Company executed deeds in favor of a third
party that more clearly conveyed a fee simple interest: 47 In addition,
part of the land deeded away included a portion of the Railway's
right-of-way." Justice Mosk conceded to the majority that the ex-
clusion of the land grant to the Railway from a 1901 action to quiet
title to all the Land Company's property supported the conclusion
that the Land Company deemed itself to no longer have an interest in
the land."9 On the other hand, Justice Mosk correctly pointed out
that a judgment entered in the 1901 case that excepted "those certain
parcels of land heretofore granted" to a third party and "that certain
right of way heretofore granted" to the railroad and thus the judg-
ment suggested a difference between the fee simple interest conveyed
to the third party and the interest conveyed to the railroad."
Justice Mosk also took an evasive and overly technical approach
to the 1903 decree of the Land Company's dissolution, which stated
in part:
And it appearing further that all of the property of said cor-
poration has been disposed of and that all of the business of
said corporation has come to an end [Para] Now therefore it
is ordered and adjudged that the said corporation, The
Redondo Land Company, be, and the same is hereby dis-
solved, and its corporate existence ended .... 41
While the majority found this decree to be a very strong indication
that the Land Company had no further interest in the railway prop-
erty,452 Justice Mosk was adamant that the appellate court should not
have taken judicial notice of the decree because the parties stipulated
at trial not to introduce new evidence after the trial ended.453 The
447. See id. at 262-63, 941 P.2d at 180, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 102 (Mosk, J., con-
curring and dissenting).
448. See id. at 261-62,- 941 P.2d at 180, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 102 (Mosk, J., con-
curring and dissenting).
449. See id. at 263, 941 P.2d at 181, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 103 (Mosk, J., concur-
ring and dissenting).
450. Id. at 264, 941 P.2d at 181, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 103 (Mosk, J., concurring
and dissenting). Justice Mosk noted that the evidence considered was not the
original document but merely a transcription and he questioned whether the evi-
dence was competent at all. See id. (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
451. Id. (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
452. See id at 247, 914 P.2d at 170, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 92.
453. See id. at 264, 914 P.2d at 181, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 103 (Mosk, J., concur-
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decree came to the parties' attention after the trial concluded and
while the case was pending before the appellate court." Rather than
address the substantial argument that the decree, from which the
railway property had been excepted, a'5 reflected a view by the Land
Company that the property had been conveyed permanently in fee
simple, Justice Mosk simply decided that it was improperly admit-
ted.45 6 Again, this approach reflected Justice Mosk's position that it is
better to go with the apparent meaning of the written document
rather than look to extrinsic evidence for a more accurate picture of
the parties' intent. Justice Mosk embraced this position despite the
fundamental guiding principle of contract interpretation: to ascertain
the intent of the parties.
Ultimately, the words of conveyance in the deed at the heart of
City of Manhattan Beach tended to favor creation of an easement but
failed to do so in a clear fashion, therefore leaving room for the rea-
sonable argument that a greater interest was intended to be con-
veyed. With this predicate for its consideration, the extrinsic evi-
dence strongly, but not irrefutably, indicated that the grantors, at
least at later times, treated the conveyance to the railway as a fee
simple. The parties clearly held concerns about the initial operation
of the railway because of the express reversion provisions covering
short term issues but almost certainly did not consider cessation of
rail services one hundred years later. The greatest likelihood is that
at the time of the original grant, the parties simply did not see the
cessation of rail services as a likely event in the distant future.
If the case is one in which the parties may have had an intent at
the time of the deed's execution, but after one hundred years it is
simply indecipherable or, more likely, one in which the parties failed
to address the particular turn of events as a realistic possibility, what
is a court to do? It is in this very situation that the court may appro-
priately fill the gap in the contract by resorting to its "sense of jus-
tice." The question asked by Justice Kennard, probably as a rhetori-
cal matter, suggests a reasonable aid in interpreting such a contract.45
ring and dissenting).
454. The appellate court agreed to take judicial notice of the contents of the
decree, but concluded that it was of "marginal" significance. Id. at 264-65, 941
P.2d at 181-82, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 103-04 (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
455. See id.
456. See id.
457. See id. at 252-54, 941 P.2d at 181, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 95-96 (Mosk, J., con-
curring and dissenting).
458. See id. at 267-68, 914 P.2d at 183-84, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 105-06 (Mosk, J.,
concurring and dissenting)..
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Where neither the writing, the context, nor the extrinsic evidence re-
veals a relatively clear, objectively discernible intent jointly held by
the parties, the court should consider the equities and do what is in
the interest of justice.
The City of Manhattan Beach presents a unique opportunity to
get a sense of the court's perception of the equities of the case due to
a published account of the oral arguments before the supreme
court.45 9 That account reflects rather clearly that the majority, by de-
ciding in favor of the city, was concerned about opportunistic if not
unethical behavior on the part of the plaintiff heirs and their heir
hunter sponsors.4" The majority must also have been keenly aware
that a decision against the city could result in the imposition of mil-
lions of dollars of liability in favor of the plaintiffs, whose interest in
the property in question was remote in every sense.46' Moreover, the
original developers had obtained what they wanted from the Railway
and its successors.42 The property in the Manhattan Beach area had
been made accessible, and therefore much more valuable, during its
developmental period.
The dissent, on the other hand, was willing to ignore the equities
in favor of a more neutral search for the mechanical determination of
title.43 Counsel for the heirs and heir hunters argued that the case
was about title, not virtue.4'
459. See Graham, supra note 1, at 1.
460. Justice Armand Arabian (retired from the California Supreme Court, but
sitting by designation), who would later write the majority decision favoring the
city, asked the city attorney: "This doesn't come from a grieving widow some-
place, this comes from an heir-hunting operation .... At common law we called
it barratry-stirring up strife and litigation. Is that how this case gets here?"
Graham, supra note 1, at 1.
461. "According to the city, the heirs have claimed the property is worth as
much as $100 million." Kowsky, supra note 8, at B3.
462 See id.
463. In response to Justice Arabian's suggestion that the law suit had arisen
due to questionable instigation by the heir hunters, Michael M. Berger, the city's
attorney, described the case as "created, concocted and stirred up" improperly.
However, "Justice Kathryn Mickle Werdegar politely interrupted Berger to tell
him, 'I don't see what impact this has."' Graham, supra note 1, at 1.
464. The "heir hunters" were John Percival Farquhar and Ricardo B. Johnson
who reportedly were descendants of land barons who first owned much of the
land in the western side of Los Angeles County. See Rainey, supra note 11, at 6.
The heir hunters initiated a number of similar actions to the one that spawned
City of Manhattan Beach v. Superior Court, reportedly generating hundreds of
thousands of dollars in recoveries for the found heirs. See id. The other cases
involved a challenge to ownership of property upon which the Santa Monica
Courthouse is located, a parcel of property pruchased from a railway by the city
of West Hollywood, a challenge to a sale of land in Brentwood by the federal
January 1998] CONTRACT INTERPRETATION IN CALIFORNIA 641
The dissenting justices were clearly influenced by that sort of
thinking.
C. Lee v. Walt Disney Co.465
Peggy Lee, a popular music recording artist, entered into a let-
ter agreement with the Walt Disney Company in October 1952 to
sing and record the spoken dialogue for an animated movie, Lady
and the Tramp. 6 The contract provided that Lee would be paid
$3500 for six days' work, plus $250 for each additional day.4" At the
time Lee executed the contract with Disney, she already had an ex-
clusive phonograph recording contract with Decca Records. 9 For
that reason, Lee's contract with Disney prevented Disney from
making phonograph recordings of Lee's performances. 40 At the
same time, the contract clearly aimed to grant Disney very broad
power to show the movie.
Thus, the contract provided, in part:
You [Lee] will be obligated to perform your services in the
recording on film (sound track) for reproduction and/or
transmission by any means or methods now known or which
may hereafter be devised or developed ....
The said rights to reproduce and transmit shall include, but
shall not be limited to, motion pictures produced or exhibited
government to a developer, and a challenge to a land transfer from a railway to
the city of Hermosa Beach. See id.
465. No. B058897 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 1992) (unpublished opinion), cert.
denied, 1992 Cal. LEXIS 6172 (Dec. 16, 1992).
466. Peggy Lee's career blossomed in 1941 when famed Big Band leader
Benny Goodman heard her sing over the airwaves and asked her to sing with
him. Throughout the 40s and 50s, Lee enjoyed great popularity for her jazz styl-
ings. Two songs, Is That All There Is? and Fever, are among her most popular
hits. See Howard Reich, Peggy Lee: A Marvelous Merging of Life and Lyric,
Cm. TRIB., July 25, 1993, Arts, at 8.
467. See Lee, No. B058897, slip op. at 7. Lee and Joseph F. "Sonny" Burke
had previously entered into an initial contract with Disney to write songs for the
same movie. See id. The songwriting contract was not implicated in the lawsuit.
Lee eventually provided voices for four characters in the movie and sang three of
the five songs that she co-wrote. See id. at 15.
468. See id. at 7. Lee also received small amounts of pay for promoting "Lady
and the Tramp" at other times, including total payment of $500 at the time
Disney initially released the movie and on its re-release, and a $500 honorarium
for promotional work when Disney released the movie on videocassette. See id.
at 14-16.
469. See id. at 9. Lee's contract of April 2, 1952, gave Decca Records the
rights to Lee's "exclusive personal services in connection with the production of
phonograph records" for one year. Id.
470. See id. at 34.
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with and/or accompanied by sound and/or voice recording,
reproducing and/or transmitting devices, radio devices,
television and all other improvements and devices which are
now or which hereafter may be used in connection with the
production, exhibition and/or transmission of any present or
future kind of motion picture productions. 1
While the foregoing portion seemingly granted Disney very broad
powers, the contract also provided protection for Lee from Disney's
releasing of musical recordings:
Anything herein to the contrary notwithstanding, it is
agreed that nothing in this agreement contained shall be
construed as granting to us the right to make phonograph
recordings and/or transcriptions for sale to the public,
wherein the results or proceeds of your services are used.4'
Although the parties drew a rather clear line between Disney's
ability to engage in public showings of the movie and its inability to
sell phonograph recordings for private listening,473 the parties could
not have foreseen at the time the potential for home viewing of
movies through the medium of video cassettes and the immense
profits that Disney would eventually draw from such sales. Lady and
the Tramp was released on videocassette in October 198744 for a lim-
ited period of eight months and generated profits in the amount of
$46 million.475 Indeed, a number of Disney contracts with artists who
performed in its animated films have been subject to challenges on
the question of sharing profits with actors or similar parties. Such
films include Fantasia,476 Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs,4' Sleeping
471. Id. at 7 (emphasis omitted).
472. Id at 9 (emphasis omitted). The appellate court noted:
When Lee was given a copy of the October 20, 1952 agreement to re-
view before signing it, she expressed concern over the rights she was
being asked to convey to Disney. In response, she was told she was re-
serving important rights for herself, and the language of paragraph 12(b)
was pointed out for her. She stated: "I then read the Ianguage, which
states in clear English that Disney must obtain my permission before it
can sell copies of the movie or any part thereof to the public. I was
granting Disney the rights that it required to exploit the movie in thea-
tres andby television broadcast. I would be entitled to participate in the
profits derived from sales to the public."
d. at 16.
473. See id. at 7-9.
474. See id. at 20.
475. See id- at 10. Buena Vista Home Video, a Disney subsidiary and co-
defendant in the case acutally release the video. Gross receipts from the English
version were $72 million and net revenues exceeded $46 million. See id. at 20.
476. The release of Fantasia on video led to litigation against Disney in three
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Beauty,478 Pinocchio,47 9 and Cinderella.4° Other movie studios and
similar copyright holders have also experienced similar lawsuits in-
volving new technology uses of older materials.4'
When the parties filed opposing motions for summary judgment,
the trial court looked to the contract language to discern whether
Disney had the right to distribute the videocassettes without Lee's
permission.42 The trial court granted summary judgment for Lee,
finding as a matter of law that Disney breached the contract with Lee
by selling videocassettes of Lady and The Tramp to the public with-
out securing Lee's permission.' As a result, Lee was entitled to a
jury trial to determine damages.4m Subsequently, the jury awarded
Lee $3,830,000 damages on all four causes of action presented, but
the judge ultimately limited recovery to $2,305,000.4 Lee appealed
different actions. See Philadelphia Orchestra Ass'n v. Walt Disney Co., 821 F.
Supp. 341, 343 (1993) (lawsuit filed by Philadelphia Orchestra against Disney
seeking $60 million, or half of amount Disney profited from video sales on the
film Fantasia); Muller v. Walt Disney Co., 871 F. Supp. 678 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)
(Lawsuit filed by estate of Leopold Stokowski, conductor of the Philadelphia Or-
chestra, which performed in Fantasia, for share of profits from home video sales);
Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers v. Walt Disney Co., 934 F. Supp. 119
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (challenge to Disney's right to use Igor Stravinsky composition
in video release of Fantasia).
477. See Michael Blowen, Say it Ain't So, Moe, BOSTON GLOBE, July 7, 1993,
at 50. Adriana Caselotti, the voice of the Snow White character, originally
earned $970 in 1937. At the time the dispute arose, she was 77 years old and did
not wish to be dragged through a long court ordeal. She requested a settlement
with Disney. See id.
478. See Disney Settles with Singer in 'Sleeping Beauty' Claim, WALL ST. J.,
June 3, 1991, at B4. Mary Costa, the voice of the Sleeping Beauty character, sued
Disney for $2 million after the movie's release on home video. The parties set-
tled out of court for an undisclosed amount. See id.
479. See Bourne Co. v. Walt Disney Co., 68 F.3d 621 (2d Cir. 1995), cert de-
nied, 116 S. Ct. 1890 (1996) (lawsuit challenging Disney's ability to use the com-
positions, including music from Pinocchio and Snow White in videos).
480. See Beth Kleid, Movies, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1990, Home ed., at F2
(Ilene Woods Shaughnessy, the voice of Cinderella, filed a $20 million lawsuit
claiming a right to share in profits from videocassette sales.).
481. See generally Barbara J. Shulman, Old Materials, New Issues: Licensing
for Interactive Media, 211 N.Y. L.J. 1, 4-5 (1994) (noting that technological inno-
vations such as home video and interactive video create new marketing options
for motion picture and record libraries, thereby raising the question of whether
the copyright holder has unfettered or only limited rights); Barbara D. Griff,
Note, A New Use for an Old License: Who Owns the Right?, 17 CARDOZO L.
REV. 53, 53 (1995) (noting history of new technology issues from invention of
"talkies" movies to present day multimedia formats).
482. See Lee, No. B058897, slip op. at 2-3.
483. See id.
484. See id.
485. See id. at 5-6. The jury awarded $2,305,000 for breach of contract,
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on the issue of damages and Disney appealed the decision on the
merits in favor of Lee.r
The appellate court identified as key to the case the interpreta-
tion of the term "transcriptions" as used in paragraph 12(b), which
prohibited Disney's sale of "transcriptions" to the public.' Disney
contended that "transcriptions" had a very "plain specific meaning,"
referring to a special purpose phonograph record used by radio sta-
tions primarily to play advertisements, prerecorded programs, or spot
announcements.* The court noted that a number of trade definition
sources supported this argument and that Disney's use of the term in
other contracts which suggested the limited meaning of transcrip-
tion.4s Disney also presented a number of declarations and affidavits
from relevant industry sources that transcriptions and electrical tran-
scriptions were used interchangeably during the early 1950s to refer
to the oversized phonograph records used primarily for radio broad-
casting. Disney had in fact offered a set of "transcriptions" to theater
owners for the purpose of promoting the movie Lady and the Tramp.
Finally, Disney also noted that its founder, Walt Disney, had em-
ployed a consistent practice of paying performers in his animated
films on a "flat fee" basis so that he would have absolute ownership
of the finished product, a practice which changed only when Disney
eventually accepted the Screen Actors Guild agreement which
provided for residuals for performers.'l
Lee argued, essentially, that the term "transcription" had a dif-
ferent plain meaning that covered "[a]ny form of recording or copy-
ing for sale to the public," including videocassettes.4 1' Lee argued
that the limited meaning that Disney wished to assign was covered by
the more specific term "electrical transcription" or "ET." The appel-
late court noted that in fact Disney did use the more precise term
"electrical transcriptions" in a number of contracts executed between
1952 and 1955.4u
Another forceful argument Lee raised, and the trial court relied
$500,000 on an unjust enrichment theory, $400,000 for unauthorized use of Lee's
name or voice in foreign sales, and $625,000 for unauthorized use of Lee's name
or voice in domestic sales. See id. The trial court ruled that all the awards were
for the same injury and limited Lee's recovery to the single largest award. See id.
486. See id. at 22-25.
487. See id. at 10.
48& See id. at 17-18.
489. See id. at 10-12.
490. See id. at 21.
491. Id. at 13.
492. See id. at 12-13.
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upon, was that Disney, in an earlier case, had argued that the term
"transcription" included video cassette recordings of movies."
3 In its
trial brief from the earlier case, Disney argued that its rights as copy-
right owner "[t]o make or procure the making of any transcription or
record" included making videocassettes and that those rights were
494
violated when another party made videotapes of its movies.
The appellate court began its analysis by noting that summary
judgment is a drastic procedure and is proper only if no question of
fact as to the issue is to be decided.4 5 The court went on to state
more specifically that summary judgment on an issue of contract in-
terpretation may be appropriate if there is no extrinsic evidence or
the extrinsic evidence is uncontradicted 6 The appellate court cited
a virtual litany of maxims or rules in aid of interpretation, including,
most importantly, that the contract should be interpreted in accor-
dance with the reasonable, objective-based understanding of the
promisee at the time the contract was made.4' The court also noted
that "[a]ny ambiguities in the agreement must be resolved in favor of
a fair and reasonable interpretation" and "[t]he agreement must be
interpreted to avoid an extraordinary, harsh, unjust or absurd re-
suit.
'498
493. See id. at 17.
494. See id. The case was Walt Disney Prods. v. Alaska Television Network,
310 F. Supp. 1073 (W.D. Wash. 1969). The court did not resolve this issue in the
course of its decision. See id- at 17.
495. See id. at 26-27.
496. See idU at 27. The court summarized by stating that "[i]n short, in the face
of an ambiguous contract and conflicting extrinsic evidence, summary adjudica-
tion is not appropriate." Id. at 28 (emphasis added).
497. See id. at 28-29. For example, the court cited section 1649 of the Califor-
nia Civil Code, noting:
If the language of the agreement is ambiguous or uncertain, i.e., it is rea-
sonably susceptible to more that one interpretation, it must be inter-
preted in the sense in which the promisor believed, at the time of mak-
ing it, that the promisee understood it.
However, this interpretation is made consistent with the objective
standard, i.e., how a reasonable promisor would have believed the
promisee understood the terms. The objective standard looks to words
and conduct, rather than undisclosed intentions.
Id. at 28-29. (citing CAL. CMv. CODE § 1649) (citations omitted). The court also
cited such maxims as words are to be understood in their ordinary and popular
sense, rather than their strict legal meaning, unless there a special meaning based
on a technical sense or usage of trade, see id. (citing CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1644,
1645); the contracting circumstances may be taken into account, see id. (citing
CAL. CIv. CODE § 1647); if the other the interpretive rules and the extrinsic evi-
dence cannot resolve the ambiguity, it is to be construed against the drafter. See
id. (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 1654).
49& Id. (citing Ecco-Phoenix Elec. Corp. v. Howard J. White, Inc., 1 Cal. 3d
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In assessing the propriety of the trial court's decision that video-
cassettes were transcriptions within the meaning of the contract and
therefore could not be sold without Lee's permission, the appellate
court first concluded that the term "transcription" has dual meanings
within the music and entertainment business: a general meaning of
any "copy" of a recorded item and a more specific meaning of a type
of "phonograph record" or "electrical recording."4  Based on the
arguments and evidence the parties presented, the appellate court
found it reasonable that either meaning may have been intended
specifically for the Disney-Lee contract.o° Thus, the appellate court
proceeded to examine which meaning should prevail in the case at
hand, looking first to the general contractual provisions but also tak-
ing into account extrinsic evidence consistent with the precedent in
Pacific Gas."'
On the one hand, the appellate court noted that interpreting the
term "transcriptions" in the contract to convey the term's more nar-
row, technical meaning of oversized discs or "electrical recordings for
use by radio stations" would fit reasonably and would not create any
conflict; Disney would be prohibited from selling electrical records,
but not video cassettes, to the public.50 The court noted Disney did
retain broad rights "to reproduce Lee's film performance by any
means known or developed in the future" and the narrow, technical
meaning would not "conflict with Disney's rights to reproduce the
motion picture. ' O' Under this view, Disney's retained rights would
then include the right to sell videocassettes and would be consistent
with the fact that Lee had an exclusive phonograph recording con-
tract with Decca Records.5 Disney's internal records reflected this
266 (1969)); Northridge Hosp. Found. v. Pic 'N' Save No. 9, Inc., 187 Cal. App.
3d 1088, 1095, 232 Cal. Rptr. 329, 333 (1986); Howe v. American Baptist Homes
of the West, Inc., 112 Cal. App. 3d 622,627 (1980).
499. See Lee, No. B058897, slip op. at 31-32.
500. See id. at 32.
501. See supra note 112.
502. Lee, No. B058897, slip op. at 33.
503. Id. at 33-34. The court cited California Civil Code sections 1641 and 1650
and quoted paragraph 11 from the contract:
Specifically, Disney sought to retain all rights to reproduce "motion
pictures produced or exhibited with and/or accompanied by sound
and/or voice recording, reproducing and/or transmitting devices, radio
devices, television and all other improvements and devices which are now
or which hereafter may be used in connection with the production, exhi-
bition and/or transmission of any present or future kind of motion picture
productions."
Ild.
504. See id. at 34.; see supra notes 468-69.
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understanding of the contract.-
In the counterbalance, the court noted several substantial argu-
ments for Lee's interpretation. First and foremost, if the term
"transcriptions" were given its technical meaning of oversized discs
or electric records made specifically for use in radio broadcasts, then
the provision concerning transcriptions it would have "no meaning,"
as the appellate court phrased it. Paragraph 12(b) referred to
"phonograph recordings and/or transcriptions for sale to the pub-
lic." ''  Since "transcriptions" in its more narrow, technical sense
would not involve sales to the public, that portion of the contract
would be self-contradictory and have no practical application. In-
deed, the term "transcriptions" would add nothing to Lee's rights un-
der paragraph 12(b) if the court accepted Disney's interpretation.
This observation was particularly significant for the court because of
the maxim of interpretation that "[a]n agreement should be inter-
preted to give effect to each of its parts."5"5
Secondly, Lee also pointed out that the more precise term of
"electrical transcriptions" was also used within the entertainment
business at the relevant time and the use of the more general term
"'transcriptions' alone in a contract might suggest to the parties that a
general rather than a technical meaning was intended."' Disney it-
self used the more precise term "electrical transcriptions" in other
contracts in the early 1950s.1 The appellate court noted that the fact
that Disney used both terms would support an inference that Disney
gave different meanings to each.5 The concurrent use of the term
"electrical transcription" also supported a reasonable understanding
on Lee's part as promisee that "transcriptions" had a broader mean-
ing, of which Disney as promisor should have been reasonably
505. See Lee, slip op. at 34. Disney, in a December 3, 1952, Talent Contract
Brief, interpreted the October 20, 1952, agreement with Lee to mean that it had
acquired all rights from Lee, with the sole exception of making phonograph rec-
ords or albums. See id. at 9. Disney released Lady and the Tramp in June 1955
and Decca Records produced a soundtrack sometime thereafter. See id.
506. Id. at 34-35.
507. Id. at 35.
508. Id. at 34 (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 1641). The appellate court reasoned
that while it was conceivable that the "electrical transcriptions" could have been
made in a smaller than normal diameter for potential sales to the public, there
was no evidence that this was ever done and therefore a promisee might not rea-
sonably believe that transcriptions was limited to its technical use. See id. at 34-
35.
509. Id. at 33.
510. See id. at 36.
511. See id.
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aware.
512
Lee's third and final argument relied on the fact that Disney had
interpreted the term "transcriptions" to include videocassettes in an
earlier lawsuit. 13 Disney had argued in its trial brief in that case, cit-
ing Webster's Third International Dictionary, that a transcription
meant "a tape, disc, or other recording made for broadcast or re-
broadcast of a radio or television program" and thus included video-
cassettes for home use. 14 The appellate court recognized that
Disney's argument in the 1969 copyright case about the meaning to
be assigned to federal copyright law would not be determinative of
the meaning to be assigned to the 1952 contract with Lee.55 The ar-
gument by Disney in the other case did show, however, that Disney
at that time interpreted the term "transcription" broadly enough to
include new technologies. 6
Faced with substantial arguments on both sides of the interpre-
tation debate, the appellate court ultimately held that the contract
provisions granting broad rights to Disney and reserving limited
rights to Lee were ambiguous and therefore should be construed
against the drafter.517 The court reasoned: "It is clear there is an ir-
reconcilable conflict in the extrinsic evidence; either one interpreta-
tion of 'transcriptions' or the other is correct. The rules governing
interpretation of contracts do not resolve the ambiguity in the
agreement. Therefore, the agreement must be construed against
Disney, as the drafter."5 8 Thus, the appellate court ruled that "the
agreement must be interpreted in favor of Lee and against Disney,
[and the] question properly was summarily adjudicated in favor of
Lee by the trial court." ' 9 The California Supreme Court denied
512. See id. at 36-37. Lee had executed a contract with Capitol Records in
1949 which made use of the more precise term "electrical transcriptions." The
court received evidence on the existence of "soundies," jukebox-like motion pic-
tures that involved synchronized sound recordings that existed at the time of the
Disney-Lee contract. Lee argued that the reproduction of soundies would have
violated her contracts, just as the video cassettes did. See id.
513. See id. at 37 (citing Walt Disney Prods. v. Alaska Television Network, 310
F. Supp. 1073 (W.D. Wash. 1969)).
514. Id. at 37.
515. See id.
516. See id.
517. See id. at 39-40.
518. Id. at 39 (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 1654); see also Ranier Credit Co. v.
Western Alliance Corp., 171 Cal. App. 3d 255, 263-64, 217 Cal. Rptr. 291, 295-96
(1985) (need parenthetical).
519. Id at 40.
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Disney's petition for review.Y
In reaching the decision that the contract did not give Disney the
right to sell the movies on videocassettes without Lee's approval, the
court varied from other decisions which have construed grants of
rights to the studios rather broadly."' While the court's decision in
Lee might possibly be distinguished on the facts, it may be better ex-
plained that the court-faced with a contract that did not contem-
plate a future development-merely sought to reach a just result.
The factors include Disney's corporate giant status and its reaping
substantial profits from the invention of home video players and the
resulting popularity of videocassettes. Indeed, children's videos have
proven to be exceptionally profitable because of children's tendency
to watch the same videos over and over again.' Despite a lack of
overwhelming financial success with the initial release of Lady and
the Tramp, Disney had already reaped profits from re-releases of the
films, concededly due in large part to shrewd planning by Disney.'
At the time of the lawsuit, Lee was at an advanced age and she had
received very minimal compensation for initially performing the
voices in the movie. In a situation where the parties have neither
contemplated a future development nor expressly provided for it in
the contract, the trial and appellate courts quite defensibly sought to
reach a just result. A decision requiring the sharing of the unantici-
pated profits would strike most people as just. Explicit recognition of
this basis for the decision would establish some precedent that would
more clearly guide future courts in similar cases.
IV. CONCLUSION
The process of contract interpretation has never been precise
because of the inherent difficulty that parties have in expressing
wishes for their contractual relations. 524 Parties may sometimes
520. See Lee v. Walt Disney Co., 1992 Cal. LEXIS 6172 (Dec. 16, 1992). Jus-
tice Baxter alone voted to grant the petition for review. See id.
521. See generally Shulman, supra note 481, at 1 (noting most of the cases with
a "future technologies" clause have held that the grant of rights was broad
enough to incorporate home video or grants the licensee the right to use the ma-
terials in any medium "now known or hereinafter invented"). Cf. Griff, supra
note 481, at 68-70 (noting that Second Circuit of Appeals tends to construe new
technology clauses in favor of broader rights to the movie company and Ninth
Circuit favors more narrow grant of rights).
522. See Lee, No. B058897, slip op. at 21.
523. See id. at 20.
524. See generally Kniffin, supra note 58, at 656 ("In a world where semantics
is a science instead of an art we might be able to read a contract and understand
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attach different meanings to the very same words or phrases, ignor-
ing the other party's understanding. Because of a strong desire to go
forward to with the transaction, parties may occasionally leave cer-
tain aspects of the contract open because of an inability to agree at
the time of formation. Unanticipated changes or technological de-
velopments over the long-term, or even shorter time spans, may re-
sult in circumstances that the parties did not contemplate. Further,
the passage of time alone may result in circumstances that the parties
did not contemplate when they executed the contract.
While recent California contract decisions embrace enlightened
approaches to issues of contract interpretation and the parol evidence
rule, even when working best, those normal rules of interpretation
fail to answer consistently the above interpretive dilemmas. In those
situations, the courts often attempt to stretch the common rules of in-
terpretation to resolve these situations. A tremendously better ap-
proach would be to simply recognize that, in such cases of lacunae
within the contract terms, the courts are empowered to weigh a num-
ber of equitable factors and attempt to reach a just result. Those eq-
uitable factors would include addressing public interests and public
good, allowing for sharing of unanticipated losses and gains, avoiding
the award of a windfall to one party at the cost of denying recovery to
the other side, and considering the parties' good or bad faith behav-
ior. These factors do align very well with the progressive, equitable
considerations adopted by the Restatement (Second). Only when
courts in jurisdictions such as California explicitly apply the "just re-
sult" principle will the law in this area be allowed to develop fully.
Justice Kennard effectively posed the question in the oral argu-
ments of the City of Manhattan Beach: Should the court merely
search for a mechanical application of rules to resolve the lack of
clarity in the contract or should the court consider equitable factors
that might lead to a just result when the express and implied terms in
fact fail to yield an answer to the disputed issue?5" While the major-
ity grounded its resolution in favor of the City of Manhattan Beach
on the rules of interpretation,5 the decision might have been more
honestly decided as favoring the public interest over the goals of heir
hunters and remote heirs with no direct interest in the property other
than seeking a windfall gain. In situations where the contract does
it without a question.").
525. See Graham, supra note 1, at 1.
526. See supra notes 401-464; 13 Cal. 4th 232, 253, 914 P.2d 160, 174, 52 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 82, 96 (1996) (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
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not provide an answer, the concerns of justice should certainly be
relevant to contract interpretation and construction.
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